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should be supported through Geo-ICT is the management of safety risks in spatial 
planning. Through spatial planning, for example, vulnerable land use in hazard-prone 
areas can be regulated or reallocated.  
The search for an appropriate role for geo-information and the further development 
of Geo-ICT to support the consideration of safety risks in spatial planning, however, 
should not start with a specific technology, but with a conception of the way safety 
risks are addressed and managed in spatial planning practices. This statement is in 
agreement with Klosterman (2001), who argued that the search for an appropriate role 
for computer-based information and methods must begin with the conception of the 
activity that is to be supported. Therefore, this research focuses on spatial planning 
practices and on the management of safety risks in these practices. The research pro-
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Dealing with Safety Risks in Spatial Planning 
 
Land use or land-use changes can trigger or generate hazards and affect the potential 
consequences of these hazards. Deforestation can trigger land slides, for example, and 
land reclamation or levee construction can increase flood hazards downstream. New 
dwellings in or near forests can trigger wildfires, especially if home owners fail to 
prioritise fire safety measures. In addition, if land is used for industrial activities, new 
technological hazards, such as the risks resulting from the storage or production of 
hazardous materials, can be introduced into the environment. Moreover, land-use 
changes can increase damage potential. Residential developments in hazard-prone 
areas, such as areas prone to flooding or earthquakes, can negatively affect the number 
of properties and people exposed to hazards. Consequently, spatial planning activities 
that are concerned with influencing land use by locating physical structures and 
activities such as agriculture, recreation or industry within a territory (Couclelis, 2005; 
Tewdwr-Jones, 2001) can result in new or increased safety risks in a particular area.  
Even though life expectancy in the Netherlands continues to rise and many un-
certainties in life have been strongly reduced (Jongejan, 2008), the number of people 
and properties exposed to hazards in general continues to increase. Scenario studies of 
land-use changes in the south-western part of the Netherlands, for example, have 
shown that almost 50% of the planned housing in urban development plans is located 
in flood-prone areas (Beckers & Van Heusen, 2008). The result of these current land-
use policies is that the population in flood-prone areas is expected to grow (see, for 
example, Van Schrojenstein Lantman, 2007). The potential damage in areas exposed 
to industrial hazards is also increasing. Spatial planning policies in the Netherlands are 
aimed at intensifying the use of space, which also results in more intensified use of 
land near potentially dangerous activities (Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat & 
VROM-Raad, 2003). 
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Through risk information, however, planners can consider safety risks and the 
consequences of land-use changes for such risks. Since much of this risk information, 
such as the location of hazard zones, emergency routes, damage potential or number 
of people affected, has an explicit geographical component and can be presented on a 
map, geo-information is regarded as essential information for risk management. For 
this reason, the further development of geo-information to facilitate the consideration 
and management of safety risks, including the consideration of such risks in spatial 
planning, is regarded as a central objective for both risk and emergency management 
and developers of geo-information and communications technology (Geo-ICT) 
(ACIR, 2005; MacFarlane, 2005; National Research Council, 2007). 
However, the availability of geographical risk information does not automatically 
imply that safety risks are considered in spatial planning and that this information is 
used. The use of Geo-ICT in spatial planning is regarded as problematic, and is far 
from widespread. Moreover, spatial planning is rarely used as an instrument to reduce 
safety risks. Therefore, this research concentrates on the consideration of safety risks 
in planning and the related use of Geo-ICT in planning. The focus is on the 
consideration of flooding and industrial accidents, since these events represent promi-
nent natural and industrial hazards in the Netherlands (Jongejan, 2008). However, be-
fore discussing these issues, the concept of safety risks will be considered, since these 
risks will play a prominent role in the discussions on spatial planning and Geo-ICT. 
 
 
1.1 Risk or danger, decision or destiny? 
 
According to Luhmann (1993), safety risks can be perceived as both risks and dan-
gers. When current or future losses are perceived as being the result of decisions, 
Luhmann referred to risks. When losses are attributed to an external factor, he referred 
to dangers, which presumes that actors cannot do anything about the damage. How-
ever, the question of whether particular events that cause loss are regarded as dangers 
or risks remains open and depends on the attributions made to the causality of the 
event by the societies that evaluate the event. Therefore, Luhmann argues that the ob-
servation of the various ways that risks are conceptualised, e.g. by examining if future 
loss is attributed to decisions or external causes or how the controllability of loss is 
perceived, is important (King & Thornhill, 2003). Nevertheless, different actors can 
perceive risks in different ways. Decision makers can perceive the potential loss that 
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may result from their decisions as risks, but the same potential loss can be perceived 
as dangers by those affected, for example, because they do not regard the loss as con-
trollable by their own decisions. In other words, “one man’s risk is another man’s 
danger” (Luhmann, 1993). 
Beck and Giddens argued that our society is increasingly confronted with risks 
and dangers (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1990). These risks and dangers are, to a large ex-
tent, portrayed as being the result of technology or the organisation of society. In 
contrast with risks resulting from early modernity, the risks our society is confronted 
with are often global rather than personal, invisible rather than visible and cannot al-
ways be controlled or even calculated (Beck, 1992). A liquidity crisis in the financial 
markets, for example, can affect many countries all over the world, but the threat of a 
nuclear war, a pandemic, extreme weather due to climate change or food insecurity 
can also be regarded as invisible risks which are likely to be felt worldwide and which 
can hardly be controlled or predicted. In addition, it seems that citizens are 
increasingly less willing to accept probabilities of harm, and demand a risk-free 
society. Consequently, discussions about the distribution of risks are occupying the 
foreground of public debate (Huysmans & Steenbekkers, 2002; Jongejan, 2008; WRR, 
2008). For these reasons, Beck argued that the society we live in can be perceived as a 
‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992).  
In addition to these new risks as mentioned by Beck and Giddens, the attribution 
of losses as previously described can also explain the increased attention for risks in 
the public debate. Losses are increasingly attributed to decisions and consequently 
perceived as controllable risks rather than external dangers (Huysmans & 
Steenbekkers, 2002; Luhmann, 1993). Such reactions could be found after hurricane 
Katrina in 2005. The damage caused by Katrina was attributed to external sources, 
such as the occurence of a hurricane in general. Nevertheless, the disaster that resulted 
from the hurricane was also attributed to decision makers. The decision to allow in-
tensive developments in the flood-prone areas of eastern New Orleans or the Orleans 
Parish Levee Board’s unwillingness to help finance the costs of higher levels of flood 
and hurricane protection, for example, can be regarded as decisions which increased 
the impact of the hurricane (Burby, 2006). Other hazards can also be perceived as both 
risks and dangers. For example, a contagious disease can be regarded as an external 
danger, but an epidemic can also be attributed to government failure if the causes of 
the epidemic are attributed to a lack of clean drinking water or inappropriate 
vaccination programmes. Because real or potential losses are increasingly attributed to 
decisions, it can be argued that the inclusion of spatial planning should be considered 
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regarding the potential safety risks resulting from such decisions. This implies that we 
should critically reflect on decision making.  
 
 
1.2 Risk components 
 
From a system perspective, disasters can be portrayed as resulting from interactions 
between physical and socio-economic systems (De Bruijn, 2005; Hilhorst, 2004). The 
physical system, for example, includes geophysical and climatologic systems. The 
socio-economic system, for example, includes local knowledge systems, legal systems 
or economic systems. Risk analysis can focus on the system as a whole, but can also 
focus on a particular subsystem or group of subsystems, such as the interplay between 
urbanisation and water runoff. In addition to focusing on particular subsystems, the 
system as a whole can be divided into various geographical parts. The physical and 
socio-economic processes that can trigger flooding and influence flood impact can be 
studied at different levels of geographical scale. For example, this can be at a very fine 
scale, which normally encompasses very small geographical areas, such as the flood 
risk at a particular building site, or at a very broad level of scale, which often 
encompasses large areas of analysis such as river catchments. From this geographical 
point of view, safety risks can be regarded as characteristic of an area (Cutter, 1996). 
Risks can be understood as a compound function of a hazard to which a specific area 
is exposed and the vulnerability of the people, structures or services within a particular 
area. This point of view is elaborated below.  
The term hazard refers to the source of threat: the events, phenomena or activity 
that may cause harm to aspects of things that human beings value. Hazards are often 
expressed as an estimated probability of occurrence. A distinction can be made be-
tween technological hazards and natural hazards. Examples of technological hazards 
are the production or transport of hazardous materials, or the genetic modification of 
crops. Natural hazards can be divided into geo-hazards and hydro-metrological 
hazards (Schmidt-Thomé, 2006). Examples of geo-hazards are earthquakes, tsunamis, 
volcanic eruptions and landslides. Examples of hydro-meteorological hazards are 
avalanches, droughts, extreme temperatures, floods, forest fires, storms and storm 
surges. Nevertheless, natural hazards are not necessarily fully trigged by natural 
causes. Anthropogenic factors may also trigger natural hazards. For example, floods 
may be triggered by land use and climate change.  
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A single area can be affected by multiple hazards, and hazards can also influence 
each other. For example, the probability of a major accident at a hazardous installation 
can be increased because of the proximity of other installations with hazardous sub-
stances. This is referred to as the domino-effect. Technological hazards can also be 
influenced by natural hazards. A flood or earthquake, for example, can cause the re-
lease of hazardous materials from industrial facilities. Such disasters triggered by both 
natural and technological hazards are referred to as natech disasters (Cruz et al., 
2006).  
Vulnerability generally refers to the susceptibility to damage from a particular 
disaster hazard (Alexander, 1997; Blaikie et al., 1994; Cutter, 1996), but there are fun-
damentally different conceptual interpretations of this concept. Interpretations either 
emphasise the exposure to hazards, the social responses – i.e. the capacity of society to 
deal with hazards and exposure – or the physical and social processes that may lead to 
vulnerability, such as economic or urban development. Although vulnerability is 
generally regarded as a combination of these points of view (Adger, 2006; Cutter, 
1993; Cutter, 1996; De Bruijn, 2005; De Graaf et al., 2007.), the concept of 
vulnerability in this research is divided into two interrelated components: exposure 
and capacities (Table 1-1). These two components can change over time as a result of 
physical and social processes.  
 
Table 1-1. Risk components  
Risk components Definition 
Hazard A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon 
or human activity that may cause injury or loss of 
life, property damage, social and economic 
disruption, or environmental degradation. 
Exposure The proneness to a particular hazard, without taking 
into consideration the capacity to deal with the 
hazard. 
Resistance capacity The ability of an area to prevent hazardous events, 
such as defences to resist high water levels.  
Adaptive capacity Capacity of an area to adapt and adjust to uncertain 
future developments and hazards.  
Coping capacity Capacity to respond in the immediate aftermath of 
an event.  
R
is
k 
V
ul
ne
ra
bi
lit
y 
Recovery capacity The capacity to return to the pre-disaster status. 
Based on: De Bruijn et al., 2007; De Graaf et al., 2007; Schneiderbauer, 2007 
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Exposure refers to the proneness of an area to a particular hazard, without taking into 
consideration its capacity to deal with the hazard. Variables related to exposure nor-
mally include hazards variables as well, such as the proximity to the source of threat, 
incident frequency or probability, magnitude, duration or spatial impact (Cutter, 
1996). For example, exposure to flooding can be expressed in terms of potential water 
levels to which a house is exposed, and exposure to dangerous industrial activities can 
be expressed as the probability that a person permanently residing at a location in the 
vicinity of a hazardous activity will be killed due to an accident with that activity. Ex-
posure is not the same as susceptibility, since the term susceptibility also takes the 
capacity to deal with the hazard into account. Floating houses, for example, can be 
exposed to high water levels, but are not necessarily susceptible to flooding since they 
are adapted to it (De Bruijn et al., 2007). Measures to reduce exposure are the exclu-
sion of ‘susceptible’ land-use activities from areas exposed to hazards. 
The term ‘capacities’ can be regarded as an overall term that refers to the differrent 
types of abilities an area has to resist, adapt, cope with and recover from flooding. The 
capacity to resist hazards includes those characteristics which influence the ability of 
an area to resist hazardous events, such as defences against high water levels (De 
Bruijn et al., 2007; Vis et al., 2003).  
Adaptive capacity can be defined as the ability of an area to adjust to permanent 
short-term changes and gradual long-term trends (De Bruijn, 2005). The time orienta-
tion lies in the future (De Graaf et al., 2007), and the emphasis is on the physical 
adaptations that are made within an area. Building adaptive capacity includes the 
adaptation of land-use activities or constructing buildings that compatible with 
potential future events. This could include measures such as the elevation of sites in 
flood-prone areas.  
The objective of building coping capacity is to increase the ability to respond in the 
immediate aftermath of an event to reduce the impact of the event (De Graaf et al., 
2007). Coping capacity refers mainly to the organisational abilities that an area has to 
prepare for and respond to disasters. It refers to the skills, resources and strengths of 
communities or societies to help themselves and others shortly before or after an 
event, including the capacity for evacuation or emergency response. Nevertheless, 
physical conditions also determine the coping capacities. The road infrastructure in an 
area, for example, defines the possibilities for evacuation and emergency access.  
The term ‘recovery’ is referred to as the capacity to return to a normal situation, 
e.g. the situation before the disaster took place. The time focus of recovery is initially 
on the event itself, but will gradually shift to the longer term (Schneiderbauer, 2007). 
Recovery capacity includes the ability of societies to reconstruct affected areas. The 
Dealing with Safety Risks in Spatial Planning   17 
 
 
capacities to cope with an event, together with the capacities to recover from an event, 
are also referred to as resilience capacity (Cardona, 2003; McEntire et al., 2002; 
Schneiderbauer, 2007). 
 The geographical conceptualisation of risk and risk components as discussed 
above is useful to categorise risk reduction measures or strategies, as will be illustrated 
by the following chapters. It should be noted, however, that the very idea of a system 
underlying this conceptualisation assumes that social and physical processes relate in 
functional and in somewhat predictable ways. This disregards the dynamics of these 
processes and a society’s response to disaster (Hilhorst, 2004). Moreover, a system 
perspective tends to overestimate the commonalities and differences between systems 
or system components, which may draw attention away from the strong connections 
and overlap that exist between different components or subsystems (Hilhorst, 2004). 
Even though the system perspective is useful to explain the various aspects of the 
concept of risk, it should still be seen as a conceptual model of reality rather than 
reality itself.  
 
 
1.3 The use of geo-information and Geo-ICT in spatial 
planning 
 
To consider both natural and technological hazards and impacts in spatial planning 
and to make informed choices between alternative ways of development, spatial 
planners require information about these safety risks. A considerable part of this risk 
information can be regarded as geo-information, which is therefore essential for risk 
management. In addition to information, geo-spatial technologies are required, which 
users can use to capture, store, update, communicate, manipulate, analyse, model, 
exchange and display geographical data and information and through which users can 
interact with it (Vonk, 2006). Not surprisingly, much geographical data has been 
gathered and processed and many geo-tools, geographic databases, technologies and 
networks (referred to as Geo-ICT) have been developed to support risk managers and 
spatial planners. In the Netherlands, for example, flood risk information systems have 
been developed which provide insight into dike strengths, flood patterns, potential 
damage or potential numbers of victims (Jonkman, 2007; Ministry of Transport Public 
Works and Water Management, 2005). In addition, geo-tools have been developed to 
support quantitative risk assessments with respect to accidents involving hazardous 
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substances (Moen & Ale, 1998). These tools can identify hazard zones for different 
incident scenarios and can support the consideration of appropriate safety distances 
between residential developments and hazardous installations.  
Nevertheless, the use of Geo-ICT and geo-information in risk management is still 
regarded as problematic in all phases of risk management and emergency response. 
This is because the information is unavailable in either the right form or at the right 
time, or is not exchanged between actors involved in risk and emergency management, 
which can result in unnecessary damage or even casualties (ACIR, 2005; National 
Research Council, 2007). Causes for the ineffective use of geo-information in risk 
management are found in the organisation of geo-information, conceptualised as the 
spatial information infrastructure (SII). At this SII level, which is also described as the 
spatial data infrastructure (SDI) level or geo-data infrastructure (GDI) level, particular 
attention is given to the organisation of geo-information exchange (Mansourian et al., 
2006; Nebert, 2004; Williamson & Rajabifard, 2003). A spatial information 
infrastructure includes not only the geo-data itself or the geo-technologies, but also 
involves access networks, policies and arrangements, standards and human resources 
that are required for the collection, management, access, delivery and utilisation of 
spatial data (Mansourian et al., 2006).  
The causes for the limited role of geo-information in emergency management are 
thus related to: 
• the availability of data,  
• the data quality,  
• the availability of technologies to process and exchange data, such as services,  
• the availability of communication networks,  
• the agreements between actors regarding the acquisition, use, security and 
management of data,  
• the interoperability of systems, e.g. through standards regarding data, services or 
semantics,  
• the skills of potential users, and finally,  
• the organisation of the development of SIIs in general, including visions and lea-
dership (ACIR, 2005; Mansourian et al., 2006; National Research Council, 2007).  
Consequently, much effort is made in establishing spatial information infrastructures 
through which geographical information becomes available to the actors involved in 
risk management and emergency response (Annoni et al., 2005; Köhler & Wächter, 
2006; Mansourian et al., 2006). However, the establishment of SIIs does not imply 
that geo-information is used for risk and emergency management purposes. 
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Examinations of the use of geo-tools in spatial planning and decision making have 
identified that the use of such tools is far from widespread (Stillwell et al., 1999; Uran 
& Janssen, 2003; Vonk, 2006). These studies not only highlighted the availability of 
spatial information or the possibilities for information exchange as a central problem, 
but they also identified a wide variety of other, often related factors that hamper the 
effective use of geo-tools and, consequently, geo-information (Bednarz & Bednarz, 
2008; Carsjens, 2009; Committee on Support for Thinking Spatially & National 
Research Council of the National Academies, 2006; Couclelis, 2005; De Wit et al., 
2009; Drummond & French, 2008; Geertman, 2006; Goosen, 2006; Klosterman, 2001; 
Uran & Janssen, 2003; Vonk, 2006).  
First of all, problems with respect to the tools themselves were identified. The tools 
can be too complex for users to understand, inappropriate for specific planning tasks 
(such as design), or mono-disciplinary rather than interdisciplinary in character. 
Second, the output provided by the tools can be oversimplified or too complex, 
generic or uncertain for planners, which hampers their use. Third, users can be unfa-
miliar with, or unaware of, support systems or lack training in the use of these sys-
tems. 
The problems discussed above are either oriented towards SII, such as the avail-
ability or exchangeability of geo-information, or towards the characteristics of geo-
information and Geo-ICT itself, such as user-friendliness. More fundamentally, factors 
related to the way potential users think and reason can influence the use of geo-
information and Geo-ICT. Geo-information and Geo-ICT have sometimes not been 
used effectively because users lacked the ability to think spatially (referred to as 
spatial literacy). Users can lack the knowledge, skills and habits of mind to use con-
cepts of space, tools of representation and reasoning processes to structure, solve, and 
express solutions to problems (Bednarz & Bednarz, 2008: 316). Another reason for 
this lack of effective use could also be that users lacked a sense of urgency about the 
problem that these tools would have supported (Goosen, 2006). In this respect, the use 
of geographical risk information and Geo-ICT in policy making depends not only on 
the availability of appropriate information and tools, but also on the forms of reason-
ing used by the actors involved in policy-making processes. Consequently, the use of 
geo-information and Geo-ICT to support the consideration of safety risks also depends 
on the way safety risks themselves are addressed and dealt with in planning practices. 
For example, Geo-ICT to support risk management in planning is only of added value 
to spatial planning if the actors involved have some commitment to the consideration 
of safety risks in general.  
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1.4 Spatial planning for risk reduction 
 
With its objective of influencing land use and land-use changes, spatial planning can 
result in risk reduction. In addition to public bodies, private actors can influence land 
use and steer risk reduction. The focus of this study, however, is on the spatial plan-
ning activities carried out by spatial planners working at the level of public admini-
stration. In general, spatial planners can directly and indirectly influence land-use de-
velopment (Needham, 2000). Examples of direct interventions are land and property 
acquisition, such as buying flood-prone land to prevent new development. Indirect 
interventions include land-use regulations such as zoning or incentives to stimulate 
direct or indirect interventions by others (e.g. the planning requirements of a higher 
level of government for local governments). In addition to these direct and indirect 
regulatory interventions, spatial planners can influence land use through other policy 
tools based on communicative mechanisms or financial mechanisms, like the dissemi-
nation of risk information through risk maps or through taxation and fiscal polices to 
stimulate the adaptation of buildings. Through this influence, the adaptation of 
vulnerable buildings can be required (e.g. such as flood-proofing a building), the 
development of vulnerable buildings in hazard-prone areas can be regulated or 
existing buildings can be reallocated. For these reasons, spatial planning is regarded as 
an important instrument to reduce both natural and industrial safety risks (Bergström, 
2006; Burby, 1998; Christou et al., 1999; Immink, 2007; Mileti, 1999). 
In spite of this recognition in risk management and planning literature, studies on 
the implementation of risk mitigation measures through spatial planning have shown 
that many local governments avoid implementing mitigation measures through spatial 
planning, especially when risks are triggered by natural hazards such as flooding or 
earthquakes (Berke et al., 1996; Burby, 1998; May et al., 1996). Nevertheless, few 
studies have been conducted to show why local planning authorities do not systemati-
cally use spatial planning in advance for reducing natural risks, especially in Europe 
(Hutter et al., 2007). Also, with respect to industrial hazards and development, re-
search has concentrated more on the siting of new hazardous installations than on the 
impact of the existing industrial safety risks on development in the locality (Walker, 
2000).  
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1.5 Research aims and research questions 
 
In the previous sections, various aspects of the relationship between spatial planning 
and Geo-ICT were discussed. In the section on spatial planning and risk management, 
spatial planning was seen to be an important instrument for reducing both natural and 
industrial safety risks. Nevertheless, the application of spatial planning for risk reduc-
tion was problematic, since planning as such was not widely used to mitigate safety 
risks. Moreover, the reasons for the use or non-use of spatial planning have rarely 
been studied. In the section on Geo-ICT, this technology was regarded as an important 
instrument to support the consideration of safety risks in spatial planning. Neverthe-
less, the use of geo-information and Geo-ICT in spatial planning was found to be 
problematic, since its use is far from effective, for example due to limited availability 
of geo-information, unsuitable geo-tools or limited possibilities for information 
exchange. 
However, it can be argued that problems with respect to the use of planning on the 
one hand, and the effective use of Geo-ICT and geo-information on the other, are 
interrelated and partly overlapping, especially with respect to the forms of reasoning 
used by spatial planners that may cause ineffective use of spatial planning and Geo-
ICT. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the forms of reasoning used by spatial planners 
in general, and on the way they deal with safety risks in spatial planning in particular. 
These insights will be used as a point of departure for discussing the contribution of 
Geo-ICT, which is expressed in the following research question:  
 
How are safety issues addressed in spatial planning practices and what contribution 
can be made by geo-information and Geo-ICT to support the consideration of safety 
risks in spatial planning? 
  
The first aim of this research was to understand how safety issues are addressed in 
spatial planning practices in hazard-prone areas, and to explore the reasons for the use 
or non-use of spatial planning for reducing safety risks in advance. The focus was on 
the consideration of flooding and industrial accidents, since these events represent 
prominent natural and industrial hazards, respectively (Jongejan, 2008), the potential 
effects of which can be considered in spatial planning. The resulting insights 
contribute not only to conceptions of spatial planning in general or the consideration 
of safety risks in planning in particular, but also to public discussions on risk 
management and the role of spatial planning with respect to risk management. 
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Insights into the use or non-use of spatial planning can also provide points of de-
parture for the further development and application of geo-information and Geo-ICT, 
which was the second aim of this research. Based on a conception of how risks are, 
and can be, addressed in spatial planning, the contribution of Geo-ICT is discussed 
and recommendations are given on the future development and application of geo-in-
formation and Geo-ICT for the consideration of safety risk issues in spatial planning.  
 
 
1.6 Outline of this thesis 
 
The outline of this thesis is illustrated in Figure 1-1. Chapter 2 describes the applied 
research approach, and together with this chapter, can be regarded as the introduction 
to the studies that were carried out to answer the central research question. These 
studies are described in the following chapters. Each study focuses on a particular 
problem either with regard to the consideration of safety issues in planning or with 
regard to the further development and application of geographical information and 
Geo-ICT. Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 are focused on the way safety risks are addressed in 
spatial planning practices. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on industrial risks and Chapters 5 
and 6 on flood risks. The emphasis in Chapters 7 and 8 is more explicitly on the fur-
ther development and application of geographical risk information and information 
systems. Chapter 7 focuses on the informational requirements and spatial information 
infrastructures (SIIs). In chapter 8, the ideas as presented in chapter 7 are worked out 
further through the concept of network centric risk and emergency management. In the 
concluding chapter, Chapter 9, the insights from the individual studies are brought 
together to give insight into how safety risks are addressed, what might be done dif-
ferently and what contribution can be made by geographical risk information and Geo-
ICT.  
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Figure 1-1. Outline of this thesis 
 
Introduction 
Research approach  
(Chapter 2) 
 
The consideration of safety risks in spatial planning 
Industrial risks 
(Chapter 3, 4) 
 
Flood risks 
(Chapter 5, 6) 
 
Discussion (Chapter 9)  
Dealing with safety  
risks (Chapter 1) 
 
The contribution of Geo-ICT 
Informational 
requirements and SIIs 
(Chapter 7) 
 
Network-centric risk and 
emergency management 
(Chapter 8) 
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2  
 
 
Research Approach 
 
As stated in the Introduction, the central aim of this research was to develop insight 
into the way safety risks are addressed in spatial planning practices and into the 
potential contribution that can be made by Geo-ICT. But how can spatial planning and 
the potential role of geo-information and Geo-ICT be analysed? This question will be 
discussed in this chapter on research approach. 
Before discussing the research approach, however, a distinction should be made 
between the research perspectives on which research is based and the theoretical per-
spectives related to the understanding of society. A research approach focuses on the 
assumptions and preconditions of science and research, whereas theories and theoreti-
cal perspectives focus on specific social phenomena such as risks or society in general, 
such as theories concerning the ‘risk society’. This chapter concentrates on the 
research perspectives rather than on theories on society or social phenomena. 
Nevertheless, these perspectives and theories can influence each other as will be il-
lustrated in Box 2-3.  
A research approach can be characterised by the epistemology, research perspec-
tives, methodology and methods that have been applied within a research project and 
which can be regarded as the building blocks of research (after Crotty, 1998). These 
four elements can be defined in the following ways: 
• Epistemology: the position that is taken on the theory of knowledge, defined as 
the way of understanding how knowledge is produced. 
• Research perspectives: the philosophical stance towards research, which provides 
the context for the methodology.  
• Methodology: the strategy that underpins the way research is carried out, 
including the research plan and research process. A methodology can be regarded 
as the basis for the choice and application of methods. 
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• Method: the operational techniques and procedures that are used to gather and 
analyse data.  
These four elements of the research approach are interrelated. Research perspectives, 
for example, are implicitly or explicitly based on specific epistemological assump-
tions. In addition, there is not a clear distinction between specific elements. 
Methodology, for example, is portrayed as the ‘border’ between research perspectives 
and the methods or working procedures in specific studies. This border, however, is 
more vague than sharp. Therefore, distinctions between different elements are neces-
sarily arbitrary, even though these distinctions can analytically clarify the overall re-
search approach as discussed in this chapter. 
 
 
2.1  Epistemological position 
 
Research perspectives, methodologies and the application of methods are informed by 
the epistemological position or standpoint from which they are used and defined. The 
epistemological position has to do with what can be known about reality. Neverthe-
less, different epistemological positions exist in science, resulting in different per-
spectives on knowledge and consequently in different research approaches. Objectivist 
epistemology is based on the core assumption that reality can be known objectively: 
there is a correspondence between the perceived reality and the reality that exists 
outside the perceived reality (Morçöl, 2001). The objectivist epistemology is based on 
a realist ontology. Ontology has to do with the the nature of reality. According to a 
realist ontology, reality exists independently of our knowledge of it.  
The epistemological position taken in this thesis, however, is based on the as-
sumption that realities cannot be discovered objectively. They are produced by human 
thoughts in cultures. Different people can construct reality in different ways and 
simultaneously give meaning to it. As a result, there cannot be one universal or objec-
tive truth. This does not imply that a particular conception of truth is always contested. 
The statement that the failure of a dike depends on dike width is generally agreed 
upon. The extent to which dike width contributes to dike failure, however, can be 
perceived differently in different practices, for example in different cultures and in 
different times. 
This epistemological position is referred to as constructivism, which implies that 
knowledge about reality should be regarded as the result of an interplay between real-
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ity and the actors who perceive reality (Crotty, 1998). The term constructivism in-
cludes both the collective generation and transmission of meaning, and the individual 
sense making process (Fischer, 2003c). The constructivist epistemology does not ex-
clude a realist ontology, but argues that this reality cannot be known objectively, 
because interpretation and reality are portrayed as being inextricable from each other. 
They are two sides of the same coin (Latour, 2004).  
Also, researchers following an objectivist epistemology will, to some extent, agree 
that social realities are socially constructed. What distinguishes constructivism from 
objectivism, however, is the idea that all meaningful reality, including the reality 
‘discovered’ through natural scientific methods should be regarded as socially con-
structed (Crotty, 1998).  
This constructivist position not only influences research, but also theories on 
society or phenomena in society, such as theories on the construction of risks, as 
illustrated in Box 2-1. 
 
Box 2-1. The social construction of risk 
From a constructivist point of view, risks can be regarded as constructions of reality rather than 
reality itself. As stated by Beck (1992), risks only exist in terms of the knowledge about them. 
Different people, including scientists, can have different methods to assess risks with different 
assumptions and different outcomes. In addition, risk knowledge can be based on both 
scientific and non-scientific information, e.g. information based on personal experiences or 
experiences of others. Both this scientific and non-scientific information on risks can be 
interpreted in alternative ways, as can be illustrated by discussions about the installation of 
telecommunication masts. In the Netherlands, numerous local groups heavily criticise the 
installation of telecommunication masts, which are needed for mobile communication 
networks. The central government, however, argues that the risks posed by these masts are 
acceptable and that permission should be granted for placing them.  
A great number of stories can be found on the internet about people who live near 
telecommunication masts and who believe they suffer from the Electromagnetic Ffields (EMF) 
caused by them (see for example www.stopumts.nl). They experience, for example, serious 
headaches or suffer from sleep disorders. Based on these experiences, local groups want to 
prohibit the installation of new telecommunication masts.  
However, recent scientific research on the effects of EMF on public health has not proven that 
telecommunication masts have a negative effect on health (Health Council of the Netherlands, 
2005). In spite of this, many local action groups still believe that the electromagnetic fields of 
these masts harm public health. In addition, local interest groups argue that scientific research 
cannot fully exclude the possibility of long-term health effects. They argue that harmful health 
effects have not been totally ruled out, since the long-term effects have not yet been measured. 
This example illustrates that different people can conceptualise risks in different ways. 
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Through an examination of risk perceptions, various factors or risk characteristics that 
influence risk perceptions have already been identified, such as the controllability, dread or 
voluntariness of the risk, the familiarity with the risk or risky activities or the potential risk 
consequences (Slovic, 1987). In this light it is not surprising that involuntary exposure to 
electromagnetic fields has resulted in local opposition, whereas the assessment of the potential 
consequences in the light of the probability of these consequences shows that the risks are low.  
 
 
2.2  Research perspectives 
 
The consideration of safety risks in planning practices will be analysed from an inter-
pretative research perspective. This perspective is characterised by a focus on under-
standing and interpreting socially constructed meanings (Fischer, 2003c; Howarth, 
2000). Based on a constructivist epistemology, interpretative research looks for 
culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the social life world.  
An interpretative standpoint, however, not only regards social realities as being the 
result of human action; these realities also shape human actions. Therefore, an exami-
nation of how meaning is attributed to risks in spatial planning practices can provide a 
way to understand how risks are dealt with in these practices. Moreover, it can provide 
insight into the question of why risks are addressed in a particular way, since 
meanings that are attributed to these risks also shape action, including the use of 
information, as illustrated in Box 2-2 on the use of risk maps in spatial planning.  
 
Box 2-2. The use of risk maps 
Through risk maps, the potential effects of specific hazards can be visualised, for example the 
area that can be affected through an incident with the transport of hazardous materials or the 
flood levels that can be expected in case of a breach in a dike. This information can influence 
the way spatial planners interpret risk. Risk maps, for example, can stimulate risk 
consciousness amongst spatial planners. Consequently, human actions (in this case, the 
presentation of risk maps) influence social reality: how risks are perceived. In this respect, 
social realities can be regarded as the result of human action. Nevertheless, they can also be 
regarded as the source of human action. Existing ideas on risks, for example, also shape the 
need for information, the interpretation of risk information and the actions that are taken as a 
consequence of these interpretations (In 't Veld, 2000; Ter Huurne, 2008). When spatial 
planners do not regard themselves as responsible for reducing particular risks, it is likely that 
no risk reducing measures will be taken as a result of the information presented on the risk 
maps, even though the risks can be considerable. 
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For similar reasons, with respect to the examination of planning practices, the 
interpretative perspective is used as a starting point for discussions on the potential 
role and subsequent further development and application of geographical risk infor-
mation. Because the actual interpretation of risks greatly affects the particular need for 
information and use of it, it makes sense to identify the meanings that are attributed to 
safety risks and to link these meanings to the potential role of geographical risk 
information. Consequently, the central research question is discussed from an inter-
pretative perspective, in which social reality is especially understood as a source of 
human action, rather than a result of such action. Obviously, research perspectives and 
theories about society are also interrelated. This is illustrated in Box 2-3. 
 
Box 2-3. Planning as a struggle about meaning 
The idea that spatial planning can be regarded as a social phenomenon, through which the 
actors involved try to allocate meaning to actual landscapes, goes hand-in-hand with an 
interpretive research perspective. From an interpretative stance, the resulting planning 
processes can, similarly to policy making processes in general (Gottweis, 2003), be regarded as 
struggles about meaning in which different actors or groups of actors try to pursue their ideas 
about the actual and desired space (Flyvbjerg & Sampson, 1998). Different people will not 
only have different perceptions about risks, but also about how society should deal with these 
risks or how a public body should deal with balancing spatial claims for risk management with 
other spatial claims resulting from objectives with respect to nature conservation or industrial 
development. From this interpretative theory about planning, planning processes can be 
regarded as struggles about meaning.  
 
 
2.3  Methodology 
 
Interpretative policy analysis can be regarded as a methodological elaboration of the 
interpretative research perspective (Yanow, 2000). This methodology offers guidance 
for the examination of planning practices and will therefore be discussed in more 
detail. Interpretative policy analysis, however, can be regarded as a reaction to neo-
positivist policy analysis. Therefore, the interpretative methodology is discussed after 
the neo-positivist methodology. 
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Neo-positivist policy analysis  
Generally, policy analysis claims to solve public problems and to produce knowledge 
that can be used in the policy-making process (Wildavsky, 1979). Nevertheless, there 
is great diversity in the views about what kind of knowledge should be produced by 
policy analysis and about which methodologies and methods should be applied 
(Mayer et al., 2004). Interpretative methodologies can be understood as being a reac-
tion to the methodologies used in what Fischer (2003b; 2003c) described as neo-
positivist policy analysis. Neo-positivist policy analysts assume that reality can be 
discovered with analytical precision through natural scientific methods such as 
empirical measurements. As a result, they regard positivist natural scientific method-
ologies and methods (such as large-scale experiments) as being the only valid means 
of distinguishing facts from values, and of making objective value-free assessments 
(Fischer, 1990; Yanow, 2000).  
It can be argued that many GIS based information systems are explicitly or 
implicitly based on a neo-positivist tradition of policy analysis, since their objective is 
often to provide objective information. The conceptualisation of risks on risk maps, 
for example, is generally based on natural scientific methods (i.e. a quantitative risk 
assessment). Flood risks on risk maps, for instance, are assessed through an analysis of 
flood probabilities, which can be based on weather models, hydrologic models and 
models of dike strengths.  
Consequently, the objective of neo-positivist policy analysis can be seen as 
‘speaking truth to power’ (Wildavsky, 1979), by providing policy makers and decision 
makers with factual information about, for example, policy problems and the expected 
effects of policy measures. The main criticism of neo-positivist policy analysis, 
however, is that it has over-relied on and misused scientific knowledge due to its 
adherence to an objectivist conception of this knowledge (Fischer, 1990). 
 
Interpretative policy analysis 
In contrast to neo-positivist perceptions of knowledge, interpretative policy analyses 
take a more complex view of the superiority of scientific knowledge over other ways 
of knowing. They recognise the value-rational aspects of scientific knowledge fol-
lowing a constructivist epistemology. According to Fischer (2003b: 215), this stand-
point should not mean that science, whether physical or social, should not be taken 
seriously, but that science should be understood to be a more subtle interaction 
between physical and social factors.  
The methodology used in interpretative policy analysis puts human meaning and 
social realities at the core of the analysis. They assume that different aspects of poli-
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cies can mean different things to different people. For that reason, interpretative 
research typically begins with the question: ‘What does a proposed policy mean and 
for whom does it have meaning?’ (Yanow, 2003: 235). An important subsequent step 
in interpretative research is identifying different ideas or groups of ideas, the actors 
who employ these ideas, the assumptions underlying particular ideas and the context 
in which the ideas are presented (Yanow, 2000). This context dimension can include 
rules, procedures, cultures, history and traditions that guide both the content and 
process of spatial planning practice. 
Much research focused on the content of ideas follows a language-based approach 
(see for example Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Hajer, 1995; Van den Brink & Metze, 
2006). This type of research takes varying degrees of language, or more specifically, 
language uses, as being the organising framework through which ideas are expressed. 
Nevertheless, actions and objects can be analysed in comparable ways (Hajer & Laws, 
2006; Sharp & Richardson, 2001; Van Assche, 2004; Yanow, 2000). They can also 
reflect a specific human conceptualisation of reality. Actions or physical measures to 
prevent flooding, such as dike elevation, also reflect underlying ideas about flood 
risks, their acceptability or the effectiveness of particular measures. In this light, the 
present study focuses on how spatial planners look at risks, which forms of reasoning 
they use in written and spoken texts, and what actions they take to deal with these 
risks. 
 
 
2.4  Case study approach  
 
This research was divided into six studies. Each study focused on a particular aspect 
of the central research question, either with regard to the consideration of flood risks 
and external safety issues in planning or with regard to the contribution of geo-infor-
mation and Geo-ICT (Table 2-1). The studies were carried out as part of the research 
project GeoRisk, funded by the Space for Geo-information programme (Ruimte voor 
Geo-informatie) (www.georisk.nl).  
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Table 2-1. Overview of the studies  
Short title  Focus Chapter 
Risk maps informing 
land use processes 
A comparison of external safety policies and develop-
ments in risk maps in the Netherlands and the UK. 
3 
The consideration of 
emergency  
management issues  
An examination of the consideration of industrial risks 
in spatial planning with particular attention to emer-
gency management issues. 
4 
Flood risk  
management in Dutch 
local spatial planning 
practices 
An examination of the consideration of flood risk 
issues in spatial planning with particular attention on 
the 
reasons for the use or non-use of spatial planning. 
5 
A spatial planning 
perspective  
An examination of conflicts that may appear during the 
implementation of flood risk reduction measures and 
directions for managing these conflicts. 
6 
 
 
Integrated flood 
management requires 
an integrated spatial 
information  
infrastructure  
An inventory of requirements for emergency managers 
regarding flood risk information, and a comparison of 
these requirements with the requirements that can be 
expected from spatial planners when flood risk is  
addressed in spatial planning.  
7 
From spatial data to 
synchronised actions 
A conceptualisation of risk and emergency 
management in order to develop a point of departure 
for the organisation of geo-information and Geo-ICT 
to support risk and emergency management.  
8 
 
The findings of these studies are based mainly on the examination of specific practices 
or cases. Case studies are an interesting research method in interpretative research, 
since they can provide in-depth understanding of specific social phenomena (Yin, 
2005). In addition, they can provide context-dependent knowledge, which is crucial 
for understanding phenomena than cannot be understood by ‘general rules’ (Flyvbjerg, 
2001). Another advantage of a case study is that it requires a less structured setup than 
a large-scale survey or experiment (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2005). Case studies 
allow an open starting point. Consequently, they are regarded as especially suitable for 
answering how and why questions, for example, such as how particular social 
phenomena work or why they appear as they do (Gray, 2004). Case studies were 
therefore used in the present research as the central method for answering the central 
research question. This section provides a general description of the selected cases or 
practices. Within the individual chapters, however, more extensive descriptions of the 
applied methods for the analysis of these practices are given. 
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The study of planning practices starts with national planning and risk management 
policies. Higher level authorities, such as national governments, can provide 
frameworks and guidelines for spatial planning and the consideration of safety risks in 
planning, which can explain to some extent how risks are perceived and managed. 
Therefore, the national policy frameworks for the consideration of industrial risks 
(Chapter 3) and flood risks (Chapters 5 and 7) were studied to understand the consid-
eration of safety risks in planning. The study of the policies on industrial risks and 
planning was carried out in cooperation with another PhD research project conducted 
by Claudia Basta at the Delft University of Technology. Through this cooperation, the 
Dutch framework could be compared with the UK framework, which was comparable 
in character, resulting in some additional understanding of the Netherlands framework 
and recent developments (Chapter 3). 
National frameworks and guidelines, however, can be reformulated during the 
implementation process at the lower level, since lower level governments also have or 
take some discretionary freedom in the implementation of higher government guide-
lines (Majone & Wildavsky, 1984). For that reason, special attention is given to the 
consideration of safety risks in regional and local practices to understand the actual 
consideration of safety risks (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). Consequently, the emphasis in 
Chapter 4 is on the consideration of industrial risks in local practices, since industrial 
risks are mainly dealt with in planning at this level. Special attention is given to how 
spatial planners deal with emergency management concerns, since spatial planning is 
increasingly used for this purpose. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the consideration of 
flood risks. In Chapter 5, local spatial planning practices in flood-prone areas are 
analysed. Planning practices of municipalities in vulnerable, flood-prone areas were 
selected, since it could be expected that flood risks were considered in these areas. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the implementation of flood risk reduction measures. Risk 
reduction measures such as land-use regulations in hazard-prone areas or the location 
of physical structures in the landscape require land or another use of land, which can 
be problematic. The problems that are encountered in the implementation phase can 
also provide understanding about the use or non-use of spatial planning to reduce 
safety risks; therefore, the implementation of safety measures was examined as well 
by studying the implementation of local and regional projects for the reduction of risk 
related to river floods and flooding caused by heavy rainfall and limited drainage 
capacity.  
The studies on the consideration of safety risks in planning were used as a starting 
point for recommendations for the further development and application of geo-
information and Geo-ICT for the support of risk management in planning. The 
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examination of local case studies showed important changes in the way in which risks 
are addressed in both policies and practices, especially with respect to flood risk 
management. Consequently, changing informational requirements were expected. For 
that reason, the expected informational requirements related to flood risks have been 
examined and described in Chapter 7. Changes in flood management policies were 
explored together with informational requirements that may result from these changes, 
providing a point of departure for the further development and application of geo-
information and Geo-ICT. Because the exploration showed that spatial planners were 
increasingly interested in emergency management concerns, informational 
requirements were compared with informational requirements in emergency 
management, which provided additional directions for the development of Geo-ICT. 
Since spatial planners are increasingly considering emergency management 
concerns, it can be argued that developments in geo-information and Geo-ICT for 
emergency management can also be relevant for spatial planning. Therefore, the 
developments in Geo-ICT in this field are explored in Chapter 8. This exploration was 
based on the idea that the search for an appropriate role for Geo-ICT and geographical 
information in emergency response should not start with a particular technology, but 
with a conception of emergency management and especially with the way decision 
making is organised in emergency response. Consequently, Chapter 8 describes a 
conception of risk and emergency management that is based on the previous studies of 
the consideration of safety risks in planning and on the experiences of the ‘Geo-data 
infrastructure for disaster management’ (GDI4DM) project, which focused on the 
development of a SII for emergency management (www.gdi4dm.nl). The ideas about 
emergency response, and the related organisation of Geo-ICT, provided some 
additional points of departure for the development of geo-information and Geo-ICT to 
support risk and emergency management. Consequently, the ideas presented in 
Chapter 7 are developed further in Chapter 8. 
 
 
2.5  Using and producing theories 
 
Theories should not only be regarded as the result of research, they can also be used as 
an interpretive framework within research. However, prudence is called for when 
theories are used in this way, since interpretative researchers do not regard these 
interpretative frameworks as neutral lenses through which reality can be discovered. 
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There is more to theories than that. They make this reality accessible through 
constructing it. In this respect, a theory can be seen as a discourse (Allmendinger, 
2002), which according to Hajer (1995: 44) can be defined as ‘a specific ensemble of 
ideas, concepts and categorisations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in 
a particular set of practices and through which meaning is allocated to social and 
physical phenomena’. Consistent with discourses, theoretical perspectives are not 
neutral conceptualisations of reality, but they highly shape the way people and groups 
of people perceive reality, define problems and choose to pursue solutions in a 
particular direction in both research and practice (after Hajer & Laws, 2006). 
Consequently, interpretative researchers reject the idea that practices should be 
analysed from existing and often general theories, referred to as deduction. Deduction 
implies that knowledge on individual phenomena is derived from universal laws. 
Interpretative researchers prefer an open starting point, because existing theories 
would focus the attention of a researcher too selectively (Forester, 1999; Yanow, 
2003). For that reason, interpretative methodologies prefer an inductive approach (see 
for example Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Yanow, 2000). Insights are derived from the 
specific phenomena studied, to illuminate particular concepts or mechanisms in policy 
practices. Most researchers, however, use both induction and deduction, since there is 
a necessary interplay between ideas and evidence in each research process (Grix, 
2004).  
Abduction can be regarded as a way to mediate between the inductive and 
deductive way of reasoning. A good example of the application of an abductive 
approach in spatial planning research can be found in Van Dijk (2008). Even though 
the concept of abduction goes back to Aristotle, the American philosopher Charles S. 
Peirce developed and applied this concept further and is therefore regarded as one of 
its major founders (Bertilsson, 2004; Danermark et al., 2002; Glynos & Howarth, 
2007). Similar to induction, the starting point of abduction is in the specific rather than 
the general. The researcher looks at particular, situation-specific phenomena. From an 
abductive point of view, however, the researcher not only describes these phenomena, 
but also makes new interpreting links. In this respect, the objective of abduction is: 
 
[…] to interpret and recontextualise individual phenomena within a conceptual framework 
or set of ideas, to be able to understand something in a new way by observing and 
interpreting this something in a new conceptual framework (Danermark et al., 2002: 80). 
  
This process of developing conceptual frameworks initially results in some vague 
concepts through which the specific phenomena can be structured, described or 
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explained (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). Existing theories can be helpful to recontextual-
ise and subsequently interpret or articulate the situation-specific phenomena. Existing 
theories on how risks can be managed, for example, can be useful to structure and 
especially interpret examined risk management practices. In contrast to deductive 
approaches, however, researchers do not use the existing theories as pre-defined 
categories to search for general truths, but compare the findings derived from the 
research with existing ideas, e.g. to identify interesting differences between the 
general theories and the specific practices or to characterise the particular in more 
detail through comparing them with general, existing ideas. Consequently, the theo-
retical frameworks that are used must be open and flexible to being ‘stretched’ and 
restructured in the process of application (Howarth, 2000: 139).  
Within an abductive way of reasoning, different empirical and theoretical elements 
can be combined to define relationships between theoretical elements, empirical 
elements or empirical and theoretical elements (Glynos & Howarth, 2007). This often 
results in several frames of interpretation, which are tested separately or used together 
to complement each other and to provide powerful and convincing explanations of the 
studied phenomena (Danermark et al., 2002). Special attention should be given to the 
influence of context on the phenomena that are studied and on the conceptual 
frameworks that are used to explain these phenomena. For example, the effects on a 
phenomenon if condition X changes should be considered, as well as the implications 
for the theories used to explore and explain the studied phenomena (Danermark et al., 
2002).  
The analysis of case studies was inspired by these abductive ways of reasoning. 
Consequently, interpretive frameworks and concepts were developed and used to 
analyse the case studies. Nevertheless, induction was used as a starting point. For 
example, the examination of the consideration of flood risk issues in planning was 
initially based on inductive ways of reasoning, resulting in different ideas for under-
standing the use or non-use of spatial planning to reduce flood risks. These initial 
results were interpreted further through a comparison with previous literature on 
spatial planning and risk management. From this literature, factors to explain the use 
or non-use of spatial planning could be derived. These factors were used as an inter-
pretive framework to structure and understand the ways of reasoning as found in the 
case studies. In contrast to deductive ways of reasoning, the interpretive framework 
was not used as a set of fixed, predefined concepts, but resulted from an iterative 
interaction with the empirical data. Through these interactions, interpretive frame-
works could be redefined, through which the area specific context could also be 
understood (see also Van Dijk, 2008).  
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2.6  Evaluating research results 
 
Interpretative research results in socially constructed, context-dependant knowledge, 
which should be aimed at understanding social phenomena rather then explaining and 
predicting them in causal terms. In contrast to positivist research, interpretative 
research does not depart from a fixed, given and stable world. Interpretative research 
assumes that social, political, or natural phenomena – and inseparable from them, their 
meanings – are constantly changing over time (Gottweis, 2003). This implies that the 
insights derived from the analyses are both time and place dependant. As a 
consequence, results of the analysis reflect perceptions of outcomes at a particular 
point in time in the planning process and often focus on the mechanisms that structure 
policy processes in specific contexts. This, of course, does not imply that the results 
cannot be applied in other analysis, for example comparative analysis, but does imply 
that these ideas should be modified to the particular study for which the ideas are used 
(Howarth, 2000). 
Furthermore, knowledge obtained from an interpretive approach cannot be 
regarded as value free, universal, explanatory or predictive. Due to this context 
dependency and the recognition that value-free knowledge cannot be obtained, the 
resulting insights cannot be valued against the reality that exists out of the reality that 
is constructed, referred to as the validity criteria (Fischer, 2003c). This implies alterna-
tive evaluative criteria for the evaluation of insights into the consideration of planning 
practices and into the contribution that can be made by geographical information 
systems. Interpretative researchers therefore suggest that results should be judged in a 
more pragmatic way. They should be evaluated in the light of their plausibility, 
trustworthiness, explanatory and convincing power, transparency or the degree to 
which they make new and meaningful interpretations possible (Crotty, 1998; Fischer, 
2003c; Howarth, 2000; Schwartz-Shea, 2006). Results from case studies, however, are 
not automatically trustworthy or plausible, as desired in the evaluation of 
interpretative research. In addition, these criteria remain rather vague. Therefore 
numerous techniques have been identified through which these criteria can be made 
operational (Hutjes, 1995; Schwartz-Shea, 2006; Yin, 2005). The following strategies 
have been applied to improve the quality of operational research.  
• Triangulation of data: research can become more reliable when data is gathered 
from multiple sources. Therefore, the analysis carried out in the different studies 
was not limited to extensive desktop study alone, including the study of literature 
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and policy documents, but was also based on additional interviews with key actors 
and to some extent on personal experiences through participation and observation.  
• Comparison: findings can become more robust if they are compared with findings 
from similar cases. Hence, the studies have often been based on case studies that 
consisted of an examination of different, interrelated practices. In addition, 
comparisons within practices were made. For example: do different actors 
involved in particular practices act in different ways? Do they have similar 
problem definitions?  
• Explicitness: conclusions are more convincing when it is made clear how the 
conclusions were derived from the empirical material. Therefore, the empirical 
material is sometimes cited in the individual chapters to clarify how conclusions 
have been derived. In addition the context in which the examined practices took 
place was made explicit, e.g. through describing the actual policy framework in 
which these practices took place.  
• Informant check: insight from the research should correspond with the different 
social realities experienced in the practices studied (Fischer, 2003c). This 
correspondence can be improved if the key actors are to some extent involved in 
the research and if they can check the interpretations made. For that reason, key 
actors were interviewed and the interview reports and research results were sent to 
these actors for evaluation. 
• Auditor check: a check on both research content and process by external 
researchers can exclude some inconsistencies and can help to increase transpar-
ency. Therefore, the research was discussed within the GeoRisk project, in which 
universities, governments, research institutes and consultancies participated; it 
was also presented at both national and international conferences. In addition, the 
papers resulting from the research were checked by anonymous reviewers.  
These techniques, however, do not guarantee that the research can be regarded as 
trustworthy or convincing. The final judgement is up to the reader or user of the 
research results, since interpretative researchers recognise that in spite of these tech-
niques, readers or users can have alternative interpretations based on their own back-
ground and experiences, resulting in their own ‘meaning making’ of researchers’ texts 
(Schwartz-Shea, 2006: 108).  
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Risk-Maps informing Land-Use Planning Processes* 
 
Abstract 
The definition of safety distances as required by Art 12 of the Seveso II Directive on 
dangerous substances (96/82/EC) is necessary to minimize the consequences of poten-
tial major accidents. As they affect the land-use destinations of involved areas, safety 
distances can be considered as risk tolerability criteria with a territorial reflection. 
Recent studies explored the suitability of using Geographical Information System tec-
hnologies to support their elaboration and visual rendering. In particular, the 
elaboration of GIS “risk-maps” has been recognized as functional to two objectives: 
connecting spatial planners and safety experts during decision making processes and 
communicating risk to non-experts audiences. In order to elaborate on these findings 
and to verify their reflection on European practices, the article presents the result of a 
comparative study between the United Kingdom and The Netherlands recent 
developments. Their land-use planning practices for areas falling under Seveso II 
requirements are explored. The role of GIS risk-maps within decisional processes is 
analyzed and the reflection on the transparency and accessibility of risk-information is 
commented. Recommendations for further developments are given. 
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3.1  Introduction 
 
The article is part of a broader comparative study on Member States practices in the 
field of land-use planning (in the following: LUP) in areas at risk (Basta et al., 2005; 
Cozzani et al., 2006) and presents recent findings of current research addressing the 
development of GIS-based tools for risk prevention and emergency response (Neuvel 
et al., 2006; Van Oosterom et al., 2005). The framework of the study is Art 12 of the 
Directive Seveso II on dangerous substances (96/82/EC), with a focus on Art 12 
“Control of Urbanization” and its implementation in selected European practices. Aim 
of the article is investigating how LUP decision making processes are supported and 
informed by “risk-maps” in two selected Member States: the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. These two countries are selected on the base of their comparable 
methodological approach to LUP for at-risk areas, to which relevant differences 
between the decisional processes involving the risk-information system are associated.  
As well known, Article 12 of Directive Seveso II requires Member States to 
consider, within their land-use planning policies, the need of defining opportune safety 
distances between dangerous establishments and urban, natural and infrastructural 
developments. “Dangerous” refers to the presence of substances which explosion, fire 
or release could lead to major accidents involving the external areas of establishments. 
In this respect, safety distances are risk acceptability criteria with a territorial 
reflection, as they affect the land-use destinations of the surroundings of Seveso sites.  
In the last decade, different methods and tolerability thresholds fulfilling the 
Seveso II requirements were developed in European countries. Analyzed Member 
State’s practices reflect the specific geographical, regulatory and societal background 
of the country (Basta et al., 2005). The resulting heterogeneity of approaches and 
regulations may be interpreted, in general terms, as the result of the ‘discretionary 
freedom’ (Bakker & Van Waarden, 1999). Member States have in implementing 
European legislation. In the specific domain of the Seveso II, this discretionary 
freedom is coupled with qualitative and quantitative variables affecting the 
development of different regulations and methods. In the analyzed case, a different 
legal background (common law vs. civil law) (Ale, 2005b), a different population 
density (resulting in a different land scarcity) and a different configuration of the 
institutional lay-out are the most relevant ones.  
From the European regulatory perspective, in order to achieve a harmonized 
implementation of Art 12, the heterogeneity of methods and practices which were 
developed or were under development in the “Europe of 25” had to converge to an 
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agreement about the general principles informing a “safe” land-use planning practice. 
This objective is stated in the first amendment of the Seveso II Directive 
(2003/105/EC). The amendment requires to the Commission the elaboration of guide-
lines defining a d-base to be used as a common reference for assessing the 
compatibility between Seveso sites and surrounding areas. This requirement gave new 
inputs to the comparative research investigating the possibility of deriving a general 
‘good-practice’ from national experiences (Christou et al., 1999; Smeder et al., 1996). 
A relevant part addressed the analysis of the decision-making processes supporting the 
definition, the enforcement and the communication of risk-reduction measures (Jones, 
1997). The issue of the different professional cultures, subjective perceptions and 
decisional approaches the great variety of actors have in ‘coping with risk’ are 
generally outlined (Horlick-Jones, 1998; Vlek, 1996). Facilitating their dialogue and 
developing a shared understanding of risks is seen as crucial for a proper definition 
and enforcement of risk reduction strategies (Contini et al., 2000). In this respect, an 
appropriate (national) risk-information system plays a central role. 
As outlined in a previous study, “risk-maps” are a valuable tool for the visualiza-
tion and exchange of risk-information in an easy-reading language. When responding 
to an-ambiguous requirements, risk-maps can improve the understanding of the 
geographical dimension of major accidents (Moen & Ale, 1998). Despite this, the 
digital representation of risk-information and the creation of national d-bases 
accessible by different users are very recent in European practices. The Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom offered the opportunity to investigate on the most recent 
developments in this field. Both countries have well established risk regulations, a 
comparable experience in term of risk prevention policy-formulation and a similar 
methodological approach to LUP for areas at-risk. On the other hand, coherently with 
their different regulatory backgrounds, they developed different spatial planning 
systems, risk tolerability criteria and risk informative systems. Risk-maps find a 
different use during planning processes, and a different consultation procedure for 
accessing risk-maps by the side public offers the opportunity to reflect on the 
problematic interface between safety and security.  
In order to present its findings, the article starts with a summary of the main differ-
ences and similarities between the two national practices. A more extensive 
description of the Dutch and the United Kingdom land-use planning regulations for 
areas at-risk follows. Decisional processes are described together with GIS-based risk 
informative systems and maps. With the support of direct interviews to Safety and 
Planning Authorities of both countries and in-depth literature analysis, a concluding 
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section reflects on possible further developments in the use of risk-maps as decision-
support for risk prevention purposes.  
 
 
3.2.  Risk-maps informing planning processes: a comparison 
between the two examined countries’ practices  
 
The comparison between the United Kingdom and The Netherlands focused on two 
distinct aspects. Firstly, the regulatory aspects related to the implementation of Art 12 
were examined and compared; secondarily, the risk-informative aspects related to the 
creation of geo-data infrastructures and the development of risk-maps were analyzed 
and discussed.  
The most remarkable similarity in the two regulatory contexts is the common 
adoption of a quantitative approach to risk assessment. In the context of the Seveso II, 
this approach involves the estimation of the probability of occurrence of major acci-
dents. Consequently, the likelihood of accidents is a variable of the following LUP 
evaluation. In this respect, the two approaches are to be considered similar. 
Nevertheless, relevant differences related to the risk assessment approach (a, b) and to 
the decision-making process (c) were outlined: 
a. The status of the risk acceptability criteria: a strictly quantitative risk assessment 
(QRA) is required in The Netherlands, where legally binding end-points are 
defined by law. A judgmental approach, using also consequence-oriented 
assessments, is instead used in the UK, where the ALARP (As Low As 
Reasonably Possible) principle applies.  
b. A different definition of societal risk: strongly quantitative but difficultly 
estimable in the Netherlands, it is based on the integration of the individual risk 
(IR) estimation with population data in the UK.  
c. A different configuration of decisional-processes, deriving from a different lay-out 
of the institutional system: strongly centralized and focused on a unique Safety 
Authority in the UK, it is a multi-level system involving different institutional 
competences in the Netherlands. 
Concerning the deriving risk-informative systems and the elaboration of risk-maps, 
differences are: 
d. In the Netherlands, shared information platform are used as reference for 
elaborating risk-maps and delivering risk data. The authority responsible for 
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granting the license to plants’ operators (which differs according to the 
classification of the plant within given dangerous categories) is also responsible 
for the regular update of the data. In the UK instead, the national Safety Authority 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) owns the data, and it is entirely responsible 
for their regular update.  
e. In the Netherlands, the information reported on risk-maps is extended to different 
kind of risks with a geographical relevance. The specific nature of the substances 
treated/stored within establishments and, until recently, iso-risk contours were 
available to general end-users. In the United Kingdom instead, risk-maps report 
only iso-risk contours with the level of risk/harm: no information is given 
regarding the dangerous substances.  
f. In the Netherlands, risk-maps are used to inform the planning process as well as 
non-institutional users (i.e. involved stakeholders or general public). In the UK, 
risk-maps instead are directly delivered to the Planning Agencies by the Safety 
Authorities, without any direct communication of their content to the population. 
In the following sections, details of each country’s practice are given. 
 
 
3.3.  Land-use planning and major accidents risk in the 
Netherlands 
 
Risk assessment method and risk tolerability definition  
The Seveso II Directive is implemented in the Dutch legislation by the Dutch Major 
Hazards Decree (BRZO) and the Dutch Public Safety Decree (BEVI). The BRZO 
focuses on the management of hazardous installations. The BEVI instead regards the 
regulation of land-uses around hazardous installations, i.e. the external safety 
regulation. Spatial decisions related to the adaptations, elaborations, modifications, 
dispensations and revisions of land-use allocation plans within the sphere of influence 
of a hazardous establishment fall under the BEVI. The Dutch external safety’s 
methodological approach is extensively described in literature (Ale, 2002; 
Bottelberghs, 2000). Relevant aspects of the current risk prevention policy which have 
a direct reflection on the elaboration of geographical risk-information are: 
• The adopted quantitative approach to risk assessment, resulting from the 
estimation of both magnitude and expected frequency of accidental events.  
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• The definition of individual risk as the chance, for an individual permanently 
located in the vicinity of a dangerous site, to die as a direct consequence of an 
accident involving Seveso II substances. Legally binding endpoints apply.  
• The classification of vulnerable objects into two classes. The first groups accounts 
hospitals, schools, and residential areas; for these objects, a risk tolerability 
threshold of 10-6 event/ year applies. The second group accounts less vulnerable 
objects as industrial zones, office buildings or recreational facilities For these 
facilities, a tolerability threshold of 10-5 event/ year applies.  
• The definition of societal risk (SR) as the chance, for a number of people > N, to 
die as a direct consequence of their presence in the vicinity of a dangerous facility 
in which an accident occurs; non-binding tolerability endpoints apply. The 
acceptability criteria for an accident are 100 times stricter for every expected 
tenfold in number of victim (i.e., the acceptability of a disaster with 10 lethal 
victims is set on 10-5 event / year, for a disaster with 100 lethal victims 10-7 event / 
year, etc.).  
The legislation was recently updated. The configuration of the Dutch territory has to 
fulfil the endpoint reported in point c by the end of 2010.  
 
Risk and LUP: the Dutch decision-making process 
While the Dutch external safety methodological approach is extensively described in 
literature, its connection with the Dutch territorial management practice called for a 
direct survey. In the Netherlands, the spatial planning system involves three levels: the 
national, the provincial and the municipal levels. As in the majority of European plan-
ning systems, the government establishes principles for spatial planning, defines build-
ing regulations and set-up long-term objectives for relevant urban and environmental 
issues (Van der Valk, 2002). All three tiers of government have independent planning 
powers, although the consistency requirement stated in the Dutch Spatial Planning Act 
has to be respected. The interaction between the tiers of government is characterized 
by consensus building and mutual adjustment. Hierarchical relations are rarely 
activated (Faludi & Van der Valk, 1994).  
This multi-level governance system is reflected in the supervision of hazardous 
installations by the side of different authorities. The Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment (VROM) is competent for facilities of national interest, 
such as nuclear power plants (NPP) and nuclear waste disposal. Dangerous establish-
ments falling under the Seveso II requirements are classified in accordance to 
threshold values considering the quantity of stored/treated dangerous substances. 
According to their classification, top-tier Seveso plants fall under the provincial 
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competence and, in case of lower-tier plants and small LPG storages, under the 
municipal competence. Operators whose facility falls under the Seveso Directive are 
responsible of the elaboration of a quantitative risk assessment (QRA). The 
supervising authority checks the validity of the analysis, and it is responsible for 
acquiring and updating all the information which are necessary to assess the 
compliance of the installation with the operational, spatial and environmental legal 
requirements.  
The described organization in the acquisition and validation of risk-related infor-
mation responds to a multi-level system, which reflects the institutional 
decentralization of the Country. Because of this decentralization, until recent 
developments in the risk-information system, geographical and industrial data of 
plants were spread out over numerous authorities. As a reaction to the Commissie 
Onderzoek Vuurwerkramp’s report (Commissie Onderzoek Vuurwerkramp, 2001), 
appointed after the accident of Enschede occurred in 2000, a national scale overview 
of the risk posed by Seveso establishments had to be created. Furthermore, the Seveso 
II Directive obligation of reporting major accident events to the European 
Commission Major Accidents Reporting System (MARS) (Joint Research Centre, 
20006) posed the problem of centralizing the information relative to accidents. 
Finally, the need of informing the public had to find a translation into a systematic 
elaboration and delivery of geographical risk-information. The most relevant 
initiatives in this respect were the development of the Installations Handling 
Dangerous Substances Database, managed by the Netherlands National Institute for 
Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), and the development of GIS-based risk 
maps (‘risicokaart’), which realization falls under the provincial responsibility. They 
are both described in the following section.  
 
Elaboration and representation of major accident risk information 
With the development of the Installations Handling Dangerous Substances Database 
the authority responsible for granting the environmental license to the operator of a 
given hazardous installations is obliged to forward all relevant information to the 
database. The authority responsible for granting the license is the owner of the data 
and it is responsible for their validity. Next to the development of the national 
database, the issue of delivering risk-information to different authorities and citizens 
in an easy-reading was addressed. As well known, the individual risk estimation is 
visualized as a set of concentric areas, representing different effect levels, which 
origin stands at the emission point of the accident. Effects are experimentally 
deducted. For each scenario, the probability of its likelihood is calculated; a 
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representative scenario is therefore selected for formulating the planning advice (Ale, 
2002; Bottelberghs, 2000). The vulnerability of the involved urban and environmental 
elements is classified accordingly to vulnerable categories (high, medium, low). 
Standing to this approach, the visualization of the risk connected to an accident results 
from the overlap between the selected accidental event, its iso-risk contours and the 
specific territorial context. Digital risk-maps reporting this overlap are therefore an 
obvious, although recent, operational development.  
For this purpose, risk-maps are developing under the provincial responsibility. The 
national Installations Handling Dangerous Substances Database is used as informative 
source together with the ISOR (Informatie Systeem Overige Ramptypen) database. 
ISOR is the result of the cooperation between the twelve Dutch provinces, in which 
additional risk information such as flood risks and vulnerable objects are collected. 
Data in this database is owned by municipalities. Thanks to these developments, 
previously spread out risk information are converging towards national, multi-
accessible d-bases. 
Provincial risk-maps are realized on a GIS platform. The variety and quantity of 
reported information is notable and comprise the localization of plants, the amount 
and nature of substances stored/treated, iso-risk contours and the emergency planning 
in the area. A recent model plotting societal risks on digital maps was developed by 
the Dutch Applied Research Institute TNO (Wiersma et al., 2005). A foreseeable 
evolution of risk-maps is therefore the incorporation of the societal risk contours. At 
present, individual risk contours are suitable to inform the development of spatial 
plans, building development plans and single planning permission. Furthermore, a 
version of risk-maps is used to inform the public and it is available via the Internet. 
This is discussed in the next section.  
 
Accessing risk-maps: status of the information  
In the Netherlands, besides to inform competent authorities, risk-maps have been de-
veloped as a tool to inform the public about the risk in their living environment. In 
accordance with the obligation of informing the citizens about the risk of major acci-
dents stated in the Seveso Directive, risk-maps are accessible via the Internet. The 
amount of reported information is notable. Citizens can access information about the 
location of hazardous installations, the hazardous substances that are used or 
produced, risks related to transport and the vulnerable objects in the area. The 
understanding of this information is supported by a detailed legend. Other kind of 
risks like panic in crowd and main aircraft routes are illustrated. Risk-maps do not 
allow any elaboration of the information and serve only for illustrative purposes; 
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nevertheless, users can select different layers with the information of interest and 
visualizing more or less accurate data. Examples can be found on www.risicokaart.nl 
(last visited: September 2006). The Province of Limburg risk-map is reported in 
Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2. 
 
 
Figure 3-1. Risk-map of the Province of Limburg: general overview of the area 
 
Figure 3-2. Risk-map of the Province of Limburg: the plant 
48   Geographical Dimensions of Risk Management 
 
Until the end of 2005, iso-risk contours were also reported in the provincial web-site 
and had a prominent communicative relevance. Strong of its information accessibility 
tradition, the underlying intention of the Dutch government was delivering easy-
reading geographical information to the public and complying, in so doing, with the 
Seveso II requirements (VROM Inspectie, 2005). Interestingly, although the 
accessibility of risk-information was responding to a requisite of transparency, a 
conflict with the increased European security requirements followed. The European 
communication of 2004 regarding the protection of critical infrastructures in the fight 
against terrorism underlined how all those “(…) physical and information technology 
facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a 
serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of citizens or the 
effective functioning of governments in the Member States (…)” should be carefully 
monitored and protected (Commission of the European Communities, 2004). The 
European Communication stressed the need of enhancing the elaboration and the 
exchange of information relative to critical infrastructures threats among public and 
private actors. Above all, it stressed the need of increasing the discretion in their 
dissemination. Being Seveso chemical plants responding to the definition of physical 
critical infrastructure, a conflict between the accessibility of risk-information and the 
security of the population had to be considered.  
This discussion opens an interesting reflection about the so-called “citizens’ right 
to know” (Gouldson, 2004). Generally, the access to environmental information 
related to industrial performance enhances a more transparent participation of 
institutional, industrial and non-institutional parties into decision making processes. 
Notwithstanding, in the case or risk-information, the same information access may 
result in a security threat. Once published on the Internet in fact, risk-information is 
accessible by uncontrollable users. The possibility of quantifying the amounts of 
safety increase and security loss is an interesting, although irresolvable, topic, which 
led to a political debate within the Dutch government. The debate led to the 
cancellation of iso-risk contours from the risk-maps delivered on the internet, as 
proposed by the cabinet on September the 9th 2005, on the base of the assumption that 
“[…] currently, security is more important than indefinite access to public government 
information […]” (Ministerraad, 2005). Interestingly, initially Dutch provinces 
refused to deny the access to iso-risk contours via the Internet. Their motivation was 
based on the assumption that accessing risk-information played a role in the 
improvement of citizens’ coping-capacity, and that the adopted risk information policy 
was in line with the citizens ‘right to know’. Nevertheless, after January 1st 2006 iso-
risk contours were cancelled from the web and currently the consultation of risk 
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contours by the side of citizens is subject to a specific procedure. This paper reports 
only general reflections about this controversial issue in the conclusions. 
 
 
3.4.  Land-use planning and major accidents risk in the UK 
 
Risk assessment method and risk tolerability definition 
In the United Kingdom, the Seveso II Directive is implemented in several regulations. 
With respect to the licensing procedure and prescribed risk assessment methods, legal 
references are the Notification of Installation Handling Hazardous Substances Regula-
tions (NIHHS) and/or the Control of Industrial Major Accidents Hazard Regulation 
(CIMAH) 1999. Land use planning in the surroundings of chemical sites is regulated 
by the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990 and the Planning (Hazardous Sub-
stances) Regulations 1992, as amended by The Planning (Control of Major-Accident 
Hazards) Regulations 1999. 
The competent authority for safety-concerned issues is the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE). HSE risk assessment method is extensively described in literature 
(HSE, 1989; Pape, 1989). The Hazardous Installation Directorate (HID) of HSE has 
developed a judgmental approach to risk assessment. The proportionality principle and 
an approach to risk estimation that varies depending on the different types of 
accidental scenarios apply. Although probabilistic in principle, a consequence-oriented 
approach is usually used to assess accidental scenarios involving the release of 
flammable liquid to which the risk of fires or explosions is associated. When 
performing the planning advice, these scenarios are object of a consequence-oriented 
estimation. Notably, risk assessment is based on the maximum quantity of substance 
each establishment is allowed to store. This leads to a conservative and precautionary 
evaluation of safety distances. After the characterization of the accidental scenarios 
associated to a specific plant is concluded, the one more relevant to perform the LUP 
advice is selected. As the “risk profile” of a plant usually sees the predominance of a 
single scenario, LUP evaluations are based on it (HSE, 2004). Concluding, the aspects 
of HSE risk regulation relevant to land use planning are: 
• the ALARP/ALARA principle, which origin can be retraced in the common-law 
orientation of the UK legal system (Ale, 2005b).  
50   Geographical Dimensions of Risk Management 
 
• the quantitative approach to risk assessment, using both the risk-oriented (in case 
of toxic release) and the consequence-oriented (in case of thermal radiation and 
explosions) methods for the definition of “consultation-distances” around plants. 
• the definition of individual risk (IR), in the first case, as the probability to receive 
at least a dangerous dose (DD) and, in the second approach, to receive a 
prescribed thermal dose unit (without any probabilistic judgment) Account is 
taken of those local circumstances (such as the prevailing wind direction) that are 
relevant to estimating the area the hazard will affect.  
• the definition of societal risk as the integration of the IR judgment with population 
data. 
• the definition of four sensitivity levels for territorial and human targets, supporting 
the classification of a given area in terms of its specific vulnerability. 
The HSE is responsible for the definition of each dangerous installation, of the so-
called “consulting-distance”, reporting the three inner, middle and outer iso-risk 
contours. Within this area, the consultation of the agency for planning purposes is 
mandatory. 
 
Risk and LUP: the UK decision-making process 
Differently than the Netherlands, the UK has a strongly centralized safety authority, 
which is the Health and Safety Executive and, in Northern Ireland, the Health and 
Safety Executive of Northern Ireland. The Hazardous Installation Directorate (HID) of 
HSE is competent for all hazardous installations in the Country and it is involved in 
planning processes regarding chemical installations, pipelines and explosive facilities. 
The role of HSE is twofold: on the one hand, it advices Local Planning Agencies 
(LPAs) on the Hazardous Substances Consent (i.e. installation and/or modification of 
Seveso II plants), while on the other hand it gives advice on the compatibility of pro-
posed territorial developments within pre-existing dangerous areas. This second 
advice is carried out by personnel of the local offices of the HID Directorate and it is 
supported by a codified system known as PADHI (Planning Advice for Developments 
near Hazardous Installations), a software that came into force in 2002 in order to 
facilitate and speed the advising process. PADHI leads to the outputs “ADVICE 
AGAINST” or “DON’T ADVICE AGAINST” on the base of both risk analysis data 
(scenarios, risk contours and/or effects areas) and territorial data (type of targets, 
proposed developments’ sensitivity level, population data) (HSE, 2005a).  
Notably, the HID has no enforcement power: it is entirely under the responsibility 
of Planning Agencies, which are competent for local land-use plans as well as for 
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granting the license to plants’ operators, whether to implement the advice stemming 
from the PADHI procedure. This advisory role of HSE with respect to planning 
authorities reflects the nature of UK health & safety system, based on a great 
autonomy of Local authorities on the one hand, and on an efficient cooperation among 
different governmental agencies on the other hand. Standing to this configuration of 
the decisional process in fact, the two phases of risk assessment and risk reduction are 
clearly distinguished: LUP decisions may, theoretically, exceed the safety advice both 
towards a major than a minor safety level. Practically, HSE advices are followed in the 
large majority of cases and are implemented by LPAs in the almost totality of land-use 
plans. 
The HSE advice is delivered to LPAs in form of risk-map, where the three inner, 
middle and outer iso-risk or iso-harm areas are represented on the relative cartographic 
base. As in the Netherlands, both the individual and the societal risk are LUP criteria. 
Differently, the societal risk is not numerically assessed and compared with numerical 
risk criteria. The concept refers to general high-density populated areas and/or specific 
vulnerable targets (hospitals, schools, elderly, children, etc), which presence has to be 
considered in order to integrate the judgment resulting from the individual risk 
criteria. Hence, SR assessment is an integration of the individual risk estimation with 
population data. Interestingly, this approach to the definition of “societal risk” for 
modelling major accident scenarios involves a major attention for the vulnerability of 
the population of a given area. In the UK, this resulted in the development of a 
national database mapping, using a GIS technology, the population distribution with a 
specific reference to different vulnerability levels. Its development was commissioned 
by the Methodology and Standards Development Unit (MSDU) of the HSE in 2002 
(Smith et al., 2005). Focusing on the distribution and characteristics of the population 
of given areas, it aimed at developing the potential for a GIS system to be used to 
provide data on the targets at risk from hazardous events. Owned and managed by 
HSE, no direct public access is allowed. Therefore, in comparison to the Netherlands, 
the UK risk assessment method, the adopted LUP criteria and the societal risk 
definition led to the development of a remarkably different risk-informative system, in 
which it is particularly evident a different risk-maps elaboration and accessibility. 
These aspects are discussed in the following section.  
 
Informing LUP process: the role of GIS risk-maps  
In the light of the essential role of HSE in the UK land-use planning processes, a 
review of its method was initiated in 1998 (HSE, 2005b). The review aimed at 
clarifying whether HSE role and methods were still valid, robust and in line with 
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broader governmental policies for land development. Being the HSE advice still based 
on the document Risk Criteria for Land Use Planning in the vicinity of Major 
Industrial Hazards of 1989 (HSE, 1989), verifying eventual bottlenecks in the system 
was advisable. One of the outcomes of the review was the proposal of developing a 
modified version of PADHI enabling LPAs to carry out risk-related LUP assessments 
independently. The project has been carried out by the Geographical Information 
Systems (GIS) team of the Risk Assessment Section of HSL (Balmforth, 2005). 
Within the project, a scoping study involving volunteer LPAs and addressed to 
explore the format of the HSE advice that could have replaced the ordinary paper 
format was carried out and published in 2005. Results outlined that a GIS format for 
risk-maps (called, in the document, “3 zone map”) was preferred by LPAs, as they 
would have had the opportunity of updating their existing database with compatible 
format data.  
The need of facilitating the consultation procedure via GIS-based advices stemmed 
from the relative frequent update of HSE risk-maps. Each time HSE assessment 
involves some changes in the risk contours or new developments in the vicinity of 
installations are promoted, new risk-maps are to be forwarded to LPAs. Hence, 
evolving to a GIS format represented a natural step of the advice procedure. Other 
findings of the scoping study were the preference, by the side of LPAs, of the 
representation of the three-zones in three different GIS layers instead on one layer 
with three different zones, in order to allow the switch off of different harm/risk areas 
when desired. Notably, with the came into force of the National Population Database 
in 2005, an overlap between the three-zones risk-maps and the geographical sensitivity 
population data is been made possible, enhancing the visualization of all the 
information relevant to define appropriate land-uses.  
 
Status and accessibility of risk-information  
Differently than in other European countries, the increased security needs deriving 
from (the threat of) terrorist attacks found in the United Kingdom a prompt translation 
in limited accessibility to risk-related information. Concerning the specific case of 
risk-maps, a first remarkable point is that they do not contain neither any reference 
regarding the substance treated/stored within the plant nor a pinpoint regarding the 
areas of plants where substances are stored. Maps as the one showed in Figure 3-3 
report only the three-zones of iso-risk or hazard and the name and address of the 
hazardous site. Risk-maps are not directly accessible via the Internet although they can 
be consulted by the citizens upon request. This can be obtained applying both to the 
HSE and LPAs. In this second case, a procedure concerning the motivations for which 
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subjects want to access risk-maps may be in place. As a result of the IFRLUP project, 
during the course of 2006 HSE’s risk-maps will be stored on a secure electronic 
server, accessible by LPAs by setting up a user profile. Citizens will not be granted 
access to this “map library” but they will still be able to access them via specific 
request. 
 
 
Figure 3-3. Example of a hypothetical three-zone risk-map realized in ArcGIS format, 
representing the case of a toxic substance for which 3 effects areas with different frequencies 
values are estimated  
 
  
3.5.  Conclusions and discussion  
 
In both the examined countries, the potential of geographically based risk-informative 
systems to represent major risks at national scale is evident. Furthermore, the 
suitability of shared d-base to connect different institutional actors during decision 
making processes is of outstanding evidence. In both countries, risk-maps are 
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becoming more central to local risk-prevention practices and GIS databases storing the 
enormous amount of data regarding the national risk situation came recently into 
force. Although differences in the two risk regulations led to the development of 
different forms of cooperation among the several competent authorities, a good 
connection between the operational competences of Safety and Planning Authorities 
seems to be achieved. 
A notable difference between the two examined countries regards the possibility of 
accessing risk-maps by the side of the public. In the Netherlands, a notable amount of 
risk information is available for the public via the Internet. In the UK, although the 
transparency of decisional processes is guaranteed by the public status of the informa-
tion, risk-maps can be gathered by the public after a specific request.  
This remarkable difference cannot be explained in a univocal way. A first explana-
tion might be a different interpretation of the threat represented by the availability of 
information regarding the existence and localization of chemical sites in the national 
territories. Evidently, a different estimation of deriving risks and a different priority 
assigned to the accessibility of information ground the choice of limiting or allowing 
the access to risk-maps by the side of public. In this perspective, a different 
interpretation of the precautionary principle (PP) can be brought into the discussion. 
As well known, there is no univocal interpretation of the PP and the debate about its 
feasible use within the technological risk prevention domain is still lively. In the 
Dutch case, where the delivery of risk information might lead to an uncontrollable 
(and not estimable) decrease of security, a more precautionary approach seems to be in 
conflict with the transparency informing the planning policy. In the UK instead, a 
major concern regards the confidentiality of industrial information and the protection 
of the population from the threat of terrorism; consequently, a precautionary approach 
applies. Both choices have a consequence in the balance between security and 
transparency. In the Dutch case, the balance hangs for transparency, with a 
governmental exposure in terms of responsibility for the exposed citizens. In the 
United Kingdom instead, the ‘right to know’ of citizens is not interpreted as a passive 
delivery of risk-information, as the balance hangs for security. Which role, then, for 
the precautionary principle as a needle of the balance? This question opens to 
interesting research developments. Generally, the authors believe that the two national 
orientations are responding to historical heritages and cultural backgrounds.  
In the UK, terrorism has been a serious threat during the past three decades, until 
the recent terrorist attack of Al Qa’ida in 2005. Combined with the traditional 
confidential attitude of the UK culture, it is not surprising that information which is 
potentially subject to misuse is carefully protected. Differently, in the recent Dutch 
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history terrorist attacks have been of scarce impact. The risk-regulation policy 
development shows that the attention given to inform the public lies in the long history 
of accidental events occurred within densely urbanized areas. In a Country with a 
population density of 450 inhabitants per km2 (Ale 2005), which is affected by the 
prior and constant risk of flood, the full awareness concerning major risks is a key 
factor of prevention. This explains, at least in part, the tendency of facilitating the 
access to risk information. In this respect, the choice of binding part of it seems 
reasonable, as it balances safety and security needs without altering the Dutch political 
tradition.  
In conclusion, the creation of national risk-informative systems on a geographical 
information platform to enhance the cooperation between authorities and stakeholders 
seems to be the advisable frontier of European risk prevention practices. Nevertheless, 
the investigation confirmed that different developments and applications of these 
instruments are grounded, again, on the political, cultural and historical contexts in 
which they are created.  
 
Acknowledgments  
We are grateful to Helen Balmforth from the Health and Safety Laboratory of HSE 
(Buxton, UK) for the documents and the suggestions she furnished. We acknowledge 
the Dutch personnel of the Dutch Ministry of Environment (VROM) for their remarks 
and corrections.  
 
56   Geographical Dimensions of Risk Management 
 
  
 
4 
 
 
The Consideration of Emergency Management Issues in 
Spatial Planning Practices* 
 
Abstract 
In the Netherlands, the possibilities for emergency preparation and response should be 
explicitly addressed when considering land development in the vicinity of hazardous 
installations or transport routes for hazardous materials. For this reason, regional fire 
departments provide local planning authorities with safety recommendations regarding 
the consideration of emergency management issues in their land allocation plans. This 
paper examines the implementation of these recommendations. We found that 
possibilities for emergency response could be increased through spatial planning. 
Therefore, the collaboration between planners and emergency responders in general 
should be considered. In this respect, the safety recommendations examined in this 
paper can be regarded as a promising way of organising this collaboration. The com-
municative character of the safety advice process fits in well with the more general 
communicative and collaborative approaches to planning. For these reasons, the 
experiences with the safety recommendations in the Netherlands can also be relevant 
for other countries. 
 
Keywords: emergency management, industrial hazards, societal risks, spatial planning 
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4.1.  Introduction 
 
Spatial planning can play an important role in increasing the safety of citizens in 
industrial areas. Within many European Member States, spatial planning is already 
used as an instrument to implement safety distances around hazardous installations 
(Cozzani et al., 2006). These safety distances reduce the exposure of people and prop-
erty to industrial hazards. The strategic spatial plans and, in particular, the operational 
land-use plans and building codes resulting from spatial planning processes can also 
be used as instruments to require the adaptation of buildings in the vicinity of indus-
trial activities. Stronger walls and windows, for example, can protect inhabitants in 
case of an explosion. Furthermore, the planning process offers the actors involved the 
opportunity for dialogue, allowing safety issues to be addressed and opportunities for 
reducing risks to be identified (Walker, 2000). Consequently, many pre-disaster 
studies have highlighted the fact that a further consideration of safety risk issues in 
planning is desirable to reduce safety risks (Ale, 2005a; Caragliano & Manca, 2007; 
Cruz et al., 2006).  
In addition to spatial planning, emergency preparation can contribute to the safety 
of citizens. Preparation includes activities and measures taken in advance to ensure an 
effective emergency response, such as enhancing emergency capacities by developing 
a contingency plan or providing training for response activities like evacuation or 
medical care (Godschalk, 1991).  
Whereas strategic and operational spatial planning both focus strongly on influ-
encing the physical characteristics of an area, such as the location of urban 
development or safety measures for construction projects, emergency preparation 
focuses mainly on organisational aspects, such as coordination, communication or 
logistics during emergency response (Caragliano & Manca, 2007). Nevertheless, 
spatial planning and emergency management activities are interrelated. The physical 
characteristics of an area greatly influence the possibilities for emergency response. 
Moreover, emergency response may require specific physical measures. The presence 
of access routes or a considerable amount of water for fire extinguishing, for example, 
can increase the possibilities for emergency response. However, limited possibilities 
for emergency response in an area can be a reason to search for alternative develop-
ment locations or additional physical measures, such as improving emergency access, 
for example. For these reasons, collaborative thinking and acting, involving spatial 
planners as well as emergency managers, can increase the safety of citizens and 
increase the coherence of safety measures. Nevertheless, little research has been done 
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that explicitly looks at the way emergency management issues, including emergency 
preparation and response concerns, are addressed in pre-disaster spatial planning 
practices. Therefore, in this paper we examine the consideration of emergency 
management issues in spatial planning practices in more detail. The central research 
question is: how are emergency management concerns addressed and implemented in 
spatial planning practices?  
The findings presented in this paper are based on case study research in the 
Netherlands. Our aim is to understand how emergency management concerns related 
to industrial hazards are addressed and implemented in spatial planning practices. We 
focus on the so-called societal risks, which are addressed in the safety recommenda-
tions from the regional fire departments. Since these safety recommendations can be 
regarded as a central instrument for the consideration of emergency management 
issues in spatial planning, the central research question will be answered by assessing 
the content and implementation of these safety recommendations. We will start with 
an overview of Dutch policies on industrial risks and spatial planning, followed by a 
description of our conceptual framework and our case study approach. We will then 
present our research findings. We first examine the content and implementation of the 
safety recommendations, paying attention to the role and usefulness of these recom-
mendations. Then, in the concluding section, we reflect on these findings and draw 
more general conclusions about the integration of spatial planning and emergency 
management.  
 
 
4.2  Dutch policies on industrial risks and spatial planning  
 
Article 12 of the European Seveso II Directive on dangerous substances (96/82/EC) 
requires Member States – in their land-use planning policies – to consider the need for 
defining opportune safety distances between dangerous establishments and urban, 
natural and infrastructural developments. In the Netherlands, the Seveso II Directive is 
implemented through the Dutch Major Hazards Decree (Besluit risico’s zware  
ongevallen – Brzo, 1999) and the Dutch Public Safety Decree (Besluit externe 
veiligheid inrichtingen – Bevi, 2004). The Brzo focuses on the management of 
hazardous installations. The Bevi concerns the regulation of land use in the vicinity of 
hazardous installations, i.e. the external safety regulations. Therefore, this section 
focuses on the Bevi.  
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In the Netherlands, land-use regulations in the vicinity of hazardous industrial 
activities, such as the production of ammonia, storage of fireworks, transport of chlo-
rine or use of airports, are explicitly risk based. Risks are quantified in terms of prob-
abilities and effects, and are expressed as individual risk (IR) and societal risk (SR). 
National acceptability criteria for IR and SR, among other considerations, should be 
used to guide land use in the vicinity of hazardous activities. 
Individual risk (IR) is defined as the probability that a person permanently 
residing at a location in the vicinity of a hazardous activity will be killed due to an 
accident involving that activity (Ale, 2002; Bottelberghs, 2000). In the criteria for IR, 
a distinction is made between vulnerable and less vulnerable objects. Vulnerable 
objects include residential areas, hospitals and schools. For these objects, the legally 
determined criterion is 10-6. In other words, the statistical probability that a person 
permanently residing at a particular location will be killed due to an incident with the 
hazardous activity should not be greater than 1 in 1 million, or 0.0001% per year. For 
less vulnerable objects such as office buildings, hotels, restaurants, shops, recreation 
facilities and so forth, the IR criterion is 10-5, i.e. a probability of 1/100,000 per year 
(VROM, 2005). Individual risks can be mapped out by connecting points of equal IR 
around a facility, creating risk contours as applied in different EU Member States (see 
for example Basta et al., 2007). Based on the IR criteria, these contours can be con-
verted into safety distances, which are legally binding and must be implemented in 
local land allocation plans. An example of IR contours is shown in Figure 4-1.  
 
 
Figure 4-1. IR contours for a fictitious hazardous installation 
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Societal risk (SR) is defined as the probability that more than a certain number of 
people will be killed in an accident (Ale, 2002; Bottelberghs, 2000). Figure 4-2 shows 
a graph, referred to as an FN graph, which displays the cumulative frequency (F) of 
more than N fatalities. The two diagonal lines represent the orientation values for SR 
for installations and transportation risks, respectively. The FN graph for hazardous 
installations illustrates that the acceptability of a disaster with 10 fatalities is set at 10-5 
per year, and at 10-7 per year for a potential disaster with 100 fatalities. In other words: 
the statistical probability of an accident with an installation resulting in 100 fatalities 
is acceptable if the statistical probability of such an accident is lower than once in 10 
million years or 0.00001%. As shown in Figure 4-2, the SR criteria become 100 times 
stricter for every expected tenfold increase in the number of victims.  
 
 
 
Figure 4-2. FN-curve representing the SR criteria for hazardous establishments (broken line) 
and the transport of hazardous materials (continuous line) 
 
In contrast to the IR criteria, the SR criteria are not legally binding. They can be 
regarded as orientation values for spatial planners, amongst others, and show which 
societal risks are regarded as acceptable in Dutch external safety policies. Conse-
quently, there is room for interpretation, and planning authorities must explain how 
they take account of the SR in their spatial plans. While the procedures for addressing 
the SR require special attention for emergency management issues, the discussion 
generally concentrates on how these issues are dealt with. The remainder of this paper 
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will therefore focus on the SR and on the consideration of emergency management 
issues to reduce risks. 
The procedures for the consideration of SR issues are described in the Bevi. 
According to the Bevi, the following aspects should be addressed if land development 
is proposed that can affect the SR within an area (VROM, 2004): 
• The existing and new objects (vulnerable and less vulnerable) and people in the 
sphere of influence of a hazardous activity. The sphere of influence can be 
described as the area in which, in a specific accident scenario, at least 1% of the 
people would be killed.  
• The SR within the area. 
• The contribution of the hazardous activity to the SR. 
• The possibilities and intended measures for reducing the SR. 
• The advantages and disadvantages of alternatives for spatial development, e.g. 
development at other locations. 
• The possibilities for emergency response and emergency preparation. 
• The possibilities for people to save themselves in case of an accident, referred to 
as self-help.  
The Bevi also stipulates that the regional fire department must be consulted about the 
safety consequences if the SR can be affected by proposed developments or spatial 
plans. The objectives of the safety recommendations from the regional fire department 
(NVBR, 2005) are the following: 
• to provide insight into the external safety risks and the possibilities for emergency 
management and self-help; 
• to suggest potential measures to reduce external safety risks and especially to 
increase the capacities for emergency response and self-help, and 
• to make land-use authorities more aware of the residual risks in case the proposed 
spatial developments are implemented. 
The regional fire department needs to be consulted if land developments are proposed 
near installations that fall under the Seveso II Directive. Nevertheless, the fire 
department should also be consulted if the SR is affected through developments near 
hazardous installations that do not fall under this directive, such as relatively small 
installations. This consultation should increase the attention for external safety risks in 
spatial planning practices. Therefore, we assume that safety recommendations have 
the potential to contribute to risk reduction. But municipalities also have discretionary 
freedom in implementing suggested measures to reduce SR, because the SR criteria 
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are not legally binding. In this light, we will examine how the safety measures to 
reduce SR, as addressed in the safety recommendations, are implemented. 
It should be noted, however, that the regional fire department is not the only 
organisation that advises a municipality on societal risks. At the local level, the 
planning department can also be advised by the local fire department. But this 
department is mainly involved in providing advice about building applications and 
regulations and is less involved in external safety policies. At the regional and national 
levels, guidelines on external safety can be given by the national government and the 
provinces. It goes without saying that these guidelines also apply to the regional fire 
department. Our research therefore focused on the safety recommendations of this 
department, as it is the main municipal advisor on issues related to the possibilities for 
emergency management and self-help. 
 
 
4.3.  Conceptual framework 
  
The use of safety recommendations can be analysed from both a conformance and 
performance perspective. Conformance studies strongly focus on decision-making 
outcomes in the light of the objective of the policy instrument itself (Faludi & Van der 
Valk, 1994; Hopkins, 2001; Mastop & Faludi, 1997). However, classic conformance 
studies have been criticised for not providing insight into what produced conformance 
(De Lange, 1995; Hopkins, 2001). In addition, some spatial planning researchers have 
argued that an evaluation should also consider the way a plan, an instrument or a 
policy was used in the decision-making process and how this helped the community 
reach outcomes. This view is referred to as a performance view. Mastop and Faludi 
(1997), for example, emphasised the importance of evaluating the contribution of a 
plan or instrument to the decision-making process in general. The prime concern 
should not be whether a plan or recommendation is followed, but whether the plan or 
instrument plays a role in the decision-making process. As a result, the planning 
process itself becomes the object of evaluation instead of the planning outcome. 
Several factors can influence conformance and performance. Evaluations of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment, for example, showed that a combination of 
cooperative and coercive strategies can positively influence the conformance and 
performance of environmental recommendations. Cooperative mechanisms such as 
dialogues can stimulate the exchange of tacit knowledge and can result in trust-
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building between actors. These ideas fit into collaborative and communicative 
planning approaches (see for example Healey, 2006; Healey et al., 1999; Needham, 
2007). Within such collaborative planning approaches, great importance is attached to 
intersubjective communication and to the quality of this communication. It is prefer-
able that important interests that might be affected by a particular plan are brought up 
for discussion, and that the individuals representing these interests take part freely, 
equally and without coercion in a cooperative search for the better argument (Booher 
& Innes, 2002; Innes, 1998). Coercive activities, such as the application of rules and 
regulations, can serve as a safety net for crucial issues that cannot be guaranteed by 
communication and collaboration alone (Van Dijk, 2008). However, an instrument 
that is too strict or rigid can result in actors focusing on avoiding sanctions instead of 
on establishing safety interests. Consequently, finding a balance between coercive and 
cooperative mechanisms remains essential. 
Research on hazard management at the local level has led to similar findings 
(Burby, 1998; Burby & May, 1997; May et al., 1996). However, these studies also 
emphasised the influence of commitment of public bodies to hazard mitigation. 
Commitment to hazard mitigation positively influences conformance and performance 
of hazard mitigation instruments. Besides the coercive and communicative strategies 
of government actors, this commitment was also influenced by psychological factors, 
trade-offs between other interests, public commitment and capacities of local authori-
ties (Deyle et al., 2008; Deyle et al., 1998; Godschalk et al., 1999; May & Deyle, 
1998; May et al., 1996; Mileti, 1999; Olshansky & Kartez, 1998; White & Richards, 
2007). Table 4-1 gives an overview of these factors, together with examples for each 
factor. A distinction can be made in Table 4-1 between factors that mainly influence 
the explicit consideration of safety measures and factors that mainly influence the 
implementation of measures. Government strategies and policies and psychological 
factors, for example, mainly influence the consideration of measures, whereas trade-
offs and public commitment mainly influence the actual implementation of measures 
in society. Nevertheless, the relative importance of the factors mentioned in the table 
may differ. For example, Olshansky and Kartez (1998) emphasised that local govern-
ments that planned for hazard mitigation had adequate staff, while May et al. (1996) 
concluded that the capacity of local governments was not a crucial factor that con-
strained the commitment of the authorities they studied. This table will be used to 
understand the conformance and performance of safety recommendations that were 
found, as discussed in the following section. 
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Table 4-1. Factors that influence commitment 
Factors that influence commitment  
Government policies and strategies 
• The lack of an overarching central policy, with clear and realistic guidelines, that 
gives high priority to land-use provisions for governing land use and development 
in flood prone areas 
• The absence of strong monitoring and enforcement policies (such as coercive 
mandates and sanctions) for local governments which do not address flood risk 
issues in spatial planning 
• The lack of policies to stimulate commitment  
• The presence of other policies that indirectly encourage development in hazardous 
areas, such as insurance systems, the construction of dikes or the improvement of 
infrastructure in flood-prone areas, which may limit opportunities for local govern-
ments to apply land-use management tools  
• Lack of technical and other forms of assistance to local governments, such as 
financial assistance 
Psychological factors 
• The lack of experience with floods, which often reduces the sense of urgency for 
flood mitigation measures 
• The perceived remoteness in time of low-probability hazards, which leads to sharp 
discounting of the benefits of avoided costs  
• The implementation of recurrence intervals, such as the 100-year flood zone, may 
result in a perception of absolute boundaries between hazardous and non-hazardous 
areas  
Trade-offs between other interests 
• The allocation of resources to natural hazards has limited visible rewards 
• Many flood-prone areas are already fully built up, and remedial actions are costly to 
implement 
• Hazard prone areas are often very valuable locations, e.g. through ocean view or 
access to water and water-based transport, and are attractive for urban development 
• Land-use regulations in flood prone areas may lead to urban developments 
elsewhere, which can be undesirable for other reasons such as nature conservation 
or accessibility 
Public commitment 
• The lack of public recognition of flood risks due to the lack of experience with 
floods 
• The lack of public participation in decision-making  
• Active opposition by other interests such as real estate and property development 
interests and entitlements based on previous local development plans and measures 
• Existing rights such as property rights and the right of development may be much 
stronger, and therefore it may be difficult to limit development in hazardous areas 
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Capacities of local authorities 
• Lack of staff, expertise and resources on hazard mitigation issues 
• Lack of clear and authoritative risk maps and risk information  
• There is no hazard-free land available for development, e.g. through other 
regulation policies such as nature conservation  
• There is little spatial contrast in levels of hazards, thus it is difficult to define 
meaningful boundaries between hazardous and non-hazardous areas 
 
 
4.4.  Case study approach 
 
Our findings are based on an examination of specific practices or cases. Case studies 
can provide an in-depth understanding of specific social phenomena (Yin, 2005). In 
addition, they can provide context-dependent knowledge, which is crucial for under-
standing phenomena that cannot be understood by ‘general rules’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001). 
Consequently, case studies are regarded as especially suitable for answering ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions (Gray, 2004). A case study approach was therefore used in our study.  
Dutch emergency management services are organised regionally. The Netherlands 
is divided into 25 safety regions, each of which is responsible for emergency response. 
Each safety region (which includes several municipalities) consists of a police 
department, fire department, and medical and paramedical services. Our examination 
of the implementation of safety recommendations focused on two contrasting safety 
regions: a relatively high-risk region (the Rijnmond, in the western part of the 
Netherlands) and a lower risk region (Gelderland Midden in the centre of the 
Netherlands) (Figure 4-3). By selecting these two contrasting regions, comparisons 
could be made between the two regions and between the different reasons that were 
found for the conformance and performance of the safety recommendations.  
The Rijnmond region can be characterised as an industrial urban area, inhabited by 
almost 1.2 million people. This region includes the industrial harbour of Rotterdam, 
one of the largest harbours in the world. In addition, about 22,000 industrial enter-
prises of above-average size are located within this region. These enterprises are 
involved in activities such as the production of chemical products, energy production 
and transport (Kruize & Bouwman, 2004). Furthermore, the region includes an 
international airport.  
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Figure 4-3. The safety regions Rijnmond and Gelderland-Midden 
 
Compared to the Rijnmond region, Gelderland Midden, which is inhabited by 650,000 
people, is not only a less densely populated region, it can also be characterised as less 
hazardous region, since it is less industrialised than the Rijnmond region. 
Nevertheless, hazardous activities such as the storage or production of chemicals or 
the transport of hazardous materials also take place in Gelderland Midden. An issue of 
particular concern is the transport of hazardous materials via the Betuwe Railway line, 
a new freight rail line that connects the Rijnmond region with the German hinterland.  
In consultation with both regional fire departments, ten spatial planning projects 
were selected: five from each safety region. This allowed comparison both between 
and within regions. The selection of a limited number of projects allowed a deeper 
analysis, leading to more understanding of the use and implementation of safety 
recommendations. Only projects that were related to the development of land alloca-
tion plans were selected. It was assumed that respondents would be most familiar with 
the planning process of recent projects. For that reason, only recent projects, for which 
the safety recommendations were made no more than two years previously, were 
selected. As a result, however, not all of the planning processes that we examined had 
been completed. The analysis therefore represents perceptions of outcomes at a 
particular point in time in the planning process. The resulting projects represented a 
wide variety of safety issues, as illustrated in Table 4-2.  
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Table 4-2. An overview of the examined case projects 
  Case project Major safety concerns 
C1 De Corridor, 
Duiven 
The proposed extension of catering establishments and 
retail shops results in an increased SR due to the presence 
of an LPG station and the transport of hazardous materials 
on the adjacent motorway. 
C2 De Hoven, 
Bennekom 
The transport of hazardous materials on the adjacent 
motorway causes safety risks for the proposed assisted 
living complex.  
C3 Kernhem, Ede The proposed residential development results in an 
increased SR through the presence of a gas pipeline and the 
transport of hazardous materials, especially on the adjacent 
motorway.  
C4 Groot Holthuizen, 
Zevenaar 
SR is expected to increase due to the proposed development 
of a residential area and industrial estate and the presence of 
a gas pipeline and the transport of hazardous materials on 
the adjacent Betuwe Railway line and motorway.  
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C5 Kleefse Waard, 
Arnhem 
The existing hazardous installations on the industrial estate 
can conflict with the proposed further development of the 
estate. Through the development of additional industrial 
buildings, SR can increase.  
C6 Schieveste, 
Schiedam 
A gas pipeline and the transport of hazardous materials on 
the adjacent motorway cause a safety risk for the plan area. 
Two alternatives were analysed in the safety 
recommendations: high and low-density alternatives. In 
both alternatives, SR will increase, but in the high-density 
alternative, the SR criteria will be exceeded.  
C7 Terbregge- Oost, 
Rotterdam 
As a result of the high population density around a freight 
railway line, SR risks were exceeded. In addition, the 
presence of an LPG station causes a safety risk for the area.  
C8 Schiekamp, 
Spijkenisse 
Two LPG stations are present in the plan area. IR criteria 
are met. The SR criteria are exceeded and the proposed 
industrial estates result in a modest increase in the SR. In 
addition a gas pipeline causes a safety risk.  
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C9 Oosteindse polder,  
Bergschen-hoek 
Some existing buildings are situated within the safety 
distances (IR) of the adjacent airport. There is a proposal to 
build 50 houses within the sphere of influence of this 
airport. This development would result in an increase in SR. 
In addition, risks caused by urban developments in the 
vicinity of a gas pipeline should be considered. 
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C10 Klappolder, 
Bleiswijk 
The extension of some industrial buildings will be allowed, 
but two gas pipelines are present within the area. The 
present and proposed land use will not conflict with the IR 
and SR criteria. 
 
The fire departments and municipalities concerned provided the safety recommenda-
tions and relevant planning documents. First, it was determined which measures were 
suggested in the safety recommendations. Second, the planning documents were 
examined in the light of their conformance with the safety recommendations. In this 
respect, we focused mainly on the outcome of the planning process. We evaluated not 
only the conformance of the land-use plan to the measures suggested in the safety 
recommendations, but also the conformance of the plan to the general goal of the 
safety recommendations, which was risk reduction. 
The reasons for municipalities to accept or reject safety recommendations were 
addressed explicitly through additional interviews with representatives of the two 
regional fire departments and spatial planners of the ten selected case projects. The 
interviews were semi-structured and took about one hour each. The interview reports 
have been approved by the respondents. Additional telephone consultations were 
carried out to discuss questions that could not be fully answered during the interviews. 
In order to acquire an initial idea of the performance of the recommendations, the 
respondents were asked how they regarded the role and usefulness of the safety 
recommendations in the spatial planning process. In addition they were asked why 
some aspects of the safety recommendations were implemented in the spatial plan 
while others were not, and what happened with safety recommendations that were not 
implemented in the spatial plan. The reasons given by the representatives provided 
insight into the various factors that could explain the conformance and performance of 
the safety recommendations. The factors, as mentioned in Table 4-1, were used to 
structure and interpret these reasons.  
The following sections discuss the research results. The five cases in the Gelder-
land Midden region are labelled C1 through C5, the cases in the Rijnmond region are 
labelled C6 through C10. The labelling of respondents is consistent with the labelling 
of the cases. For example, respondent 6 (noted as R6) refers to case C6 in the 
Rijnmond area. 
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4.5.  Content and implementation of safety recommendations 
 
In their safety recommendations, the regional fire departments addressed a wide vari-
ety of emergency management issues. The advice given in the safety recommenda-
tions is summarised in Table 4-3, together with the number of times a specific piece of 
advice was found in the analysed safety recommendations (ten in total). Table 4-3 
gives an indication of the type of issues that were addressed in the safety recommen-
dations. Most recommendations focused directly on increasing the capacity for emer-
gency response, which we defined as the capacity of the area to respond immediately 
to an event and the response in the aftermath of an event. Measures to increase the 
emergency response capacity were mentioned in recommendations 1, 2, 4 and 6. In 
addition, other risk-reduction measures were suggested which were indirectly related 
to emergency management. First, the reduction of the hazard, defined as the industrial 
activity that could cause injury or loss of life, was addressed in recommendations 8 
and 11. Second, the limitation of exposure of vulnerable people and objects was 
addressed in recommendations 7, 10, 12, 13 and 14. Third, increasing the capacity of 
the area to resist an incident was suggested in recommendations 9 and 15. Finally, 
some procedural advice was given in recommendations 3 and 5.  
 
Table 4-3. Safety issues addressed in the safety recommendations for the Gelderland Midden 
(Gld) and Rijnmond (Rnm) cases respectively 
 Municipalities should: Gld Rnm 
1. Increase the possibilities for self-help through risk communication 5 4 
2. Consider the current and future fire extinguishing water infrastructure  5 4 
3. Explain how societal risks were addressed in the land allocation plan 5 3 
4. Provide escape routes away from the risk object  2 4 
5. Recognise and accept residual risks 5 0 
6. Ensure accessibility for emergency services  2 2 
7. Exclude vulnerable objects from hazard-prone areas 3 1 
8. Consult the owner of the gas pipelines on additional measures to 
reduce risks 
 
1 3 
9. Take precautionary measures in buildings such as fire prevention 
measures to create a ‘safe haven’ for shelter 
1 2 
10. Include IR contours in the spatial plan 0 2 
11. Reduce the amount of hazardous materials produced, used, stored or 
transported 
0 2 
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12. Control the opening hours of adjacent catering establishments 1 0 
13. Limit population density to reduce SR 1 0 
14. Give explicit attention to the presence of vulnerable people such as 
elderly or disabled people 
1 0 
15. Construct a dam to prevent the inflow of hazardous material 0  1 
16. State the number of people present in the plan area in the spatial plan 1 0 
 
The issues and the number of times an issue was addressed obviously depended on the 
selected cases. Within our case selection, there were many safety issues related to the 
pipe transport of hazardous materials and to LPG stations; therefore many recommen-
dations related to these issues were found. It should therefore be noted that the number 
of times a specific recommendation was given provides information about our case 
selection, although it can also be regarded as an indication of the kind of emergency 
management issues that are addressed in the spatial planning process.  
Even though the safety recommendations are often part of the procedure for the 
development or reconsideration of the land allocation plan, only a limited number of 
issues addressed in the safety recommendations were implemented through the land 
allocation plan itself. Within the land allocation plan, recommendations on IR con-
tours and safety distances were included. Furthermore, the development of vulnerable 
objects and the population density within the sphere of influence of the hazard were 
controlled through regulations within the land allocation plan. This was not surprising, 
since the IR criteria are legally binding, as discussed in Section 4.2. 
The focus of our analysis, however, was on the measures that were suggested to 
reduce SR. Most measures were implemented through policy instruments other than 
the land allocation plan, such as environmental licenses, contingency plans, risk 
communication strategies and private law arrangements with developers, or through 
more detailed plans in which the project implementation was described. According to 
our respondents, issues related to the fire extinguishing water infrastructure, for 
example, were worked out in project plans; access routes were addressed in private 
law agreements between the municipality and private developers, and risk communi-
cation issues were addressed in risk communication and contingency plans.  
Sometimes recommendations were implemented in a different way. For example, 
instead of controlling the opening hours of catering establishments to prevent an 
overlap with the provisioning of the adjacent LPG station, the provisioning itself was 
limited and was only allowed in the morning (C1). The recommendation to exclude 
new vulnerable objects in the vicinity of transport routes of hazardous materials was 
explicitly rejected in only one of the examined cases (C2). In this case, the municipal-
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ity decided to allow the proposed complex, a house for assisted living. Nevertheless, 
additional measures were taken to increase possibilities for emergency management 
and evacuation.  
All municipal respondents said they intended to implement the safety recommen-
dations. Similar to experiences in the UK (Walker, 2000), they believed they were 
being responsible and regarded the measures as suggested in the safety recommenda-
tions as legally compulsory, especially with respect to IR criteria because legal 
acceptability criteria existed. One respondent (R6) stated that not implementing the 
safety recommendations implied that the municipality would be responsible in case 
there was an event. Furthermore, the recommendations were regarded as professional 
(R9) and, therefore, could not be easily rejected. This does not mean that all recom-
mendations to reduce SR were implemented. When SR criteria were met, additional 
measures were not necessarily taken, as was found in one of the case projects (C2). In 
addition, it was argued that trade-offs, such as economic or planning concerns could 
be a reason to accept an exceedance of the SR criteria (R7, R8).  
According to one municipal respondent (R7) who had also dealt with other 
planning processes in which the SR criteria were exceeded, the municipality tried to 
find ways to achieve the desired developments even though the SR criteria were 
exceeded. It was argued that in such cases higher societal risks could be accepted if 
additional compensation measures, such as improved evacuation or access routes, 
were implemented or if the desired urban development was very important for the city 
(e.g. the creation of jobs). Similar reasoning was found in another case project (C8). In 
the land allocation plan, it was explained why the proposed urban development was 
required. Additional compensation measures, such as the development of emergency 
routes, were proposed. Based on these considerations, the municipality regarded the 
SR as acceptable.  
Even though almost all recommendations were adopted by the municipality, 
measures were hardly implemented through the land allocation plan itself. As 
explained by the planners we interviewed, the land allocation plan was mainly meant 
to allow or prohibit specific land-use changes. Other policy instruments were regarded 
as more suitable for implementing measures. One respondent argued that his munici-
pality (R8) was cautious about implementing the safety recommendations in the land 
allocation plan, since too many restrictions could cause ‘planning damage’, i.e. nega-
tive consequences from land-use changes, which could result in claims from the 
people affected.  
It should be noted, however, that most of the planning processes we studied were 
still in progress. Even if a final version of the land allocation plan was available, the 
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full implementation of the safety recommendations, for example through arrangements 
with developers, more detailed project plans or risk communication plans, still had to 
be undertaken. The municipal planners we interviewed did not have a good overview 
of the actual implementation of the safety recommendations within their municipality, 
especially regarding the recommendations that related to emergency management and 
risk communication. Implementation takes place through many different instruments 
and departments, which makes monitoring complex.  
The regional fire department in Gelderland Midden, for example, wanted more 
insight into the actual implementation of its recommendations. It assumed that not 
every suggested measure was implemented. The fire department, however, did not 
have the capacity in time and resources to study this, since it is not its task to monitor 
implementation. The province does have a role in monitoring, but is mainly focused 
on the legal criteria, such as the IR contours and procedural criteria, for example 
whether or not the SRs are properly explained. In addition, the province monitors the 
development of contingency plans. The municipalities remain responsible for the 
implementation of the measures given in the safety recommendations and apparently 
make use of their discretionary freedom in implementing these measures. Within the 
municipality, however, people were often responsible for a particular aspect of the 
safety recommendations. It was hard to identify who was responsible for the imple-
mentation of the recommendations as a whole. 
 
 
4.6.  The role and usefulness of the safety recommendations 
 
The studied cases represented two contrasting regions. It was therefore expected that 
municipalities in the more industrialised Rijnmond region would be more aware of 
industrial risks or that emergency management issues would be considered more 
explicitly in planning processes. This expectation, however, was not reflected in our 
findings. Emergency issues were not addressed differently in the two regions, safety 
recommendations in the Rijnmond region did not contribute more to the safety of citi-
zens than those in Gelderland Midden, and the reasons found for the conformance and 
performance did not differ considerably. 
In general, spatial planners regarded the safety recommendations as professional 
and useful for solving planning problems. The recommendations provided more 
insight into the safety issues that were relevant for the plan area and into possible risk 
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reducing measures. Consequently, the recommendations increased the capacity of 
planners to deal with these safety risks. Furthermore, the municipalities and fire 
departments both believed that the safety recommendations increased risk awareness.  
The planning process offers the actors involved the opportunity for dialogue, 
through which risks and risk reduction measures can be addressed. Through this dia-
logue, for example, the fire department tries to get support for the safety measures and 
tries to get them implemented. This dialogue takes place not only through written 
documents, but also through informal communication between emergency managers 
and spatial planners during regular meetings on safety issues organised by the regional 
fire departments. In this light, the communicative character of the safety 
recommendations, through which the active involvement of emergency services in 
formal and informal planning processes is stimulated, can be regarded as an important 
strength.  
According to our respondents, the safety recommendations seldom resulted in the 
cancellation of proposed developments. As was also found in our case studies, the 
safety recommendations resulted in adjustments of the development, such as addi-
tional measures to compensate for the increased safety risks. These additional 
measures could even be used to justify and allow urban development when SR criteria 
were exceeded. In this respect, the discretionary freedom of the municipality in 
implementing the recommendations was used to balance local safety and development 
objectives.  
In two cases (R7, R9) the representatives from the fire department and the 
municipalities concerned stressed that the performance was best when the fire 
department is consulted at an early stage in the planning process. Although formally 
required, consultation at an early stage is also regarded as desirable, since the land 
allocation plan becomes more resistant to change when it comes closer to its final 
stages. Moreover, consultation at an early stage offers the opportunity to discuss 
measures informally and explore options for mutual adjustments.  
The safety recommendations, however, did not perform well in all researched 
planning processes. One bottleneck that was experienced was that different authorities 
made recommendations on external safety (see Section 4.2). Sometimes these recom-
mendations proved to be contradictory (R1). Furthermore, risk analyses and safety 
recommendations sometimes changed over time. In one of the cases, a recalculation of 
the transport of hazardous materials resulted in a reduction of SR (C7), which made it 
easier to meet the SR criteria. The opposite also happened. As experienced by one 
respondent (R7), the forecasted transport of hazardous materials sometimes increased 
dramatically. This resulted in an exceedance of SR criteria, conflicting with the 
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intended urban developments. In this respect, it was emphasised that periodic 
meetings with the authorities involved in external safety risk management were 
important. The safety recommendations should therefore not be regarded as static 
advice, but as a process in which safety issues can be discussed during the planning 
process.  
Another difficulty related to the performance of the safety recommendations was 
that land allocation plans only focused on a limited part of the municipal territory, 
whereas some safety recommendations were relevant for the municipality as a whole. 
On the other hand, some municipalities intended to develop, or actually had 
developed, policy plans which specifically focused on the management of external 
safety issues within the entire municipal territory (C1, C5, C8), or were developing 
strategic local plans which included requirements related to external safety (C7). The 
development of such plans provides the opportunity to guide the consideration of 
external safety risks beyond the land allocation plan, involving aspects such as the 
risk-communication plan or contingency plan. Experiences with pre-disaster recovery 
plans in the USA have shown that a combination of stand-alone plans and comprehen-
sive plans is likely to be most effective for reducing damage (Berke & Campanella, 
2006). 
The implementation of the safety recommendations was limited even further by the 
capacity of the municipalities and fire departments. Expertise in external safety was 
not widely available at every municipality. Some municipalities could not answer our 
questions because the external safety expert had just left, or had just started in that job, 
and therefore did not have enough expertise to answer our questions. The repre-
sentative of the Rijnmond regional fire department also mentioned the lack of exper-
tise at some municipalities as a bottleneck for the implementation of safety recom-
mendations. Some municipalities had a large turnover in staff, which sometimes 
resulted in a limited availability of expertise on external safety issues. On the other 
hand, the capacity of the regional fire department itself was limited as well, which 
sometimes hampered the safety recommendation process. This issue was addressed by 
the fire departments as well as the municipalities, especially in the Rijnmond region. 
As a result, the fire departments were not involved intensively in every planning 
process and did not monitor the implementation of their recommendations. Only the 
planning processes with the highest impact on SR were followed intensively.  
Two municipal respondents questioned whether the spatial claim of external safety 
on spatial planning in general had become too restrictive (R1, R7). As stated by one 
them (R7), adapting urban developments to hazardous activities should not be self-
evident (as he thought was generally the case), but the production, storage, use and 
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transport of the hazardous materials themselves could be limited as well. Another 
respondent (R1) had the impression that the safety recommendations had become too 
strict. In his view, this was due to the fact that the advising authorities did not want to 
be responsible in case of an incident, especially after a disaster. In such cases, external 
safety regulations can seriously hamper spatial developments.  
 
 
4.7.  Discussion and conclusions  
 
Our examination of spatial planning practices showed that emergency management 
concerns were addressed in these practices in a communicative way through the safety 
advice of the regional fire department. The safety recommendations stimulated 
dialogues between safety experts of the regional fire department and the municipality, 
which according to the representatives we interviewed, strengthened the cooperation 
between these two governmental bodies. It can be argued that this collaboration 
between spatial planners and emergency managers contributed to risk reduction. 
Within the cases studied, the safety recommendations were adopted even when risk 
acceptability criteria were already met. However, in both of the regions that were 
studied, the adoption of safety recommendations tended to result in relatively modest 
fine-tuning of spatial plans rather than more substantive changes. Moreover, the 
implementation of safety measures seldom led to an elimination of industrial risks, 
because the adopted measures focused mainly on increasing the capacity of an area to 
deal with these risks (for example, through additional access and evacuation routes) 
instead of eliminating them. In areas where the SR was exceeded, these measures were 
even used to justify the increase of the societal risk and to facilitate the proposed 
development.  
These findings are consistent with Ale’s (2005) observations that the emphasis in 
Dutch risk management practices is shifting from eliminating hazards to coping with 
hazards without really reducing them. As shown in the case studies, this does not 
mean that measures for reducing hazards or exposure to risks were not considered or 
implemented at all. In some cases, the storage of LPG at LPG stations was limited and 
safety distances around hazardous installations were implemented. The limited contri-
bution to risk reduction can be regarded as the result of the absence of strict rules for 
the acceptance of societal risks. Nevertheless, this absence can also be regarded as a 
strength, since it allowed spatial planners to balance various spatial claims.  
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The conformance and performance of the safety recommendations, however, not 
only depended on the government strategies that were applied. As previously indicated 
in the conceptual framework, other factors also played an important role. The 
implementation of safety recommendations depended largely on the expertise and 
capacity of both the municipal and fire department staff. Moreover, economic interests 
were mentioned as a factor for not implementing safety measures. Therefore, the 
theoretical framework clearly provided a useful framework for understanding the 
found conformance and performance. Nevertheless, one factor (the role of public 
commitment) was hardly mentioned by the interviewed representatives of the munici-
palities and regional fire departments. It seemed that public commitment hardly influ-
enced the consideration and implementation of safety recommendations.  
Moreover, some important factors were not included in the conceptual framework. 
First, there was the timing of the safety recommendations. Safety recommendations 
should be provided at an early stage in the planning process, because the plans are 
more fluid at that stage and can therefore be changed more easily. Second, there was 
the quality of the recommendations. Outdated information or contradictory advice 
could negatively influence the performance and conformance of the safety recom-
mendations. Consequently, these can be regarded as additional factors that influence 
commitment as mentioned in the conceptual framework. 
Our findings confirm the assumption that collaboration between spatial planners 
and emergency managers can contribute to safety. In the studied cases, however, this 
contribution went beyond the implementation of safety distances as imposed by the 
Seveso II Directive. Additional measures for increasing safety, such as evacuation 
routes or risk communication, were also addressed and implemented through spatial 
planning and land-use plans. Consequently, spatial planning should also be recognised 
as an instrument for increasing the possibilities for emergency response. Therefore, 
collaboration between planners and emergency responders in general should be con-
sidered. The inclusion of safety recommendations in the planning process can be 
regarded as a promising way of organising this collaboration between planners and 
emergency responders. The communicative character of the safety recommendation 
process turned out to be an important strength, especially if compared with the Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment, which was criticised for its limited contribution to 
facilitating dialogue (Richardson, 2005). Because this communicative approach fits 
well into more general collaborative and communicative planning approaches (see 
Section 4.3), the Dutch experiences with safety recommendations may also be relevant 
for the integration of spatial planning and emergency management in other countries. 
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Nevertheless, the measures suggested in the safety recommendations could not 
always be implemented through land allocation plans. These plans were regarded as 
regulatory instruments to prohibit specific land-use changes. Consequently, the land 
allocation plans only made a small contribution to increasing the possibilities for 
emergency management. However, this does not mean that safety recommendations 
should be limited to those measures that can be implemented in land allocation plans. 
Similar to safety recommendations, land allocation plans should not be regarded only 
as regulatory or coercive instruments. The process of plan development offers oppor-
tunities for promoting cooperation and communication, e.g. for addressing safety 
issues in general and for promoting the adoption and implementation of safety 
measures through other plans and processes, such as risk communication plans, con-
tingency plans, building regulations or private law arrangements with developers. For 
these reasons, the integration of spatial planning and emergency management 
processes deserves further attention. 
Our findings have provided insight into the way in which safety recommendations 
are adopted and implemented, but more of this type of research is needed. More cases 
should be studied to make the findings more robust. Moreover, comparative studies 
with other countries are desirable in order to understand the contextual influence on 
the consideration of emergency management issues. In addition, more attention should 
be given to the phase before the first draft of the land allocation plan. In this analysis, 
only formal drafts were analysed. Therefore, it is possible that within these drafts the 
planners had already anticipated the expected recommendations from the regional fire 
department. Consequently, the performance of the safety advice may be 
underestimated. Finally, the planning process should be studied over a longer period 
of time. Most of the planning projects that were studied had not yet been completed, 
which made it difficult to evaluate whether or not the measures were actually 
implemented. Insight into the actual implementation and enforcement of measures is 
important, because a lack of implementation and enforcement can increase the likeli-
hood and consequences of an incident (Commissie Onderzoek Vuurwerkramp, 2001; 
Voogd, 2004).  
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Flood Risk Management in Dutch Local Spatial 
Planning Practices* 
 
Abstract  
Spatial planning is increasingly regarded as an important instrument to reduce flood 
consequences. Nevertheless, there are very few studies that show why local planning 
authorities do or do not systematically use spatial planning in advance to mitigate 
flood risks. This paper explores flood reduction strategies in local planning practices 
in the Netherlands. It also explores why spatial planning was or was not used to reduce 
flood consequences. The arguments for the use or non-use of planning mainly referred 
to requirements from other governmental bodies and the perceived role and the related 
responsibility of local planning authorities, previous disaster experience, and previous 
experience with spatial planning for flood risk management.  
 
Keywords: spatial planning, flood risk management, the Netherlands 
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5.1  Introduction 
 
Many settlements are located on flood-prone areas near rivers or the seacoast. To 
protect these settlements, dikes have been constructed. These dikes have significantly 
reduced the probability of flooding. However, settlement expansion, combined with 
the expected effects of climate change, are increasing the probability and the potential 
impact of flooding within the areas protected by dikes (Oosterberg et al., 2005). In 
risk management literature, there is a growing consensus that, in addition to the re-
duction of the probability of flooding, reduction of flood consequences is needed as 
well. Spatial planning is increasingly regarded as an important instrument to support 
flood impact reduction. Through the regulation of land use, for example, vulnerable 
land uses can be excluded from flood-prone areas and building codes can encourage 
the elevation of residential areas (Burby, 1998; Godschalk et al., 1999; Hooijer et al., 
2004; Mileti, 1999; White & Howe, 2002). In spite of this recognition of spatial 
planning in relation to flood risk management, several studies have shown that local 
governments usually neglect to implement flood mitigation measures in spatial 
planning (Berke et al., 1996; Burby, 1998; May et al., 1996). Moreover, there are only 
a few studies that show why they do not systematically use spatial planning in this 
respect (Hutter et al., 2007). The studies that are available refer mainly to the North-
American and Australian situation (Deyle et al., 2008; Deyle et al., 1998; Godschalk 
et al., 1999; May & Deyle, 1998; May et al., 1996; Mileti, 1999; Olshansky & Kartez, 
1998). Comparable studies have rarely focussed on areas in Europe. Notable excep-
tions are the study by White and Richards (2007) for the UK and the study by 
Kamphuis (2007) for the Netherlands. Kamphuis examined the flood management 
policies and practices of ten municipalities in the western part of the Netherlands. He 
showed that local governments regard water authorities and project developers as 
being responsible for the management of flood risks. In addition, he showed that 
municipalities scarcely use spatial planning to reduce potential flood consequences. 
Nevertheless, these authors hardly addressed the question of why municipalities did 
not feel responsible, and thus, why spatial planning was not systematically used.  
With this background, this paper explores why spatial planning is used or is not 
used in the Netherlands at the local level for the implementation of measures to reduce 
flood consequences. It aims at a better understanding of spatial planning decision-
making in relation to flood risk management, i.e. to supplement the insights gained in 
the USA, Australia and New Zealand. This can contribute to the further development 
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and implementation of flood mitigating measures as a way to deal with the potential 
effects of climate change. The scientific purpose of this paper, however, is exploratory 
in character. Even though the findings can be a starting point for research with a more 
explanatory character, the intention here is to search for factors that can explain the 
use of spatial planning for flood reduction, rather than making generalisations, as is 
common in more explanatory research (Grix, 2004). Our main argument is that higher 
level government policies and psychological factors strongly influence the adoption of 
spatial planning as an instrument to reduce flood consequences.  
 The research was conducted by examining local planning practices in three case 
study areas. First, we explored whether risk reduction measures were implemented in 
these planning practices, and, if so, which measures were used. Second, we explored 
the reasoning of the planning authorities when deciding to implement or not to im-
plement these measures. Based on these explorations, we suggest several strategies 
that could encourage the use of spatial planning for flood mitigation on the local level. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start with an overview of Dutch na-
tional flood management policies, followed by a description of the analytical frame-
work and the research method. Then, we describe and analyse two types of planning 
practices. In the final section we summarise the conclusions derived from these prac-
tices and discuss their implications for planning.  
 
 
5.2  Dutch flood management policies 
 
In the Netherlands, all three tiers of government – central, provincial and municipal 
government – have planning powers. Decision-making consistency between these tiers 
is established through the formal regulations of the Dutch Spatial Planning Act as well 
as through communication aiming at consensus building and mutual adjustment of 
planning proposals (Van der Valk, 2002). Consequently, the spatial policies of higher-
level authorities influence the spatial policies of lower-level authorities. Local 
planning practices, however, can only partly be understood from higher level govern-
ment policies, since municipal governments also have some discretionary freedom in 
the implementation of provincial or national planning frameworks and guidelines. 
These frameworks and guidelines can to a certain extent be adapted and reformulated 
during the implementation process at the local level, mainly because they leave room 
for interpretation.  
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Dutch national and regional flood management policies are traditionally aimed at 
reducing the probability of flooding through the construction and maintenance of 
dikes. These dikes are intended to protect the hinterland against floods from the sea or 
major rivers, and to make the Netherlands more resistant to flood hazards. The area 
that is protected by a dike is referred to as a dike-ring area. This is an area encircled by 
a contiguous ring of dikes or high areas that will not be flooded, even under the most 
unlikely circumstances (Eijgenraam, 2006). Dikes that directly protect a dike-ring area 
against flooding from the sea or major rivers are called primary dikes. Design 
standards for these primary dikes are legally established in the Dutch Flood Defences 
Act. They are defined as ‘the average exceedance probability – per year – of the 
highest water level which the primary dike must be capable of withstanding from the 
outside, while taking into account other factors which determine the water defensive 
capability’. These standards differ according to the economic value of the assets in the 
dike-ring area. The regional water boards are responsible for the daily maintenance of 
most primary dikes. Some dikes, however, such as the Afsluitdijk, are managed by the 
Rijkswaterstaat, a policy implementation agency of the Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management.  
In 1993 and 1995, some areas in the river forelands of the Meuse river were 
flooded due to high river discharges. Moreover, dike-ring areas along the Meuse and 
Rhine in the Netherlands were threatened with flooding in 1995. Almost 250,000 
people had to be evacuated, since the authorities felt that the dikes would not hold. 
And in 1994 and 1998, the western part of the Netherlands was particularly affected 
by water-logging problems due to heavy rainfall, which resulted in damage to crops 
and to some buildings.  
As a reaction to these events, a dike-reinforcement programme was implemented. 
The flood events, together with the water-logging events, also triggered a new national 
flood management policy, which addressed the need for more physical space for 
water. It was argued that the likelihood of a river flood should also be reduced through 
spatial measures rather than heightening the dikes even further. The latter measure can 
increase potential flood depths, restrict natural river dynamics and spoil landscape 
qualities such as cultural heritage and scenery (Vis et al., 2003). These spatial 
measures were intended to reduce the maximum river water levels and, in combination 
with the dike reinforcements, reduce the probability of flooding.  
Examples of such spatial measures are the removal of obstacles from the flood-
plains, dike relocation, the restriction of land for construction and commercial activi-
ties in the river forelands, the construction of water retention areas and the construc-
tion of bypasses or secondary channels to circumvent urban bottlenecks. A new 
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national policy directive, called ‘Room for the River’ (Ruimte voor de rivier), and a 
corresponding implementation programme, provided the basis for the implementation 
of these measures in a joint effort of the ministry, provinces, municipalities, water 
boards and non-governmental stakeholders (Van der Most & Wehrung, 2005).  
In 2003 a new policy instrument, called the ‘Water Assessment’ (Watertoets), was 
introduced to ensure that water interests were taken into account in spatial plans and 
decisions. The status of the Water Assessment was established in several policy 
documents, governmental agreements and in legislation on spatial planning. The 
Water Assessment was intended to connect the different, sometimes divided, domains 
of water management and spatial planning (Milieu- en Natuurplanbureau & RIVM, 
2004). The Water Assessment can be characterised as a communicative process in 
which water managers advise on the consequences of land use developments for the 
water systems and on the spatial claims that may result from water management 
measures needed now and in the future, such as water retention areas (Van Dijk, 
2008). This means that the initiator of new spatial plans (e.g. a municipality or 
province) is obliged to ask the water manager (usually the water board) to address and 
advise on the relevant water management issues within the plan area. However, this 
advice is not binding.  
An evaluation of the application of the Water Assessment, which examined 108 
instances of such water advice, showed that only 8% of these instances addressed 
water safety issues. Furthermore, an analysis of 183 spatial plans showed that water 
safety was only considered in 6% of these plans (Werkgroep Evaluatie Watertoets, 
2006). Even allowing for the fact that water safety is not relevant to every spatial plan, 
e.g. for the one-third of the Netherlands that lies high enough to be safe from flooding, 
the results suggest that water safety and flood reduction measures are rarely addressed 
in local spatial planning practices.  
However, these established flood management policies are currently being recon-
sidered. Consistent with other European countries, more attention is being given to 
measures to reduce flood consequences. These discussions mainly take place within 
the framework of the so-called ‘Water Safety in the 21st Century’ project. In this pro-
ject, spatial planning is regarded as an important instrument to implement measures to 
reduce flood consequences (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2008b).  
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5.3  Analytical framework  
 
The first research question is: what kind of flood risk reduction measures were 
implemented in local spatial planning practices? It should be noted, however, that such 
measures often focus on specific flood risk aspects only. For example, the construction 
of dikes mainly aims at improving the defences against superfluous water, the 
protection of natural flood plains reduces flood hazards and the regulation of land use 
usually aims at reducing the exposure of people and property to flooding. As a result, 
risk reduction measures are often complementary. The regulation of land use, for 
example, can complement dikes. Nevertheless, flood risks still differ spatially within a 
dike-ring area. In case of a dike failure, for example, water levels will rise quickly and 
reach high levels in relatively deep areas near the dike. In addition, flow velocities in 
these areas are often high, whereas water depths and flow velocities in higher areas 
further away from the dike are often much lower. As a result, ensuring that urban 
development takes place away from areas with potentially high water depths and flow 
velocities can effectively reduce the number of casualties (Jonkman, 2007; Pols et al., 
2007). 
In this paper, we have distinguished different risk components to characterise 
different risk reduction measures. Risks are generally regarded as a function of a 
hazard and the vulnerability of the physical and socio-economic system to this hazard. 
The term ‘hazard’ refers to the events or phenomena that may cause harm to things 
that human beings value. ‘Vulnerability’ generally refers to the susceptibility to 
damage from a particular disaster hazard, but there are fundamentally different con-
ceptual interpretations of this concept. Interpretations either emphasise the exposure to 
hazards, the social responses – i.e. the capacity of society to deal with hazards and 
exposure – or the physical and social processes that may lead to vulnerability, such as 
economic or urban development. Although vulnerability is generally regarded as a 
combination of these points of view (Adger, 2006; Cutter, 1993; Cutter, 1996; De 
Bruijn, 2005; De Graaf et al., 2007), we have divided the concept of vulnerability into 
two components: exposure and capacities (Table 5-1). These two components can 
change over time as the result of physical and social processes. Furthermore, the 
different risk components are interrelated. For example, a system cannot be vulnerable 
if it is not exposed to a hazard. 
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Table 5-1. Different risk components  
Risk components Definition 
Hazard A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon 
or human activity that may cause injury or the loss of 
life, property damage, social and economic 
disruption, or environmental degradation. 
Exposure The proneness to being affected by a particular 
hazard, without taking into consideration the capacity 
to deal with the hazard. 
Resistance capacity The ability of a system to prevent hazardous events, 
such as water defences to resist high water levels.  
Adaptive capacity Capacity of a society to adapt and to adjust to 
uncertain future developments and hazards.  
Coping capacity Capacity to respond in the immediate aftermath of an 
event.  
V
ul
ne
ra
bi
lit
y 
Recovery capacity The capacity to return to the pre-disaster status. 
R
is
k 
Processes Physical and social processes that affect hazards and 
vulnerability, such as climate change or urbanization. 
Based on: De Bruijn et al., 2007; Schneiderbauer, 2007; De Graaf et al., 2007 
 
As shown in Table 5-1, a distinction is made between risk reduction measures that 
focus on the reduction of the probability of flooding and on measures that focus on the 
reduction of potential flood consequences. The first category contains measures that 
reduce flood hazards and increase the resistance capacity, such as dike reinforcement 
or flood plain protection. The second category contains measures that reduce exposure 
and increase the adaptive, coping and recovery capacity. Processes can affect both 
flood probability and flood consequences.  
The second research question is: what was the reasoning of local planning 
authorities when implementing or not implementing measures to reduce flood risks? 
Research in the USA and Oceania in particular, has already revealed a wide variety of 
factors that may influence the commitment of local planning authorities to the adop-
tion of spatial strategies for risk reduction (Deyle et al., 2008; Godschalk et al., 1999; 
May & Deyle, 1998; May et al., 1996; Mileti, 1999; Olshansky & Kartez, 1998; White 
& Richards, 2007). These factors are divided into five groups: higher-tier government 
policies, psychological factors, trade-offs between other interests, public commitment 
and capacities of local authorities. These factors are summarised in Table 5-2, together 
with examples for each factor. We used these factors to structure and analyse the 
findings of our research.  
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A distinction can be made in Table 5-2 between factors that mainly influence the 
adoption of spatial planning, i.e. the explicit consideration of spatial planning as an 
instrument to reduce flood risks, and factors that mainly influence the implementation 
of spatial planning measures, such as the actual implementation of land regulations. 
Higher-tier government policies and psychological factors, for example, mainly influ-
ence the adoption of planning, whereas trade-offs and public commitment mainly 
influence the actual implementation of planning measures in society. Nevertheless, not 
every factor can explain the adoption and implementation of measures. Moreover, the 
relative importance of the factors may differ spatially. For example, Olshansky and 
Kartez (1998) emphasised that the local governments that planned for hazard 
mitigation had adequate staff, but May et al. (1996) concluded that the capacity of 
local governments did not seem to constrain the commitment of the authorities they 
studied.  
 
 
Table 5-2. Factors that influence commitment of local authorities to spatial planning for flood 
reduction  
Factors that influence commitment  
Higher level government policies  
• The lack of an overarching central policy in clear and realistic guidelines that gives high 
priority to land use provisions to govern land use and development in flood prone areas 
• The absence of strong monitoring and enforcement policies, such as through coercive 
mandates and sanctions for local governments who do not address flood risk issues in 
spatial planning 
• The lack of policies to stimulate commitment  
• The presence of other policies that indirectly encourage developments in hazardous areas 
such as insurance systems, the construction of dikes or the improvement of infrastructure 
in flood prone areas, which may limit opportunities for local governments to apply land 
use management tools  
• Lack of technical and other forms of assistance to local governments, such as financial 
assistance 
Psychological factors 
• The lack of experience with floods, which often reduces the sense of urgency for flood 
mitigation measures 
• The perceived remoteness in time of low-probability hazards, which leads to sharp 
discounting of the benefits of avoided costs  
• The implementation of recurrence intervals, such as the 100-year flood zone, may result 
in a perception of absolute boundaries between hazardous and non-hazardous areas  
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Trade-offs between other interests 
• The allocation of resources to natural hazards has limited visible rewards 
• Many flood prone areas are already built out and remedial actions are costly to 
implement 
• Hazard prone areas are often very valuable locations, e.g. through ocean view or access 
to water and water based transport and are attractive for urban development 
• Land use regulations in flood prone areas may lead to urban developments elsewhere 
which can be undesirable for other reasons such as nature conservation or accessibility 
Public commitment 
• The lack of public recognition of flood risks due to the lack of experience with floods 
• The lack of public participation in decision-making  
• Active opposition by other interests such as real estate and property development 
interests  
• Existing rights such as property rights and the right of development may be much 
stronger and therefore it may be difficult to limit developments in hazardous areas 
• Entitlements based on previous local development plans and measures 
Capacities of local authorities 
• Lack of staff, expertise and resources on hazard mitigation issues 
• The lack of clear and authoritative risk maps and risk information  
• There is no hazard free land available for development, e.g. through other regulation 
policies such as for nature conservation  
• There is little spatial contrast in levels of hazards, thus it is difficult to define 
meaningful boundaries between hazardous and non hazardous areas 
Based on: Deyle et al., 2008; Deyle et al., 1998; Godschalk et al., 1999; May & Deyle, 1998; 
May et al., 1996; Mileti, 1999; Olshansky & Kartez, 1998; White & Richards, 2007 
 
 
5.4  Research method 
 
Data for answering the research questions were collected in three case study areas. 
Each of these areas can be regarded as relatively high risk since water depths and flow 
velocities are potentially high. Nevertheless, house construction projects were pro-
posed and implemented in these areas. Therefore, the consideration of additional 
measures to reduce flood consequences could be expected. The areas are: dike-ring 16, 
dike-ring 22 and the Westergouwe residential development project (see Figure 5-1). 
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Figure 5-1. Location of the case study areas 
 
Dike-ring area 16, encompassing the polders Alblasserwaard and Vijfheerenlanden, is 
located to the east of Rotterdam. This dike-ring area of 39,000 hectares consists of 11 
municipalities and is inhabited by 197,000 people. The dikes are designed to resist 
water levels that are expected once in 2,000 years. However, a recent evaluation of 
these dikes showed some weak sections in the dike ring. The actual likelihood of 
flooding was estimated at once in 400 years, although the evaluation report stressed 
that the method used is not yet seen as robust enough and that the results are only an 
indication and should not be regarded as authoritative (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat & Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006; Ministry of Transport Public 
Works and Water Management, 2005). Moreover, the dike-ring area is very flat and 
water levels can rise quickly, which can lead to a high number of casualties. From a 
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flooding perspective, therefore, the area can be regarded as relatively vulnerable. In 
the next decade, approximately 2,000 houses will be built within this area.  
Dike ring 22 encompasses the city of Dordrecht with 120,000 inhabitants. The city 
is located on an island in the delta of the rivers Rhine and Meuse. The dikes that 
protect the city are designed to resist water levels that are expected once in 2,000 
years. Nevertheless, some parts of the city are not protected by dikes. New housing 
has been proposed at locations both inside and outside the dike ring. The third case 
study area, the Westergouwe area, is located in the Zuidplaspolder, which is one of the 
deepest polders of the Netherlands. For this area, which is part of the city of Gouda, 
3,800 new houses were proposed on a location that lies between 5.60 and 6.13 meters 
below mean Dutch sea level (Pols et al., 2007). The dikes are designed to resist water 
levels that are expected once in 10,000 years.  
We conducted a desktop study of the spatial planning practices in these areas, and 
we also interviewed representatives of the local planning authorities and water boards. 
During the first round of interviews, one representative from each of the three water 
boards involved was interviewed by phone. These representatives were responsible for 
spatial planning issues within their water board organisation. Thirteen telephone 
interviews were conducted with representatives of the local planning authorities, i.e. 
the municipalities. These representatives were responsible for spatial planning issues 
within their municipality. They were asked to explain how flood risks, especially from 
the river, were addressed and dealt with as part of their spatial planning practices. 
They were also asked to explain why spatial planning was used or not used to address 
flood risks. The arguments mentioned by the representatives provided insight into the 
different factors that can explain the use or non use of spatial planning for flood 
management.  
Subsequently, during a second round of interviews, four planning processes were 
studied more extensively, and three municipal representatives and one provincial 
representative were interviewed in person. This was done because the telephone inter-
view had revealed that, in the light of flood risk mitigation, spatial planning was used 
most intensively in these four planning practices. The representatives were selected 
because they were key actors in these planning practices. By interviewing these 
representatives face-to-face, we expected to increase the understanding of their 
reasons to use spatial planning in this way.  
Based on the distinction of spatial measures in relation to flood management, the 
examined practices were divided into two groups. The first group consisted of spatial 
planning practices which only implemented measures to reduce the probability of 
flooding. This group of practices, labelled as Established Policy Practices, represented 
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the flood management policies described previously. The second group consisted of 
practices which implemented or seriously considered additional measures to reduce 
flood consequences. This group was labelled as Practices to Reduce Flood 
Consequences.  
 
 
5.5  Established policy practices 
 
As part of the established policy practices – nine practices used within the dike-ring 16 
area – land-use strategies to reduce flood risks were only addressed minimally. Within 
the dike-ring area, some land-use developments, such as residential development, 
were regulated to protect the existing dikes and to reserve space to facilitate dike 
reinforcements in the future. For areas in the river forelands, which are not protected 
by dikes, changes in land use were also regulated, and spatial measures that affected 
the dike-ring area, such as river broadening, were facilitated by the local spatial plans. 
These measures can be characterised as measures focussing on the reduction of the 
probability of flooding, as discussed in the analytical framework.  
Even though flood risks were hardly mentioned in spatial plans, and the water 
board did not yet advise on flood risks, it cannot be concluded that measures to reduce 
flood consequences were not considered at all in these established policy practices. 
For example, one spatial planner explained that civil servants in her region tried to 
develop ideas about how to deal with residual flood risks, but that they were still 
searching for appropriate strategies. 
Most arguments for not using spatial planning to reduce flood consequences, as 
given by the respondents, directly or indirectly referred to higher-tier government 
policies. This can be illustrated by the stories that resulted from the interviews. As 
explained by one municipal respondent, the national criteria for the design of dikes 
were met. Flood risks had therefore been reduced to an acceptable level. Conse-
quently, additional risk reduction measures were not considered in spatial planning, 
despite potentially severe flood consequences. Other respondents in the established 
policy practices used comparable arguments.  
In addition, the local spatial planners did not regard themselves (i.e. their munici-
palities) as being responsible for additional flood risk reduction measures. However, 
responsibility can be perceived in many ways and can therefore be regarded as a 
multi-layered concept (Giddens, 1999). For this reason, Bovens (1999) has identified 
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several types of responsibility. He also made a distinction between passive and active 
responsibility. Passive responsibility, which we refer to as accountability, is based on 
external answerability and the potential of being blamed or rewarded. Active respon-
sibility, which we refer to as commitment, is an internalised sense of duty towards 
particular actions or tasks. In other words, there is a difference between being respon-
sible or being held responsible, and feeling responsible or acting responsibly. Being 
responsible in a formal sense does not automatically imply responsible behaviour.  
The spatial planners representing the established policy practices mainly perceived 
responsibility in the light of formal tasks or duties. They believed the responsibilities 
for flood management were held by the water managers, i.e. the water boards and the 
Rijkswaterstaat. Therefore, these planners argued that the water managers should 
indicate which additional land use and design strategies were necessary to reduce 
flood risks, not the municipality: ‘The water board should indicate how to deal with 
flood risks at a proposed building site. They should indicate this in their water advice 
in which they advise the municipality how to deal with water issues in the municipal 
spatial plans’. Some planners also argued that the province was partly responsible as 
well, referring to a causal or liability perception of responsibility. As one of them 
explained: ‘The decision about the location of building sites, which is often made at 
the provincial level, already implies an acceptance of the flood risks’. 
 The water managers, however, did not address the need for additional measures. 
As a result, such measures were not addressed in spatial planning at all. According to 
the representatives of the water boards, the boards are working to reduce flood risks, 
but this is mainly done by reinforcing the weak sections in the dike ring. As stated by 
one representative of the water board: ‘We do not advise about how to deal with flood 
risks in spatial plans in the dike-ring area, since this kind of advice goes ahead of the 
current flood management policies’. Even though higher-tier government has encour-
aged cooperation between spatial planners and water managers through the Water 
Assessment, water managers hardly used this instrument to address the use of spatial 
planning for the reduction of flood consequences. As a result, spatial planners 
considered the proposed land-use changes as legitimate in the light of flood risks, and 
additional land-use strategies were regarded as unnecessary. Consequently, measures 
to reduce flood consequences were hardly addressed in spatial plans. 
Other arguments for not adapting spatial plans to flood risk issues referred to the 
availability of suitable building locations and to the perception of the seriousness of 
the flood risk. For example, alternative building locations were not available within 
the municipality or were not allowed in the provincial spatial plan, e.g. because these 
areas were protected as part of open space preservation or nature conservation poli-
94   Geographical Dimensions of Risk Management 
 
 
cies. Furthermore, some respondents argued that additional measures were unneces-
sary in their municipality because their municipality was situated in the highest part of 
the dike-ring area. Therefore, they perceived the flood risk as relatively low.  
 
 
5.6  Practices to reduce flood consequences 
 
The Westergouwe and Dordrecht case and two practices in the dike-ring 16 area could 
be labelled as practices to reduce flood consequences, since measures for the 
management of exposure and the adaptive, coping and recovery capacity, as discussed 
in the analytical framework, were considered. In these cases, land-use changes near 
dikes and in the river forelands were regulated to protect the dikes and to facilitate 
future dike reinforcements. In addition to these measures to reduce the likelihood of 
flooding, spatial planning was also used as an instrument to reduce potential flood 
consequences. At one municipality in the dike-ring 16 area, exposure was limited 
because the municipality decided to build fewer houses to reduce potential damage. 
For another proposed residential area, the municipality paid extra attention to artificial 
hills and evacuation routes, which increased the adaptive and coping capacity. The 
other municipality in the dike-ring 16 area investigated the elevation of the residential 
areas to reduce vulnerability. In addition, the configuration of these artificial hills was 
considered, since this could influence the recovery capacity. The proposed building 
site was situated in the lowest part of the dike-ring area, near the river and adjacent to 
a sluice. This sluice would serve as an outlet for the water in case a flood should 
occur. Urban development near this sluice would hinder the outflow of water. There-
fore, special attention was given to the consequences of urban development on the 
capacity of the sluice. 
In the Westergouwe case, spatial planning was also used to implement measures to 
reduce the exposure of people and properties to flood risks. As a result of the spatial 
planning process, the proposed residential area will be raised between 1 and 1.5 
metres, since it is expected that water levels would most likely reach this height at that 
location in case of a dike failure (Werkgroep Wateropgave Westergouwe, 2004). In 
the Dordrecht case, in contrast, the division of the dike-ring area into smaller com-
partments through secondary dikes was explored. This division could reduce exposure. 
The secondary dikes could also increase the capacity for evacuation and shelter, and 
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they could provide an access route for emergency services in case of a flood event. As 
a result, coping capacities would be increased. 
The territories of the municipalities that did address flood risks explicitly can be 
regarded as relatively flood-prone areas. This flood proneness, however, was not the 
only argument that was mentioned to explain why spatial planning was used to reduce 
flood consequences. Many other arguments were given as well. These arguments 
mainly referred to psychological factors and higher-tier government policies and ini-
tiatives.  
In 1995, only two municipalities in the dike-ring 16 area decided to evacuate some 
parts of their territory. This decision was prompted, apart from the dangerously high 
river level, by the existence of a weak dike section. In our case study, these were the 
same municipalities that considered additional mitigation measures in recent spatial 
plans. The respondents referred to these events to explain their attention for flood risk. 
According to one of these respondents, the municipal executive included additional 
flood reduction measures in the local spatial plan because it felt that flood risks had 
become a subject of major public concern after the evacuation in 1995. 
The respondents in the Dordrecht case also referred to previous flood experience. 
The historic centre of Dordrecht is situated in the river forelands and is not protected 
by primary dikes. Therefore, this area has a relatively high probability of flooding, 
which was regarded as a main reason for the relatively high awareness of flood con-
sequences in Dordrecht. Recent near-flood experiences also affected public commit-
ment, which again played an important role in this municipality. As a result, previous 
experiences with imminent floods were an important argument to use spatial planning 
to reduce flood risks.  
Nevertheless, the case studies have shown that previous disaster experience is not 
the only factor that explained the adoption of mitigation measures in local spatial 
planning practices. The availability and interpretation of authoritative requirements of 
higher-tier government as well as the acknowledgement of the flood risk issue by the 
water board also partly explained the attention for additional land-use and design 
strategies. This was mentioned by two respondents from the dike-ring 16 area and also 
by the respondents from the Westergouwe area, which was not evacuated in 1995. In 
these cases, the water managers acknowledged the flood risk issue in their water 
advice. This advice was worked out in detail and implemented in the spatial plan in 
order to get approval of higher-tier government.  
One of our respondents in the dike-ring 16 area explained that the province must 
approve local spatial plans. The municipality felt that, in the light of the Water 
Assessment, additional measures to mitigate flood risks were needed to legitimise the 
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proposed spatial developments and to gain approval, although the province had not yet 
opposed the developments. As this respondent explained: ‘The province examines 
whether the municipality has carefully considered the issues addressed in the Water 
Assessment. To gain the approval of the province, we decided to consult with the 
water board in advance’.  
Within the Westergouwe case, however, the province initially agreed with the 
proposed development, but the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Envi-
ronment ordered the province and the municipality to pay more attention to water 
issues, and in particular to explain the soundness of the proposed residential develop-
ment in the light of water management (Werkgroep Wateropgave Westergouwe, 
2004). Even though this order mainly focussed on water logging, it also led to the 
consideration of flood risks. Additional flood mitigation measures were explored and 
implemented. Comparable arguments were also expressed by the representatives in the 
dike-ring 16 area.  
Finally, experiences and knowledge with previous spatial planning strategies for 
flood reduction were mentioned as an important reason for the explicit consideration 
of flood risk issues in spatial planning. This argument referred to the expertise of local 
authorities. The respondents in the Dordrecht case explained that their experience with 
land use and design strategies in another project, which focussed on urban devel-
opment in the river forelands, had changed their notion of flood risk management and 
planning. This experience had motivated them to consider such strategies within the 
dike-ring as well. The same applies to the respondents involved in the Westergouwe 
project. They argued that their experience had motivated them to consider land use 
strategies to reduce flood consequences. They did this, for example, by reducing flood 
exposure or by improving the coping capacities in other areas as well.  
 
 
5.7  Discussion and conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper was to explore how flood risks are addressed in local 
spatial planning practices in the Netherlands. More specifically, it addressed the ques-
tion of why spatial planning was or was not used for the reduction of flood conse-
quences. These insights should contribute to discussions on the implementation of 
flood mitigation measures as a way to deal with the potential effects of climate change 
on urban development.  
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Making a distinction between various risk components (see Table 5-1) turned out 
to be useful to characterise the way in which flood risks were addressed in different 
planning practices. Based on these various risk components, it can be concluded that 
most of the planning practices that were examined in this study focussed on the 
implementation of measures to reduce flood hazards and to increase the resistance 
capacity of the dike-ring areas. Measures to reduce flood consequences, including 
measures to increase the coping, adaptive and recovery capacities of dike-ring areas 
and measures to reduce flood exposure, were only considered in some practices.  
Based on research in the USA, New Zealand and Australia, several factors could be 
distinguished that influence the way local authorities use spatial planning to mitigate 
flood risks (see Table 5-2). These factors were suitable for explaining the use of 
spatial planning for flood reduction in the Netherlands. The cases we examined indi-
cate that psychological factors, higher-tier government policies and the local inter-
pretation of these policies explain to a large extent the actual use of spatial planning. 
National flood management policies do seem to have led to spatial planners assuming 
that they are not responsible for the further reduction of flood consequences. In this 
respect, a lack of accountability in combination with a lack of recent flood experiences 
resulted in a lack of commitment to use spatial planning to reduce flood consequences. 
In some of the cases we studied, risks were perceived as relatively low and there-
fore additional spatial planning measures to further reduce flood risks were not con-
sidered. On the other hand, such measures were taken in relatively high risk areas. For 
these reasons, actual flood risks and risk perceptions can be regarded as important 
additional factors that can influence commitment to spatial planning for flood reduc-
tion. Of course, these factors are interrelated with other factors identified in Table 5-2. 
The perceived flood risk in an area, for example, can influence perceived trade-offs or 
public commitment.  
Our respondents, however, hardly mentioned trade-offs with other interests as an 
argument for not using spatial planning to reduce flood consequences. Nevertheless, 
measures that integrated flood management and urban development interests were 
applied far more often than measures that only focussed on flood consequences. 
Instead of reducing the proposed number of houses, for example, the houses them-
selves were adapted or the building site was elevated. Also issues related to public 
commitment for the implementation of measures to reduce flood consequences hardly 
played a role in the ways of reasoning of spatial planners.  
When compared to other countries such as the USA and the UK, trade-offs and 
public commitment seemed less relevant in the cases we examined. A possible 
explanation is that in the Netherlands, spatial planning is rarely adopted as an instru-
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ment to reduce flood consequences. Spatial measures are sometimes considered, but 
have not yet been implemented. Nevertheless, these factors can become more signifi-
cant when measures to reduce flood consequences are more actively considered and 
implemented. It is therefore important to regard the factors presented in Table 5-2 in 
the light of specific and changing planning contexts.  
 
Recommendations 
If the further reduction of flood risk consequences through spatial planning is desir-
able, existing national planning procedures should be extended. More specifically, the 
Water Assessment should be expanded by adding a specific flood risk component. An 
evaluation of the Water Assessment showed that it is an effective instrument to place 
water interests more at the centre of spatial planning practices, although flood risks are 
hardly addressed in actual Water Assessment practices. This calls for the inclusion of 
a specific flood risk component in these practices. 
Nevertheless, planning practices cannot entirely be understood from the institu-
tional structures and procedures. Other factors, such as the personality and individual 
power of the actors involved, also influence the outcome of the planning process 
(Hajer & Laws, 2006). For that reason, individual spatial planners, as well as water 
managers, also have an important task. They have the power to organise attention to 
flood risk issues and risk reduction measures. They can also challenge existing prac-
tices, roles, responsibilities and cultures instead of reproducing them naively (Forester, 
1989). People in higher-tiers of government should therefore actively coordinate the 
consideration of flood risks in spatial planning practices, since local governments felt 
more responsible for the consideration of flood risk issues when higher-tier authorities 
required them to do so. Subsequently, spatial planners should address flood risks more 
extensively on the local level and implement actions that can be taken to reduce flood 
risks. 
However, this requires higher-tier governments and local spatial planners to be 
more aware of the flood risks within their jurisdictions. Water authorities have an 
important task in supporting them. They should address flood risks and flood risk 
reduction measures as part of their Water Assessment and provide other authorities 
with area-specific flood risk information.  
Trade-offs with other interests were hardly used as an argument for not using 
spatial planning. Nevertheless, water and climate change should not be regarded as 
independent land-use functions, but as creative inputs for integral flood management 
that involves different interests. If different interests can be integrated, then the 
implementation is likely to be more successful. In this context, issues related to public 
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commitment for the implementation of measures to reduce flood consequences are 
important too. Our research showed that these issues hardly play a role. Nevertheless, 
public commitment is a crucial factor for the implementation of risk reduction meas-
ures (Roth & Warner, 2007). Consequently, the experts and authorities involved in the 
planning process have an important task in broadening the discussion and organising 
attention to the interests and perspectives of other experts, authorities and the public 
during both the development and implementation process of flood risk reduction 
measures.  
Even though this research provided insight into the use and non-use of spatial 
planning to reduce flood risks, further research is needed. The number of cases, for 
example, could be extended to provide more explanatory insights. Moreover, the 
planning process should be studied over a longer period of time. As a reaction to pre-
vious flooding events and climate change, actual flood risk policies have been recon-
sidered in the Netherlands (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2008c) and other 
European countries, such as the UK (White & Richards, 2007) and Germany (Hutter 
et al., 2007). Spatial planning is increasingly recognised as an important instrument to 
implement measures to reduce flood consequences, such as the regulation of land use 
in flood-prone areas. An evaluation of these spatial planning practices over a longer 
period of time can provide more insight into the effectiveness of spatial planning for 
flood risk management and therefore contribute to making the considered flood 
management strategies operational.  
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A Spatial Planning Perspective for Measures 
concerning Flood Risk Management* 
  
Abstract 
As a reaction to flooding events, various governments in Europe addressed the need to 
create more physical space for water. Experiences in the Netherlands have shown, 
however, that the development and implementation of these measures can result in 
local opposition. Based on an examination of such conflicts, it is argued that spatial 
planning should not only be regarded as an instrument for regulating the land required 
for flood reduction, but also as an important instrument and substantive perspective 
through which participation can be facilitated and through which water management 
objectives can be balanced with other spatial claims on the landscape. 
 
Keywords: spatial planning, flood management, space for water, the Netherlands.  
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6.1  Introduction 
 
In the 1990s, some areas in the Netherlands experienced local flooding or were threat-
ened with flooding near rivers. These events triggered a new national water manage-
ment strategy which was consistent with other European countries (Bohm et al., 2004; 
Howe & White, 2004; Johnson & Priest, 2008), and which addressed the need for 
more physical space for water. First of all, it was suggested that rivers required more 
space. The elevation of dikes alone was regarded as undesirable, since a further ele-
vation could increase potential flood depths, restrict natural river dynamics and spoil 
landscape qualities such as cultural heritage and scenery (Vis et al., 2003). For these 
reasons, it was thought advisable to create more physical space for the rivers by 
reducing the maximum river water levels and consequently the probability of flooding.  
The regional and local water systems, including the secondary rivers and channels, 
also required more space to prevent problems with local flooding due to heavy rainfall 
and limited drainage capacity. More physical space for water would increase the 
drainage and storage capacities in the water system, through which the probability of 
local flooding would be reduced. Clearly, more physical space needed to be given to 
water and water-related land uses (Howe & White, 2004; Wolsink, 2006). Examples 
of measures to reduce peak water levels in the rivers are the removal of obstacles from 
the floodplains, dike relocation and the construction of bypasses or secondary 
channels to circumvent urban bottlenecks. Examples of measures to prevent local 
flooding are the development of local and regional water retention areas, canal broad-
ening and the regulation of land use in areas exposed to local flooding. These physical 
measures, aimed at providing more space for water to reduce flood risks, are referred 
to as spatial measures for flood risk management. 
The organisation of Dutch water management practices is extensively described in 
the literature (Wiering & Immink, 2006; Wiering & Arts, 2006; Wolsink, 2006; 
Woltjer & Al, 2007). Relevant aspects of the current system for the implementation of 
spatial measures for flood risk management are the strictly functional responsibilities 
of water authorities for flood defence, water quality and water quantity management, 
and the hierarchical organisational culture within these authorities. Water managers 
are accustomed to operating in a rather autonomous, isolated and technocratic way. 
Spatial measures for flood risk management, for example, are often developed in the 
domain of water management and from a water-management perspective. Conse-
quently, other regional and local ideas on both plan development procedures and sub-
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stantive aspects of the plan are neglected. As a result, policy makers encounter strong 
local opposition, which sometimes results in major project delays, inadequate solu-
tions or even in the cancellation of projects aimed at providing more space for water 
(Davidse, 2008; Grijzen, 2008; Neuvel, 2004; Roth et al., 2006; Schuwer, 2008).  
In this light, it is argued that a spatial planning approach towards the development 
and implementation of spatial measures can have an added value in dealing with 
current and potential conflicts. Therefore, the central questions addressed in this paper 
are: what types of conflicts appear during the development and implementation of 
spatial measures for flood risk reduction, and what can be the added value of a spatial 
planning perspective in dealing with these conflicts? 
These research questions are answered through studying four Dutch projects in 
which spatial measures for the reduction of flood risks were developed. These projects 
are discussed from a spatial planning perspective. First we define what a spatial plan-
ning perspective is, and then we translate this perspective into an operational analyti-
cal framework. This framework is used to analyse the case study projects and to 
increase understanding of practices and conflicts related to the development and 
implementation of spatial measures. In addition, the spatial planning perspective is 
used to provide suggestions on how things might be done differently.  
 
 
6.2  Spatial planning perspective  
 
Spatial planning focuses on the physical landscape and the activities that take place in 
the landscape. Based on the demands and requirements of society, spatial planning 
tries to position activities such as agriculture, recreation or industry, as well as physi-
cal structures such as roads or houses, in the landscape (Tewdwr-Jones, 2001). As a 
result, the actors involved in spatial planning try to influence current and future land 
use. For this reason, spatial planning can be characterised as a future-oriented activity 
(Couclelis, 2005). Based on this point of view, spatial planning can be perceived as a 
policy-making process through which the actors involved try to define and create 
desired spatial situations while defining and preventing undesired ones (Van Leeuwen 
et al., 2007). 
Similar objectives can also be encountered in transport planning, flood risk 
management or urban planning. Spatial planning, however, distinguishes itself from 
these fields through its holistic, integrative approach: it tries to coordinate different 
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spatial sector claims. Spatial planning, for example, tries to balance and, if possible, 
integrate spatial claims for water retention with claims for residential development.  
In contrast with other disciplines which are aimed at integrating various sector 
claims, such as integrated water resources management (Biswas, 2008), the starting 
point of spatial planning is the landscape in general, instead of a specific sub-system 
in the landscape such as the water system or urban system. Through this interdiscipli-
nary and comprehensive approach, spatial planning strives for a physical organisation 
of space, which is coherent and desirable from both sector and multi-sector points of 
view (Hidding & Van den Brink, 2006). For this reason, spatial planning is not only 
involved with the statutory planning process of development control and development 
plan preparation, but also with broader concerns such as social, economic and cultural 
issues (Tewdwr-Jones, 2001). 
In addition to these substantive questions, the term ‘spatial’ also links to procedural 
aspects, for example, about how spatial planning processes should be designed, how 
spatial planning decisions should come about or how conflicts about both substantive 
and procedural aspects should be managed. This includes questions about the 
involvement of local actors and the role of these local actors in the policy-making 
process. Of courses, substantive and procedural aspects are interrelated. The actors 
involved, for example, greatly influence the way a problem is defined. 
Within flood risk management, however, spatial planning is often narrowed down 
to a regulatory instrument through which land use change in flood-prone areas can be 
regulated (Hutter, 2007). Although similar to participatory water management, spatial 
planning can also be an important instrument by, for example, facilitating more 
interactive policy making and can provide an interesting substantive focus.  
 
 
6.3  Research approach 
 
Many conflicts in spatial planning practices are about incompatible spatial claims. 
Different actors can have diverse, and often conflicting, spatial claims on the same 
area. For example, one group might prefer residential use for a particular area, while 
another group might prefer to prohibit residential development in the same area in 
favour of ecological interests. Consequently, the analytical framework used in this 
paper focuses on these conflicting spatial claims.  
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Based on ideas of how people perceive reality (Kolkman, 2005; Schön & Rein, 
1994; Te Velde et al., 2002), it is assumed that spatial claims and ideas about desired 
current and future landscapes are influenced by specific convictions, values, norms, 
interests and knowledge (Table 6-1). In this respect, the analysis of conflicts focuses 
not only on conflicting spatial claims or conflicting ideas regarding current and 
desired landscapes. These claims and ideas are in turn also based on diverse and often 
conflicting interests, norms, values, convictions and knowledge, all of which require 
examination as well.  
 
Table 6-1. Factors that influence desired landscapes  
Factor Definition Examples 
Convictions Convictions are opinions about the way things 
are. They are strong beliefs that are not easily 
called into doubt.  
The conviction that one 
should not kill, or that 
planet earth is a globe. 
Values Values can be described as worldviews about 
the way things should be. Values are ethically 
loaded.  
Democracy, social 
justice, 
solidarity and equity. 
Norms Norms are the translation of values into tangible 
rules for behaviour.  
Equal risk acceptability 
criteria, traffic rules. 
Interests Interests can be described as ideas about what is 
perceived as advantageous for individuals or 
groups, and is therefore something to be striven 
for. Interests are induced by convictions and 
values.  
Financial interests: can 
my company still make 
a profit? 
Social interests: can my 
children grow up in a 
safe environment? 
Knowledge Knowledge is constructed from experiences, 
facts, stories and impressions. Knowledge is not 
only the result of observation, but it also steers 
observation.  
Knowledge about risk, 
knowledge about the 
viewpoint and 
behaviour of other 
actors. 
Based on: Kolkman, 2005; Schön & Rein, 1994; Te Velde et al., 2002 
 
To characterise and analyse the procedural aspect of policy-making processes and to 
characterise how water management authorities dealt with local actors and local oppo-
sition, theories on interactive policy making were used. Interactive policy making is a 
popular attempt to solve conflicts in policy-making processes and to increase the sup-
port of local stakeholders, among others (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2005). It can be regarded 
as a more collaborative policy-making approach. Within interactive policy making, 
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stakeholders are regarded as knowledgeable actors, and authorities try to cooperate 
with these stakeholders. Even though interactive approaches are not developed 
exclusively for spatial planning, these approaches are becoming more prominent in 
planning practices (Albrechts et al., 2001; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2005; Hajer & 
Zonneveld, 2000; Van Rooy et al., 2007). This is why this perspective was chosen to 
analyse the procedural aspects of the policy-making process.  
Different types of interactive policy-making can be characterised by varying levels 
of participation, meaning the degree to which people are offered the opportunity of 
participating in and determining the final outcome of the policy-making process. In 
addition, different styles of governance can be distinguished in the way the 
governmental body deals with the target groups of the proposed policy, the stake-
holders and ultimately other initiators of spatial measures (Pröpper & Steenbeek, 
1999). Based on the level of participation and the governance style, interactive policy-
making processes can be characterised by a participation ladder (Table 6-2). In this 
regard, planning processes can be seen as strongly interactive if there are many local 
actors involved and if these actors have the opportunity to determine the planning 
process.  
Governance styles and levels of participation, however, should not be regarded as 
static, but rather dynamic. They can change over time and co-exist alongside one 
another. Participation can be defined as consulting during the elaboration of a solution 
or consulting on specific issues, but can be very limited during the process of agenda 
setting. Therefore, the level of participation and the governance style should be 
studied over a longer period of time.  
 
 
Table 6-2. Characterisation of the participation of local stakeholders  
Level of 
participation 
Definition Governance 
style 
Co-deciding The development and policy-making process is left to 
the initiators and stakeholders. This process is facilitated 
by authorities. 
Facilitating  
Co-producing The government authorities and stakeholders are 
partners. Agenda setting and problem-solving are joint 
activities. The government commits itself to the results 
of the process. 
Cooperating  
Delegating The authorities give participants the power to make 
decisions within the decision-making context provided  
Delegating 
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Advising Citizens have the opportunity to bring up problems and 
formulate solutions, but the government defines the 
agenda. The politicians are committed to the results in 
principle, but can deviate from them. 
Participatory  
Consulting Authorities define the problems and possible solutions. 
Citizens are consulted about the problems and solutions 
and can give their points of view. The authorities are free 
to commit to these points of view. 
Consultative  
Informing The citizens are informed about the policy process, but 
are not allowed to have input.  
Open-  
authoritarian  
No-
participation 
The public is not informed about the policy-making 
process and is not allowed to influence it.  
Closed-  
authoritarian  
Based on: Edelenbos & Klijn, 2005; Pröpper & Steenbeek, 1999 
 
The analysis of conflicts, degree of participation and governance styles was done by 
examining four ‘making space for water’ (MSW) projects (Table 6-3, Figure. 6-1). 
Two of the selected cases concern projects in which there was strong local opposition, 
ultimately resulting in the cancellation of the projects. The other two projects are still 
in progress and have some degree of local support. These projects (with their con-
trasting processes) were selected to compare and understand conflicts that appear in 
MSW projects.  
 
Table 6-3. Overview of the projects 
Project Objective Status Sources 
1. Schardammerkoog Water retention 
area 
Cancelled (Neuvel, 2004) 
2. Nieuwe Driemanspolder Water retention 
area 
In progress (Neuvel, 2004) 
3. Ooijpolder Calamity 
polder 
Cancelled (Davidse, 2008; Roth 
& Warner, 2007; Roth 
et al., 2006; Warner, 
2008) 
4. Kampen Bypass River bypass In progress (Grijzen, 2007; 
Grijzen, 2008; 
Schuwer, 2008) 
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Figure 6-1. Location map of the studied projects 
 
The analytical framework described above was first used for the examination of 
conflicts that appeared during two projects for the development and implementation of 
water retention areas (Neuvel, 2004). These two projects were analysed to determine 
how the policy-making process came about with regard to the level of participation 
and governance style. In addition, substantive conflicts were examined with regard to 
conflicting knowledge, interests, values, norms and convictions. The research began 
with a document analysis involving scientific literature, policy documents, reports, 
minutes, newspaper articles and other relevant documents. In addition to this first 
examination, key actors from both governmental and non-governmental organisations 
such as water boards, municipalities, farmer’s groups, and inhabitant and nature 
conservationist groups were selected and interviewed. The interviews were semi-
structured with open-ended questions. 
In this paper, we compared the results of this research with experiences from two 
other studies on ‘making space for water’ projects in the Netherlands. These studies 
focused on the development of a ‘calamity polder’ (Davidse, 2008) and a river bypass 
(Schuwer, 2008). The studies were carried out as masters thesis projects, supervised 
by the present authors. Each piece of research focused on conflicting spatial claims 
and the arguments on which the actors involved based their claims. In addition, the 
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research focused on the level of participation and governance style, and consequently 
on the way the policy-making process in these projects came about. This was done 
using an interactive policy-making framework and methodologies similar to those 
applied during the analysis of the water retention projects. 
The results from these masters theses were augmented with experiences from 
external studies on the same calamity polder project (Roth & Warner, 2007; Roth et 
al., 2006; Warner, 2008) and the same river bypass project (Grijzen, 2007; 2008). 
These studies provided additional information on the projects and the conflicts that 
appeared during the projects. By bringing these case studies together, the empirical 
findings provided a more robust starting point for reflecting on conflicts that appeared 
during these ‘making space for water’ projects. Subsequently, the four case study 
projects were compared by asking the following sub-questions (which were derived 
from the analytical framework):  
• Which conflicting spatial claims appeared during the policy-making process and 
how can these conflicting claims be understood in the light of convictions, values, 
norms, interests and knowledge? 
• How did the authorities deal with these conflicts in terms of governance style and 
the level of participation during the process? 
  
 
6.4  Case studies 
 
Water retention area Schardammerkoog 
In 1994 and 1998, the north-western part of the Netherlands experienced local 
flooding. After these events, the water board asked a research institute to calculate the 
current and expected risks of local flooding, taking the discharge and storage capacity 
of the water system into consideration. According to these studies, the water system 
met the national guidelines. In the near future, however, the water system could fail 
more often due to urban development and climate change. For these reasons, the water 
board began to search for suitable measures to maintain the current level of protection 
against future water surplus. 
In addition to the water board, the province, a regional agricultural group and a 
nature conservation organisation were involved. They discussed alternative solutions 
for managing water surplus. This resulted in one preferred solution: a water retention 
area, to be located in the Schardammerkoog polder, near Lake IJssel. Subsequently, 
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the preferred solution was presented to the local stakeholders in an open authoritarian 
style. They received a letter in which the proposals for the water retention area were 
presented.  
Both the regional and local actors agreed upon the necessity of additional measures 
to reduce the probability of local flooding, but they disagreed on the proposed 
solution. Therefore a local pressure group was established which represented local 
farmers and inhabitants during official hearings and meetings with the water board, 
municipality and province. 
Many local stakeholders still regarded pumps as the best practice for preventing 
local flooding and questioned the effectiveness of a water retention area. Moreover, 
the water retention area conflicted with the interests of local stakeholders. The water 
retention area required 75 hectares of agricultural land and therefore conflicted with 
agricultural interests. In addition, the water retention area conflicted with the desire of 
the municipality and inhabitants to preserve the open landscape.  
The representative of the inhabitants in the pressure group also argued that if water 
retention areas were needed, several smaller areas in different polders were desirable, 
rather than one large retention area in their polder. This idea was based on a value-
rational argument: smaller water retention areas would result in a fairer distribution of 
the burden. In addition, the local pressure group heavily criticised the style of 
governance of the water board. The inhabitants of the area wanted to be involved at an 
earlier stage of the policy-making process.  
As a reaction to the local opposition, the water board asked the province to work 
out the plans in cooperation with local stakeholders, which was a participatory style. 
Both local representatives and the province regarded this participation as constructive. 
Nevertheless, this participation did not result in the implementation of the water 
retention area plan. The strong local opposition caused a decrease in the political sup-
port for the water retention area, especially amongst the members of the water board 
council. As a result, this council cancelled the plan for a water retention area.  
This project showed how the scope of problems and solutions can become 
narrowly defined through the involvement of a limited number of actors in the early 
stage of the policy-making process. Moreover, the plans that were developed followed 
a typically technical and sector-based approach. Initial proposals for measures were 
motivated mainly by technical arguments such as flood probabilities, water level 
reduction and pumping or storage capacity. Through this technical focus, other values 
which were based on non-technical or non-scientific arguments or arguments unre-
lated to water management, such as arguments about distribution of burden, were ex-
cluded from the initial debate. As a result of the closed style of governance, adaptation 
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of the initial plan to local views was hardly allowed. Consequently, opportunities to 
balance the spatial claims of the water authority with the spatial claims of local actors 
were limited.  
The conflicts that appeared in the Schardammerkoog project, however, were not 
only about the different spatial claims of the actors involved, but also about the values, 
norms and knowledge underlying the proposal of the water retention area, such as the 
idea that open landscape should be used for water retention. These values and this 
knowledge were mainly contested by the actors whose interests conflicted with the 
proposed spatial measures. Focusing on the values and knowledge underlying the 
spatial claims instead of the interests involved can be regarded as a way of dealing 
with the ‘dilemma of stake’: how to account for interests without being undermined as 
an interested party (Edwards & Potter, 1992). As a reaction to this dilemma of stake, 
affected actors can construct their arguments in such a way that they are not regarded 
as being simply interest-based (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996). For example, 
local actors brought the proposed water retention area up for discussion based on the 
value-rational argument that a large-scale water retention area implies an unfair distri-
bution of burden. Of course, opposing views are not necessarily interest-based. 
Nevertheless, it can be expected that if proposed spatial measures conflict with inter-
ests of local actors, then the underlying values and knowledge on which a measure is 
based will also be contested.  
 
Water retention area – Nieuwe Driemanspolder 
In the 1990s, the south-western part of the Netherlands also experienced local 
flooding. Based on studies of the local water board it was concluded that the water 
system did not meet the guidelines for local flooding. Consequently, a water retention 
area was needed and the pumping capacity had to be increased (Hoogheemraadschap 
van Rijnland, 2000). The Nieuwe Driemanspolder was proposed as the location for 
this water retention area because this polder was located near the main bottleneck in 
the water system. In addition, the province already had plans to transform this agri-
cultural area into an area for nature, with agricultural and recreational use. It was 
argued that since these land uses could be combined with water retention, that the 
selection of the Nieuwe Driemanspolder would be the most appropriate location for 
water retention.  
Because the province had already started the policy making process on the coor-
dination of various spatial claims in the Nieuwe Driemanspolder, it became the 
coordinating authority for the further elaboration of the project. The proposed water 
retention area lay within the territory of two water boards and three municipalities. For 
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that reason, these authorities formed a steering committee for the project. The 
objective of this steering committee, however, was not only to develop ideas for the 
development and implementation of the water retention area, but also to develop a 
spatial plan for the polder which could balance claims for water retention, open space 
preservation, agriculture, recreation and nature. 
 Similar to the Schardammerkoog case, local stakeholders were actively consulted 
only after the choice for a water retention area in the Nieuwe Driemanspolder was 
made and elaborated on by the steering committee. The participation of these local 
stakeholders was formalised through the establishment of a sounding board group in 
which representatives of inhabitants of the polder, land owners, farmers and nature 
organisations were involved. The task of this group was to ascertain the desires, ideas 
and objections of the local stakeholders and to advise the steering committee on the 
further development and implementation of the water retention area in accordance 
with a participatory style.  
In contrast to the Schardammerkoog case, local pressure groups were not 
established. Moreover, the proposed water retention area was hardly criticised by local 
stakeholders. Criticism from local stakeholders focused mainly on various technical 
details regarding the elaboration of the plan rather than on the concept of water 
retention itself. Some representatives from nature conservation organisations in the 
sounding board group, for example, worried about the water quality of the water in the 
retention area during a peak in water storage, and the effect this water quality would 
have on the desired natural habitats. Local farmers wanted to be compensated for the 
loss of land or criticised the planned canal for the water retention area, since it would 
require agricultural land. Inhabitants involved in the sounding board group were 
concerned about the increase in traffic that was expected from the recreational use of 
the water retention area. In spite of these concerns, however, the respondents did not 
reject the water retention plan.  
The water retention area seemed to be compatible with the convictions, values, 
norms, interests and knowledge of local actors representing different sector perspec-
tives such as agriculture, nature conservation or recreation. An important explanation 
for this ‘fit’ can be found in the historic development of the policy-making process. In 
the past, many plans had been developed for this polder. In recent decades numerous 
new functions had been proposed for the polder such as housing development, a rub-
bish dump, a forest and even a Chinese theme park. The interviewed inhabitants who 
were members of the sounding board group explained that they were ‘not very happy’ 
with the development of a new water retention area in their backyard. The proposed 
water retention area conflicted with their values, norms and interests because they pre-
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ferred to keep the area as it was. In spite of this preference, however, they did not take 
action to prevent the development of a water retention area. They expected that the 
area would be transformed in any event, and felt that the development of a water 
retention area might be ‘the best possible development’ at the present time and might 
prevent other, less desirable developments. Farmers in the polder also supported the 
development of the water retention area, as was explained by the interviewed farmer 
who was a member of the sounding board group. The local farmers wanted to have 
clarity about their future. The development of a water retention area might be an 
opportunity for them to sell their land and to develop a new farm in a region with 
better prospects.  
In contrast with the Schardammerkoog project, the Nieuwe Driemanspolder project 
focused explicitly on balancing different spatial claims. Through this focus, spatial 
claims for water retention were integrated with claims for agriculture, nature 
conservation and recreation. Local stakeholders became involved during the elabora-
tion of the plans and supported the proposal for a water retention area. It should be 
noted, however, that part of the support for the water retention area was actually the 
response of stakeholders choosing an option they viewed as less threatening than 
other, less desirable developments, rather than their involvement in the water retention 
plan itself. 
 
Calamity polder – Ooijpolder  
In February 2000, the Vice Minister presented policy proposals for the national policy 
‘Room for the River’. These proposals made the national government’s intentions for 
the development of calamity polders public. Calamity polders are existing polders that 
can be deliberately inundated to store water in case of peak water levels. Through the 
use of calamity polders, the accidental flooding of other, more densely populated or 
economically strategic downstream areas could be prevented. Potential locations for 
the calamity polders had already been selected in the preparation of the National 
Spatial Policy Document, using an open authoritarian style (Davidse, 2008). The 
Ooijpolder was one of the selected calamity polders. 
Local and regional authorities and interest groups were surprised by the proposals 
and heavily criticised the proposed calamity polders (Roth et al., 2006; Warner, 2008). 
As a reaction to this criticism, a state advisory commission was established by the 
national government to further investigate the need and conditions for calamity 
polders.  
A local bank director in the Ooijpolder invited the chairman of the commission, 
David Luteijn, to the bank’s annual general meeting, to inform citizens in the 
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Ooijpolder about the calamity polder plans. This meeting can be described as an open 
authoritative rather than consultative meeting (Warner, 2008).  
The presentation caused social turbulence in the Ooijpolder. People were con-
cerned about the consequences of becoming a calamity polder: they were afraid that 
property values would decline, that desired urban developments would be prohibited 
and that investments in the area would be reduced (Roth et al., 2006). The presenta-
tion triggered local opposition, initially by farmers, but followed by the establishment 
of a local pressure group (Roth et al., 2006). Similar to the Schardammerkoog group, 
this pressure group included both farmers and a considerable number of inhabitants. 
The Ooijpolder group, however, lobbied at both the regional and national level, did 
additional research on the effectiveness of calamity polders, informed the inhabitants 
of the polder and used the media to increase public awareness regarding their point of 
view. Similar to the Schardammerkoog group, the arguments used by the local pres-
sure group did not focus explicitly on interests such as property values. The pressure 
group focused mainly on the knowledge and technical assumptions underlying con-
trolled flooding (Davidse, 2008; Roth & Warner, 2007). They believed, for example, 
that the estimate used for peak river discharges was too high, undermining the need 
for calamity polders. This strategy can be regarded as another strategy for dealing with 
the dilemma of stake: to focus on the assumptions in the plan instead of the interests 
held by the members of the local pressure group. This prevents the pressure group 
from acquiring the label of an NIMBY-driven (Not In My Back Yard) pressure group 
(Roth et al., 2006). 
In 2003 a consultancy bureau submitted a report to the Ministry of Transport, 
Public Works and Water Management that criticised the research on calamity polders. 
The Ministry initially denied the existence of this report to the local pressure group, 
and the report was only made public after the local pressure group announced it would 
appeal to the government information act. These and other reports raised growing 
doubts about the effectiveness of calamity polders and the underlying technical facts 
(Roth et al., 2006). 
At this stage, the lobbying of Members of Parliament by the local pressure group 
turned out to be effective as well. One of the contacts of the pressure group helped 
propose a resolution, which was voted on in Parliament, to transfer the budgeted funds 
for the calamity polders to the general budget for the Room for the River Policy. The 
acceptance of this resolution by Parliament forced the national government to post-
pone the spatial reservation for the calamity polders in the National Spatial Planning 
Act. This meant that the plans for the calamity polder in the Ooijpolder were removed 
from the political agenda (Roth et al., 2006).  
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As illustrated by the Ooijpolder case study, local actors turned out to be very good 
at utilising their networks outside the formal policy-making and information meeting 
process to influence the outcomes (Warner, 2008). Experiences in other planning 
processes have also shown that actors involved in planning continue to communicate 
via traditional forms and institutions, but that many activities related to spatial 
planning such as bargaining, decision-making and influencing activities are taking 
place outside the formal structures and rules of the planning process (Hillier, 2000). 
As illustrated by the Ooijpolder project, and to a lesser extent by the 
Schardammerkoog project, this communication no longer takes place behind closed 
doors, but in public, involving the media and local stakeholders. Consequently, 
authorities who are developing spatial water measures that conflict with local ideas on 
the current and desired future landscape should expect strong local opposition.  
Even though the proposed calamity polder conflicted with local interests, such as 
maintaining property values, local opposition focused mainly on the knowledge 
underlying the plan for the calamity polder. Consequently, the conflicts were not only 
about different local and national interests, convictions or values, but also about the 
technical knowledge on which the proposed calamity polder was based.  
 
The Kampen bypass 
In addition to the calamity polders, the national government also explored other pos-
sibilities for and consequences of creating more room for the rivers. After this explo-
ration, the national government decided to develop an integral plan for flood 
management on the main rivers. One of the measures considered in this national plan 
was the development of a river bypass near Kampen, adjacent to the IJssel River. 
Consequently, the national government put a claim on this area to enable the devel-
opment of a river bypass in the future, even though the implementation of the bypass 
was not planned until between 2050 and 2100. This claim conflicted with the housing 
objectives of the local government. The municipality of Kampen wanted to build 
4,000 to 6,000 houses in this area. In addition, the proposed bypass conflicted with 
other spatial claims such as a new railway and the upgrading of a main road. There-
fore, the province brought the involved authorities together to develop a spatial master 
plan for the area and to explore, as had been done in the Nieuwe Driemanspolder 
project, how the different objectives and claims could be integrated.  
The regional master plan was developed in cooperation with local, regional and 
national authorities. These authorities proposed developing a river bypass in the short 
term and integrating it with the other spatial claims, such as the development of a 
railway. Five development scenarios were described in the master plan, which was 
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presented using a consultative governance style to the public by means of three infor-
mation meetings. These meetings were open to all interested parties. The participants 
were allowed to respond to the various scenarios (Grijzen, 2007; Schuwer, 2008).  
The scenario for the bypass as a new secondary river, navigable for recreational 
boating, was most popular with the participants. During the information sessions, 
however, inhabitants of Kamperveen, a small village near the city of Kampen, were 
especially opposed to the proposed scenarios because the bypass would physically 
split their community. In reaction to this resistance, the province offered to support 
people in developing alternative scenarios with the aid of the experts involved in the 
development of the master plan. This governance style can be regarded as a more 
interactive participatory style, since the authorities did not necessarily commit them-
selves to the result. Through this more participatory style, province representatives 
successfully transformed local opposition by inhabitants of Kamperveen into 
constructive participation (Grijzen, 2008). This resulted in a sixth scenario, which was 
a variant of the popular secondary river scenario. In this variant, however, the secon-
dary river would divide the Kamperveen community as little as possible. Based on the 
information meetings, the project group opted for the elaboration of a bypass as a 
secondary river that would be navigable for recreational boating and for a trajectory 
that did not divide Kamperveen.  
In addition to the inhabitants of Kamperveen, the inhabitants of Noordeinde, a 
small village in the province of Gelderland, also heavily opposed the plans. The 
project team was also considering the territory of Noordeinde for the planned route of 
the bypass. In this village as well, the proposed bypass conflicted with local ideas 
about the desired landscape. For example, people were afraid that the bypass would 
attract recreation and would result in new houses, which would disturb the peaceful-
ness of the area (Grijzen, 2008). In addition, the inhabitants claimed that the policy 
makers had forgotten to inform them about the project. They were not actively 
informed about the consultation round, and only found out about it three days before-
hand (Grijzen, 2008). The people of Noordeinde were able to attract local, regional 
and national media attention. As a reaction, the project leaders for the project’s master 
plan organised an information evening and promised the inhabitants that the bypass 
would not cross the territory of Noordeinde. They also extended the consultation 
round (Grijzen, 2008).  
Similar to the Nieuwe Driemanspolder project, the elaboration of the master plan 
was carried out by a project group which consisted of civil servants from the local and 
regional authorities and a steering group in which the local and regional governments 
were represented. Representatives of non-governmental stakeholders were not 
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involved in the consultation rounds as they had been during the presentation of the 
scenarios, but were invited to participate in a sounding board group. However, the 
sounding board group did not have any formal decision-making power.  
During the elaboration of the plans, ideas for residential development were worked 
out further. The proposed residential development in the area, which was needed for 
financing the desired development, amongst other objectives, was still strongly 
opposed by some inhabitants. Like the group in the Ooijpolder, the local pressure 
group from Zwartendijk (another village near Kampen) focused on the knowledge 
underlying the purported housing need. They argued that the housing need was greatly 
overestimated and proposed building houses at alternative locations, especially within 
the city itself (Stichting Werkgroep Zwartendijk, 2007). In addition, some farmers 
were still dissatisfied with the proposed developments because the plans could result 
in their relocation. As this article went to press, local farmers and the local pressure 
group from Zwartendijk are still trying to influence the planning process. Like the 
Ooijpolder group, they are not only using formal methods of resistance, such as formal 
appeals, but also more informal ones. The Zwartendijk group, for example, is carrying 
out additional research on housing needs, presenting alternative plans and 
communicating their ideas through billboards in the fields. Nevertheless, the 
representatives of local and regional authorities still expect the current plans to be 
implemented. They regard acquiring sufficient funding for the bypass as one of the 
main bottlenecks for implementation of the plans (Schuwer, 2008), not the conflicts 
with local actors.  
Similar to the other case study on the development of spatial measures for water 
management, the proposed bypass near Kampen resulted in conflicts with local actors 
affected by the bypass. As in the other case study projects, these conflicts were not 
only about the different interests, but also about the underlying knowledge on which 
the ideas were based. In the light of the policy-making process, this case study showed 
how governance styles, and especially adapting governance styles, can contribute to 
persuading local opposition to engage in more constructive participation (Grijzen, 
2008). In addition, the project illustrated that a spatial planning perspective can be 
used to coordinate various activities that result in spatial claims, such as the 
development of a bypass, residential areas or new railroad. 
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6.5  Discussion and conclusions 
 
Spatial measures to reduce flood risks require space, or at least another use of space. 
In the case studies, the spatial claims resulting from the proposed measures conflicted 
with other spatial claims and underlying values, norms and interests of actors in the 
area (Table 6-4). When proposed measures conflict with local views, policy makers 
can encounter serious opposition organised by the affected local and regional stake-
holders. These stakeholders are able to organise strong opposition and make their 
voices heard, as was found in the Schardammerkoog, Ooijpolder and Kampen Bypass 
projects. 
 
 
Table 6-4. Overview of the governance styles and conflicts on plan content 
Project  Governance style 
(from.. via … to) 
Conflicting points of view 
Schardammerkoog closed authoritarian 
? open authoritarian 
? consultative 
Knowledge: effectiveness and efficiency of 
water retention versus pumping  
Interests: use of land and landscape quality 
versus water retention 
Values: distribution of burden 
Norms: one large or numerous smaller 
retention areas, involvement of local actors 
Nieuwe 
Driemanspolder 
closed authoritarian 
? open authoritarian 
? consultative 
Knowledge: water quality 
Interests: continuation of agricultural 
businesses and livability versus land for 
water retention and recreation 
Values: openness versus water safety 
Norms: open landscape, water retention  
Ooijpolder closed authoritarian 
? open authoritarian  
Knowledge: effectiveness and efficiency of 
calamity polders with respect to alternative 
flood mitigation measures 
Interests: land values, development potential, 
flood protection 
Values: protection against flooding, 
effectiveness, efficiency  
Norms: level of protection of flood prone 
areas, effective and efficient measures 
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Kampen Bypass open authoritarian? 
consultative ? 
participatory ? 
consultative 
Knowledge: housing needs 
Interests: river bypass, housing development, 
infrastructural developments, landscape 
quality, land ownership, agricultural interests 
and financial interests 
Values: openness, peacefulness, social 
coherence 
Norms: no bypass through a village, open 
landscape  
 
Through this opposition, not only the measures themselves, but also the underlying 
knowledge and values of the proposed measures are contested. In the end, this can 
result in the cancellation of projects as illustrated by the Schardammerkoog and 
Ooijpolder projects. .In this light, it can be argued that a more interactive approach to 
policy-making would be a positive development. This approach, in contrast to an 
authoritarian top-down approach, allows for discussion about the various spatial 
claims from various actors or groups of actors. An interactive policy-making process 
can help involved stakeholders recognize their dependency on other actors and learn 
about the convictions, values, norms, interests and knowledge of other actors 
involved. Furthermore, more interactive policy-making can increase trust amongst 
involved actors, provide additional, area-specific knowledge and creativity and be 
helpful in identifying potential conflicting values and interests at an early stage (Innes 
& Booher, 2003; Van Woerkum & Aarts 2002).  
Nevertheless, the most appropriate level of interaction or governance style cannot 
be predefined. They are context dependent. Comparable governance styles in the 
Schardammerkoog and Nieuwe Driemanspolder led to very different outcomes. The 
Kampen case study, along with previous studies on interactive decision-making 
processes (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2005), have shown that policy-making processes are 
promising if levels of participation and styles of governance are adapted to the 
conflicts at hand, if the interactions are well prepared and if the voiced preferences are 
taken seriously. 
More interactive policy-making, however, implies that discussions are broadened 
to introduce additional local spatial claims, such as agriculture or housing. This study 
of the MSW projects showed that the proposed measures for flood risk reduction not 
only conflicted with local views on water management, but also with local views on 
the desired current and future land use. These desires were not only based on water 
management ambitions, but also on ambitions with respect to agriculture, recreation or 
housing. Clearly, conflicts were therefore not only about the proposed measure itself, 
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but also about its relationship to other spatial claims and about the underlying 
knowledge, values and interests. In other words, these conflicts were about the future 
landscape desired by national and local society and about the coherence of different 
land uses within this landscape. For this reason, a spatial planning perspective can be 
of added value if compared to the sectoral water management perspective. A spatial 
planning perspective implies a substantive focus on the landscape as a whole and on 
the coherence of and between different land uses and inhabitants. This perspective 
emphasises a more holistic starting point through which spatial measures for water 
management can be discussed in relation to other spatial claims. Moreover, the pro-
posed measures and underlying arguments can be confronted with other convictions, 
values, norms and interests with respect to current and future land use. For these rea-
sons, it can offer an interesting approach for the development of spatial water 
management measures. As illustrated by the Nieuwe Driemanspolder and the Kampen 
Bypass project, for example, a more holistic approach offers the opportunity to 
balance and integrate spatial claims for water management with other claims such as 
agriculture, housing or transport.  
In the introduction, it was argued that the space for water policies could result in a 
greater priority for water issues within spatial planning practices (Howe & White, 
2004; Wolsink, 2006). These case studies, however, have made it clear that in MSW 
practices, a greater priority for a spatial planning approach and the consistent 
consideration of other spatial claims, values and interests – such as landscape preser-
vation or agriculture – are required. Within flood risk management, however, spatial 
planning is often narrowed down to a regulatory instrument through which, for exam-
ple, land use changes in flood-prone areas can be regulated (Hutter, 2007). However, 
as this paper has illustrated, there is more to spatial planning than that. In addition to 
providing an interesting research perspective, spatial planning also provides added 
value as a substantive focus in interactive policy-making processes. This was shown in 
the development and implementation of spatial measures for water management, since 
this type of policy making inherently requires balancing different spatial claims with 
varying interests, values, norms and convictions with respect to the current and future 
landscape and its inhabitants and users. 
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Integrated Flood Management Requires an Integrated 
Spatial Information Infrastructure*  
 
 
Abstract 
This examination of flood management practices in the Netherlands and the required 
spatial information in these practices has revealed an increased recognition of the 
strong interdependence between risk management and emergency response processes. 
In short, professional actors involved in flood risk management increasingly 
considered flood mitigation measures in the light of possibilities for emergency 
response. As a result of this wider conception of flood management, information needs 
for flood-risk management and flood-emergency response are increasingly 
overlapping. Consequently, the importance of an integrated spatial information infra-
structure that facilitates the process of both risk and emergency management is 
addressed. 
 
Keywords: flood management, spatial information infrastructure, risk management, 
emergency management. 
                                                 
*  
Submitted as Neuvel, J.M.M. and Zlatanova, S., 2009. Integrated flood management asks for 
an integrated spatial information infrastructure Natural Hazards. 
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7.1  Introduction  
 
Risk and emergency management activities are often divided into four categories: 
mitigation, preparation, response and recovery. A considerable part of the requested 
information before and during a disaster is explicitly geographical, or in other words, 
the information contains a specific spatial reference, such as hazardous installations, 
risk contours, vulnerable facilities, shelters, emergency routes, toxic clouds and 
flooded areas. As a result, geospatial information systems are increasingly seen as 
indispensable in supporting risk and disaster management activities (Brazier & 
Greenwood, 1998; Contini et al., 2000; Craciunescu et al., 2006; Greene, 2002; 
Köhler & Wächter, 2006; Parker et al., 2007). Spatial information systems can support 
risk and emergency management activities with gathering, storing, retrieving, 
visualizing, communicating, analysing and modelling geographical and administrative 
information.  
System requirements related to the different activities in risk and emergency 
management, however, highly differ. For example, as experienced in Dutch risk and 
emergency management practices in the past, actors involved in emergency response 
required simple, intuitive interfaces and approaches for communication and informa-
tion access. The requirements for extended functionality or even intelligence in sup-
port of decision-making were minimal. For risk prevention, more extended function-
alities were desired to make better arguments for the evaluation of alternative policies. 
Actors involved in risk management preferred more extended models to estimate the 
potential number of victims, but more simple applications were also required to 
communicate with non-experts such as stakeholders or governors (Neuvel & 
Zlatanova, 2006). 
Although risk and emergency management activities have their own characteristics 
and the actors involved in different activities have their own system requirements, it is 
still possible to identify at least one common challenge that constrains the ability of 
risk and emergency management to plan for and manage emergencies effectively and 
efficiently: the need for better information (Cutter, 2003; Parker et al., 2007; 
Schneiderbauer, 2007; Zlatanova & Li, 2008). In this paper the spatial informational 
requirements in risk and emergency management are explored together with their 
implications for the further development of spatial information systems and especially 
for the development of spatial information infrastructures. The information needs are 
explored through two case studies on flood management in the Netherlands. Based on 
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an examination of risk and emergency management activities, the actors involved, and 
the information needs, we argue that an integrated spatial information infrastructure, 
which serves all activities in risk and emergency management (mitigation, preparation, 
response and recovery), should be strived for.  
 
 
7.2  Conceptualisation of risk and emergency management 
 
Risks, are generally regarded as a function of a hazard and the vulnerability of the 
physical and socio-economic system to this hazard. The term hazard refers to the 
events or phenomena that may cause harm to things that human beings value. 
Vulnerability refers to the susceptibility to damage from a particular disaster hazard. 
Nevertheless, fundamental conceptual differences related to the concept of 
vulnerability exist (Cutter, 1996; De Bruijn et al., 2007; De Graaf et al., 2007; 
Schneiderbauer, 2007). Based on these discussions of conceptual differences, we 
divided the concept of vulnerability into two components: exposure and capacities 
(Table 7-1), although the different risk components are interrelated. For example, a 
system cannot be vulnerable if it is not exposed to a hazard.  
 
Table 7-1. Different risk components  
Risk components Definition 
Hazard A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon 
or human activity that may cause injury or the loss 
of life, property damage, social and economic 
disruption, or environmental degradation. 
Exposure The proneness to being affected by a particular 
hazard, without taking into consideration the 
capacity to deal with the hazard. 
Resistance capacity The ability of a system to prevent hazardous events, 
such as water defences to resist high water levels.  
Adaptive capacity Capacity of a society to adapt and to adjust to 
uncertain future developments and hazards.  
Coping capacity Capacity to respond in the (immediate) aftermath of 
an event.  
R
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Recovery capacity The capacity to return to the pre-disaster status. 
Based on De Bruijn et al. 2007; Schneiderbauer 2007; De Graaf et al. 2007 
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Flood management activities are often divided into four categories: mitigation, prepa-
ration, response and recovery. Mitigation focuses on minimizing the disaster impact in 
the event of a disaster. Mitigation activities can take place both during the recovery 
from a past disaster and during the preparation for a potential disaster. The control of 
land use, the modification of constructions to create emergency routes or the use of 
building techniques that help reduce damage are examples of mitigation activities. 
Within mitigation, prevention is sometimes distinguished as a different category of 
activities (Schneiderbauer, 2007); prevention deals with the avoidance of unsafe situa-
tions such as the regulation of dangerous industrial installation near resident areas, 
reforestation to reduce flood hazards or landslides, or the regulation of development in 
flood prone areas. In this light, mitigation activities are referred to as those activities 
that are undertaken to limit a disaster's potential impact. In this paper, however, miti-
gation activities also include prevention activities. 
Activities and measures taken in advance to ensure an effective response, such as 
the enhancement of emergency capacities through the development of a contingency 
plan or through the training of response activities, are considered preparation. Similar 
to mitigation, preparation activities are pre-event actions. 
Response comprises all activities carried out to fight a crisis immediately before or 
directly after it has taken place, to save lives, to minimize damage to property, and to 
enhance the effectiveness of recovery (Godschalk, 1991). Examples of response 
activities immediately before or after an event are the provision of timely and effective 
warnings, the temporary evacuation of people and property from threatened locations, 
the coordination of emergency response activities and medical care. 
Finally, recovery is related to all measures that are required to return to a normal 
situation, such as medical and social-psychological aftercare of victims, site clearance 
and the repair of houses or infrastructure. These measures can be divided into short-
term recovery activities and longer term recovery activities (Godschalk, 1991). The 
former consists of assessing damage, clearing debris and restoring utilities while the 
later includes reconstruction and evaluation activities such as the reassessment of 
contingency plans. Post-disaster recovery and reconstruction offers the opportunity to 
reduce the probability and impact of future disruptions. This focus on preventing re-
occurrence connects longer-term recovery activities to mitigation and preparation 
activities.  
Normally, risk and emergency management activities are divided into pre-event 
activities consisting of mitigation and preparation activities and post-event activities 
including response and recovery activities. Within the literature on GIS and risk and 
emergency risk management, however, it has been suggested to merge preparation and 
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response activities since many GIS systems developed in the preparation phase are 
utilised in the response phase (Cova, 2005). In the light of skills needed, this catego-
risation partly makes sense. Both emergency training and response call for tactical 
skills in interagency coordination and decision-making to cope with emergencies 
under disaster conditions. Like mitigation, emergency planning demands strategic 
skills in planning, policy design and implementation (Godschalk, 1991). Within the 
recovery phase, short-term recovery activities are closely linked to response activities. 
On the other hand, recovery in the longer term is strongly linked to mitigation since 
longer-term recovery asks for strategic skills whereas short-term recovery puts more 
emphasis on tactical skills. Consequently, emergency training, response and short-
term recovery in this paper are regarded as one related group of activities referred to as 
emergency management. This term refers to all the activities related to directly pre-
paring and providing assistance or intervention immediately before, during or imme-
diately after a disaster. Activities related to mitigation (including prevention), emer-
gency planning and recovery in the longer term are referred to as risk management 
while the term flood management is used to refer to both emergency and risk 
management activities (Figure. 7-1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-1. Flood risk and emergency management  
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7.3  Method 
 
To examine the characteristics and informational requirements of flood management, 
two case studies on flood management in the Netherlands were carried out. Since 
many actors were involved in flood management, informational requirements were not 
worked out and discussed for all actors involved. It was decided to work out only the 
informational requirements for key actors. The first case study focused on the 
activities, actors and information needs in flood risk management. Land use planners 
were selected as a key actor in flood risk management since we expect that land use 
planners will play a prominent role in future flood risk management practices. Conse-
quently, land use planners are regarded as an important target group for future spatial 
information systems for flood management.  
Within the second case, the activities, actors and information needs related to flood 
emergency management were examined. In this examination, special attention was 
paid to the information needs of the fire department. The fire department plays a 
prominent role in emergency response and can be regarded as an important target 
group for spatial information systems for emergency management. Consequently, the 
information needs of land use planning and the fire department were worked out in 
detail. 
Within the two cases, spatial information requirements of professional actors 
involved in flood management were explored through a literature study, interviews 
and workshops. The literature study aimed to investigate the organisation of Dutch 
prevention and emergency management and the ‘state-of-the-art’ in GIS technology 
used for crisis response and risk prevention. Several workshops were organised to 
discuss existing problems and to identify where improvements were required and 
where they could be successfully implemented. Two of the workshops were especially 
important for this study because they mainly focused on the work and information 
requirements of the risk and emergency management sector. The first workshop was 
attended by fire departments, police departments, paramedic teams, provinces, water 
boards and universities. The second seminar hosted representatives from advisory 
organisations in risk prevention, such as the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management and knowledge organisations that focus on public safety and flood 
management. During these workshops a large number of carefully selected questions 
were discussed, one of which focussed on the required data for risk and emergency 
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management. The information derived from these workshops was used as starting 
point for this paper.  
More detailed insight into informational requirements came from additional 
interviews for both case studies. Five interviews were carried out with twelve respon-
dents. The respondents were experts involved in spatial planning, flood risk manage-
ment, flood risk modelling or a combination of these fields and work at the Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management, the province, the environmental 
assessment agency and a consultancy bureau respectively. The representatives were 
asked to define their (mainly spatial) informational requirements for flood risk 
management activities. Each interview took about 1.5 hours. Previous to the interview 
the respondents received information about the informational requirements that were 
derived from the workshops and previous interviews. This document was used as a 
starting point for the discussion of the respondents’ informational requirements. In 
addition to the informational requirements, different scenarios for flood risk manage-
ment policies in the Netherlands were also discussed during the interview. In this 
paper, however, informational requirements are discussed in the light of a flood risk 
management policy in which land use planning is regarded as an important instrument 
in implementing measures to reduce flood consequences. 
In the flood emergency management case, more detailed insight into informational 
requirements was gained through a literature study, interviews with experts from the 
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, fire department 
responders and participants in projects developing software for flood management. 
Using the interviews, the major actors, the cooperation between the teams, the 
required information and the systems currently used for both monitoring and simula-
tion of floods and control and coordination during the disaster have been investigated. 
The analysis focused on the needed spatial information. Finally, the characteristics and 
informational requirement for the two different flood management activities were 
compared. 
 
 
7.4  Changing Perspectives on Flood Management in the 
Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands is primarily a large delta that is shaped by the rivers Rhine, Meuse 
and Scheldt. It has a population of over 16 million people living on about 40,000 km2. 
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Therefore, the Netherlands is considered a small but densely populated country. 
Because one fourth of the Netherlands lies below sea level and almost two thirds of 
the Netherlands would regularly be flooded without levees or dikes protecting it (Van 
Nes et al., 2001), the country can be regarded as a flood prone area.  
Dutch flood management strategies are traditionally aimed at reducing the 
probability of flooding through more than 3,600 km of primary dikes that directly 
protect the hinterland from flooding by the sea or major rivers (Ministerie van Verkeer 
en Waterstaat & Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006). Nevertheless, this flood risk 
management strategy has been changing since the 1990s. After the flooding of 
unprotected areas in the river foreland of the Meuse in 1993 and 1995 and a near 
flooding event of the dike ring areas along the Meuse and Rhine in 1995, flood risk 
policies were changed and river dikes were raised at various places. This action was 
supported by a plan which allowed for the largest rivers to be given greater freedom to 
spill out across some parts of their original floodplains. The plan, which became 
known as the ‘Room for the River’ Policy, entailed the removal of obstacles from the 
floodplains, dike relocation, and the creation of retention areas, bypasses and secon-
dary channels to circumvent urban bottlenecks.  
In addition to the room-for-the-river measures and dikes, which are mainly 
focussed on reducing the probability of flooding, the national government and the 
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, in particular, are 
considering the need for additional mitigation measures to reduce the consequences of 
flooding (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2008b). This consideration is taking 
place in a national project, Waterveiligheid 21e eeuw, (Water Safety in the 21st 
century). Within the discussions on Dutch flood management strategies, flood mitiga-
tion measures are increasingly being considered in the light of the reduction of flood 
consequences, including the possibilities for emergency response. This has resulted in 
a renewed recognition of the interdependency of flood risk and emergency manage-
ment. Land use planning is also being seen an important instrument in implementing 
such mitigation measures.  
To reduce flood consequences further, additional attention is being paid to the 
organisation and preparation of flood emergency management. An evaluation of the 
organisation and preparation of flood emergency management showed that many 
improvements can be made in both the organisation and training of flood emergency 
management. One of the issues raised by this evaluation is the improvement of infor-
mation exchange and communication within and between operational emergency 
managers, coordinators, governors and the public (COT et al., 2005). To improve 
flood emergency management, the Dutch government has established a special task-
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force. Other initiatives are also being taken to improve flood emergency management. 
For example, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management is 
continuously working on improving both their flood models and their risk analysis and 
assessments by developing better terrain models and giving more exact estimates of 
potential damage and numbers of victims (COT et al., 2005; Ministry of Transport 
Public Works and Water Management, 2005). In the last decade, various projects were 
also funded for developing early warning systems (estimating also measurements from 
water level gauges) and information systems to support the communication between 
actors involved in emergency response. These improvement efforts also included 
improving cooperation with neighbouring countries (STOWA, 2008). 
 
 
7.5  Flood Risk management in the Netherlands 
 
In the first case study, Dutch flood risk management practices are examined. In this 
section, the performed activities, actors and informational requirements are investi-
gated in the light of the changing perspectives on flood risk management.  
 
Activities and actors 
Risk management activities and processes can be grouped into four clusters: 1) identi-
fication, 2) risk assessment or evaluation, 3) choice and implementation of risk reduc-
tion measures and instruments, 4) monitoring and maintenance of the acceptable risks 
(Bottelberghs, 2000; Schanze, 2006).  
As expected, water authorities play an important role in risk management. The 
Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management takes a leading 
role in the management of flood risks from the sea and major Dutch rivers and lakes. 
Both regional water boards and the provinces play a prominent role in the flood risk 
management of other rivers, lakes and canals while the regional board and the 
Rijkswaterstaat (Ministry of Waterways and Public Works) have an important func-
tion in the monitoring and management of Dutch dikes. Land use planning authorities 
and non-governmental stakeholders such as inhabitants are already involved in the 
implementation of ‘room-for–the-river’ measures. These actors, however, still have a 
limited role in the evaluation an implementation of flood mitigation measures. As 
mentioned before, perspectives on flood-risk management are changing, though. 
Consequently, it is expected that land use authorities, including the municipality, the 
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province and the spatial planning ministry will be more instrumental in evaluating and 
implementing flood risks and flood risk management strategies. Since the national 
ministry on water management would like emergency response issues to be more 
influential in future flood risk management practices, we expect that emergency ser-
vices will be more involved in risk management practices as well. Table 7-2 gives an 
overview of key actors in Dutch flood risk management practices. 
 
Table 7-2. Key actors involved in risk management 
Activities  Key actors involved 
Identification of flood risks  Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management (V&W), provinces, water boards 
Evaluation and assessment of 
flood risks 
V&W, Ministry of Housing Spatial Planning and the 
Environment (VROM), provinces, municipalities, water 
boards, emergency services, non-governmental 
stakeholders 
Choice and implementation of 
risk reduction measures and 
instruments 
V&W, VROM, provinces, municipalities, water boards, 
emergency services, non-governmental stakeholders 
Monitoring and maintenance of 
the acceptable risks 
V&W, water boards. 
 
Informational requirements 
The investigation of information needs of spatial planners resulted in a wide variety of 
information needs related to flood risks. Based on the literature on risk and emergency 
management, these informational needs have been divided into four categories: 
hazards, exposure, capacities and processes. Within these categories, static informa-
tion and simulated information could be distinguished as summarised in Table 7-3. 
Static information has its time orientation in the present whereas the time focus of the 
simulated information is in the future. Even though we do not pretend that the infor-
mation needs derived from the interviews and summarised in this table give a com-
plete overview of the information needs for risk management, the information needs at 
least give a good indication of the required information related to flood risks. 
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Table 7-3. Examples of information needed for flood mitigation in land use planning 
 Examples of information needs 
Hazards Static information: Flood prone areas; Nature of the flood, e.g. flash flood, salt or 
fresh water. 
Simulated information: Estimates of actual flood probabilities and expected 
effects and consequences such as potential water depth and velocity.  
Exposure Static information: Information about citizens in the area exposed such as total 
number of inhabitants or people under restrictions such as prisoners; Vulnerable 
objects such as schools, drinking-water supply or installations with hazardous 
substances; Buildings characteristics such as high/low-rise building (shelter), 
building material (strength). 
Simulated information: Damage and number of victims for a particular flooding 
scenario. 
Resistance 
capacity 
Static information: Probability of failure of dikes and other hydraulic structures 
such as sluices. 
Simulated information: Simulation of dike breaches or failure of hydraulic 
structures. 
Adaptive 
capacity 
Static information: The extent of flood proofing measures or the flood 
compatibility of the use of the ground floor of buildings. 
Simulated information: The effect of adaptive measures on potential flood 
damage and potential number of victims. 
Coping 
capacity 
Static information: Capacity of people such as the ability of people to get to a 
safe location; Possibilities for shelter; Infrastructure information such as road 
capacities. 
Simulated information: Possibilities for evacuation, shelter and capacity of 
emergency services and hospitals. 
Recovery 
capacity 
Static information: The extent of insurance, recovery plans 
Simulated information: Potential damage. 
Processes Static information: - 
Simulated information: Climate change, urbanization, economic developments. 
 
 
7.6  Flood emergency management in the Netherlands 
 
In addition to examining flood risk management characteristics and informational re-
quirements, a case study was carried out to study the performed activities, actors and 
information needs in flood emergency management. The results of this study are 
summarized below.  
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Activities and actors  
Both emergency training and response activities are focussed on emergency response 
and its preparation. On the operational level, the activities carried out in emergency 
management can be divided into four clusters: 1) containment and control of the flood 
and its effects, 2) medical assistance, 3) public order and traffic management, 4) 
taking care of the population (Diehl & Van der Heide, 2005; Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken, 2002). Table 7-4 gives an overview of the key actors involved in 
these activities.  
 
Table 7-4. Operational flood emergency activities and key actors involved  
Activities Key operational actors 
Containment and control of 
the flood and its effects 
Regional fire department; Rijkswaterstaat; Military 
National Reserve. 
Medical assistance (Para)medical services (GHOR); Red Cross (SIGMA 
teams) Royal Dutch Water Life Saving Association 
(KNBRD), Royal Netherlands Sea Rescue Institution 
(KNRM). 
Public order and traffic 
management 
Police department 
Taking care of the population Municipality 
 
As for all other disaster types, the fire response units have an important task in the 
containing and controlling the hazard and its effects. They are responsible for 
pumping water out of the streets and other flooded areas, removing blockages, helping 
evacuate citizens and animals and checking for contamination of water, soil and air. In 
the event of an emergency, the fire department is also responsible for warning the citi-
zens through the net of stationary sirens. In case of an imminent flood event, the local 
offices of the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management 
(Rijkswaterstaat) within the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Manage-
ment are intrinsic to monitoring high water levels. They also give early warnings if 
necessary (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 2002; Rosenthal et al., 1998). The 
water boards are monitoring and, if necessary, strengthening the dikes in the event of 
an imminent flood. Several other organisations, such as the Dutch National Reserves, 
can take a part in the containment and control of the hazard and its effect, if the 
operational organisations (i.e., first responders) need support (http://www.natres.nl/). 
 Key actors involved in medical assistance include the ambulance services and 
hospitals. In addition to these, the SIGMA teams of the Red Cross and special ambu-
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lance teams can be formed and included in the medical help operations. However, they 
are usually involved in large disasters only. In addition to these organisations, the 
Royal Dutch Water Life Saving Association, KNBRD (http://www.rednet.nl) can be 
enlisted to save people. 
In the event of an emergency, the police are responsible for the processes related to 
public order and traffic management including the evacuation of threatened or affected 
areas and the protection of shelters and commando centres. In most cases the police 
work under the authority of the mayor.  
Besides the overall responsibility for disaster management under the authority of 
the mayor, the municipal structures are responsible for processes related to taking care 
of the population such as informing citizens, accommodating non-injured people from 
affected areas and registering casualties.  
On the strategic level, the organisation of emergency management response in the 
Netherlands is divided into a local level (the site of an incident), the regional level, the 
provincial level and the national level. Most minor emergency incidents are responded 
to at the local level. Within this operational structure, the local fire officer has the 
primary operational responsibility for the on-site coordination of local disaster 
response. If the magnitude of an incident increases and the affected area transcends the 
incident area, then a regional coordination team will be formed in conjunction with the 
operational coordination team at site. The regional coordination team is often situated 
in a regional office remote from the incident (e.g. a joint office of the regional 
emergency services). If a regional coordination team is formed, then the mayor of the 
municipality in which the incident occurs takes the administrative lead. On the mu-
nicipal level, a policy team is formed to support the mayor.  
Many more bureaucratic structures will be involved in ‘responding’ to the calamity 
when the calamity transcends administrative borders, for example, a municipal, 
provincial or national borders. Moreover, additional coordination teams can be formed 
up to the international level (Rosenthal et al., 1998). In the event of an imminent 
flood, experts from the Water Board, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and 
Water Management will be involved in these coordinating teams. As a consequence, 
numerous actors can be involved in preparation and response; therefore, collaboration 
is required.  
 
Informational requirements 
To compare information needs in flood risk and emergency management, the risk 
components as discussed in Section 7.2 were used to structure the information needs 
within flood emergency management. Because many actors are involved in emergency 
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management, only the informational requirements of the fire department are worked 
out in more detail (Table 7-5). The fire department was selected because they are a 
central actor in emergency response and can be regarded as an important target group 
for spatial information systems for emergency management.  
The interviewed experts stressed that is very important to have information about 
the actual situation and actual consequences of the event. They often made a 
distinction between information that exists prior to the disaster and information that is 
or should be obtained during the disaster. Based on this time aspect, the information 
for emergency response was divided into three categories. In addition to the static and 
simulated information as distinguished in flood risk management, a third category was 
added: dynamic information. Information created or obtained during the disaster is 
denoted as dynamic information. Table 7-5 gives an overview of the information 
needs for the processes which the fire department is responsible for during a flood. A 
more complete list of information needs of the fire department during an event can be 
found in Diehl et al. (2006) and Snoeren (2006). Spatial information related to the 
physical and social processes that can affect hazards and vulnerability were not men-
tioned by the experts in the interview as information needed. Therefore, this was not 
mentioned in the overview table. 
 
Table 7-5. Information needs for the fire brigade in case of floods a  
 Examples of information needs 
Hazards Static information: Flood prone areas.  
Simulated information: Estimates of actual flood probabilities and expected 
effects and consequences such as potential water depths and velocity.  
Dynamic information: Incident information such as scale of the flood and 
water depths; Meteorological information such as wind direction and speed, 
precipitation (rain/snow). 
Exposure Static information: Information about citizens in the area exposed such as 
total number of inhabitants or people under restrictions such as prisoners; 
Vulnerable objects such as schools, drinking-water supply or installations 
with hazardous substances; Buildings characteristics such as high/low-rise 
building (shelter), building material (strength), cables and pipes.  
Simulated information: Damage and number of victims for a particular 
flooding scenario. 
Dynamic information: Victims: trapped people, people in need; Damage: 
property damage, unstable buildings and infrastructure. 
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Resistance 
capacity 
Static information: Probability of failure of dikes and other hydraulic 
structures such as sluices. 
Simulated information: Simulation of dike breaches or failure of hydraulic 
structures. 
Dynamic information: Actual probability of the failure of dikes and other 
hydraulic structures. 
Adaptive 
capacity 
Static information: The extent of flood proofing measures or the flood 
compatibility of building use. 
Simulated information: The effect of adaptive measures on potential flood 
damage and potential number of victims. 
Dynamic information: The actual extent of adaptive measures taken in an 
area through temporal flood proofing, sand bags, or preventive evacuation of 
people, animals and properties, to name a few. 
Coping 
capacity 
Static information: Capacity of emergency units such as hospitals or the fire 
brigade units; Capacity of people to get to a safe location; Possibilities for 
shelter; Infrastructure information such as road capacities and characteristics 
(paved or un-paved, broad or narrow); Borders such as municipality borders, 
regional borders, provincial borders; Recourses such as water sources/water 
collection or sandbags; Information for context and orientation such as aerial 
photographs, large scale topographic maps, accessibility maps for buildings 
and industrial terrains. 
Simulated information: Capacity of emergency units, people and resources 
Dynamic information: Actual capacity of emergency units, possibilities for 
shelter; Accessibility: in- and out-routes, traffic direction, blocked or 
possibly blocked roads. 
Recovery 
capacity 
Static information: - 
Simulated information: - 
Dynamic information: Actual damage 
a To train response activities, the dynamic information is often simulated. 
 
 
7.7  Discussion 
 
The main lesson derived from the exploration of flood risk and emergency manage-
ment activities is that even though activities and actors differ, informational require-
ments overlap considerably. As a result, information has to flow across and between 
different actors involved in different flood management practices. A spatial informa-
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tion infrastructure that covers both risk and emergency management allows the re-
quired exchange of information. Therefore, the development of a spatial information 
infrastructure that integrated risk and emergency management deserves extra attention. 
These statements are discussed in more detail in a comparison between the 
characteristics of flood management and those of informational requirements.  
 
Activities and actors 
The exploration of flood management activities has shown that flood risk and emer-
gency management activities profoundly differ. Emergency management activities are 
often carried out under high time pressure and ask for tactical skills, whereas flood 
risk management activities are carried out under less time pressure and ask for strate-
gic skills. 
Within both flood risk and emergency management, many actors are involved on 
different levels. As shown in our exploration, emergency preparedness and response is 
often the domain of emergency units such as medical services, the fire department and 
police services, while mitigation and recovery are often the domains of the planning, 
engineering and public works departments. 
The exploration, however, has revealed a changing perspective on flood 
management, especially in the field of flood risk management. Within Dutch flood 
risk management, more attention is paid to flood consequences and possibilities for 
emergency management. In this light, flood risks are managed in a more integrated 
way in which both hazards, exposure, capacities and processes are taken into account. 
Land use planning is increasingly being considered an important instrument to reduce 
flood consequences. As a result, flood risk management is expected to become a more 
important issue in land use planning.  
 
Informational requirements  
The informational requirements of two actors involved in two different domains of 
flood and emergency management have been discussed in detail: the land use planning 
department and the fire department. Even though the activities of the land use planners 
and the fire department differed, it was interesting to observe that informational 
requirement considerably overlapped. The informational requirements with respect to 
the static and simulated information especially overlapped. Land use planners 
emphasized the need for information about flood emergency aspects such as the 
possibilities for emergency response and evacuation. On the other hand, represen-
tatives of the fire department mentioned the importance of the spatial data obtained by 
the land use planners, such as the risk maps. As a consequence, flood risk and emer-
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gency management can be seen as activities where informational requirements are in-
creasingly overlapping (Figure 7-2.). 
 
 
Figure 7-2. Information overlap between risk and emergency management. 
 
Real time dynamic information was mainly required for activities related to flood 
emergency management. Nevertheless, the real time information obtained during 
flood emergency activities can be used to improve simulated information in other 
flood management activities. Dynamic information about the development of a flood 
wave, for example, can be used to improve flood models for flood risk management 
and emergency trainings. After a crisis, this dynamic information can, if recorded, also 
be used to evaluate emergency response. 
 
The need for an integrated spatial information structure 
The differences in activities and actors involved in flood management suggest that risk 
prevention and emergency response should be seen as different kinds of activities with 
different users and with different requirements for spatial information systems. Flood 
management, however, is a set of activities that have to be carried out in collaboration 
with multiple agencies. These agencies should not only cooperate within one activity 
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of flood management, for example, during response activities, but should also work 
together even if they are involved in different activities. For example, the revealed 
interest in flood response issues in Dutch flood risk management practices requires the 
cooperation between land use planners, normally involved in risk management, and 
emergency response units, normally involved in flood emergency management.  
A closer examination of informational requirements shows that it is very likely that 
informational requirements between flood management activities and the management 
of other hazards overlap as well. For example, a considerable part of the information 
about a society's capacity to deal with flood hazards will also be useful to assess the 
risks of industrial hazards, such as the release of toxic gasses. As a result, information 
needs to flow across and between agencies and flood risk and emergency management 
domains.  
In this respect, an appropriate spatial information infrastructure that enables the 
exchange of information is increasingly considered a critical aspect to support risk 
management activities (Cutter, 2003; Greene, 2002; Grothe et al., 2008; Köhler & 
Wächter, 2006; Mansourian et al., 2006; Parker et al., 2007). A spatial information 
infrastructure allows the exchange of information between actors involved in risk and 
emergency management. Because differences in informational and system require-
ments exist, the architecture of a spatial information infrastructure should allow room 
for differentiation in information supply and system requirements. The widely applied 
Service Oriented Architecture approach offers an interesting concept for such an 
information infrastructure. Within this concept, the required information for each actor 
is acquired through the composition of a relevant package of information services. 
These datasets and services can be acquired from a great variety of available user-
specific systems. Through a selection of services, the user is not connected to all 
available databases for risk management but only to a relevant selection. Furthermore, 
these services can be presented in different applications, to meet specific user 
requirements and user interfaces and to enable the implementation of services from 
one application into another (Figure 7-3).  
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Figure 7-3. A service oriented spatial information infrastructure 
 
In addition to the information, services and application, the spatial information infra-
structure requires technical standards such as the ISO standards, access networks such 
as the internet or through satellites, policies that comprise policies to share informa-
tion and policies for responsibilities towards information production and maintenance 
of required spatial data sets, and finally, people who use the spatial information, to-
gether with information suppliers and any value-adding agents in between 
(Mansourian et al., 2006; Williamson & Rajabifard, 2003).  
The development and application of open standard by the Open Geospatial 
Consortium, INSPIRE or GMES, for example, increasingly facilitates the exchange of 
geographic information and services. Nevertheless, the emergency response sectors 
and/or other local organisations often maintain much of the information. Access to the 
information, however, remains a limitation in risk and emergency management deci-
sion making (Zerger & Wealands, 2004). Sometimes, it is unclear whether two emer-
gency sectors possess the same information; maps and plans maintained by the police 
brigade might be not available for ambulances or fire department. This tendency is 
very strong in the case of spatial information (ACIR, 2005). The different sectors 
often have individual information systems for management of information, which 
cannot not communicate with each other and therefore are unable to share information 
(ACIR, 2005; Scholten et al., 1998). As a result, it is hard to operate together.  
A good deal of research on models and services for risk management, however, 
often concentrate on particular activities within a particular group of actors such as the 
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fire department, police department or medical teams (Diehl & Van der Heide, 2005) a 
particular phase of risk management (Mansourian et al., 2006) or a particular hazard 
(Craciunescu et al., 2006). The overlap in informational requirements implies that 
spatial information systems should allow different actors involved in both flood risk 
and emergency management to operate together (i.e. to understand each other) before 
and in any critical situation. These systems should also allow the most appropriate 
information to be generated, found and delivered in a fast and efficient manner.  
 In addition to the further development of the physical network, a wide range of 
arrangements should be made to achieve an integrated spatial information infrastruc-
ture, and to enable the exchange of information and services. Experiences on the de-
velopment of such a structure have already shown that the bottleneck in information 
exchange is often not really in the technical aspects--technically, these problems can 
be solved-- but mostly in reaching agreements between different information holders 
about for example data standards or conditions for data exchange (Diehl & Van der 
Heide, 2005). Consistently, people involved in mitigation should recognise the bene-
fits of information used for both risk and emergency management. 
 
 
7.8  Conclusions 
  
The exploration of flood management practices has shown that flood risk and emer-
gency management activities, actors and informational requirements profoundly differ. 
Nevertheless, the examination of flood risk and emergency management practices also 
showed a considerable overlap in informational requirements. An examination of the 
informational requirements of the fire department that is involved in response 
activities stressed the need for information related to hazards and vulnerability. Inter-
estingly, this information is often collected, used and kept by actors involved in risk 
management, such as land use planning authorities. On the other hand, actors involved 
in land use planning and flood risk management stressed the need for information 
about the possibilities for emergency response in a particular area. Interestingly, actors 
involved in emergency management and its preparation often collect, use and keep 
this information.  
Consequently, information developed or gathered for one category of risk 
management activities should be available for other activities and to other actors as 
well. Given this, an integrated information infrastructure should be strived for. The 
Service Oriented Architecture approach offers an interesting concept for such an 
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information infrastructure This implies, however, that future spatial information sys-
tems should not only be developed in the light of one risk or emergency management 
activity, one type of actor or one type of hazard, which is often the case in actual risk 
management practices, but should be based on an integrated information infrastructure 
that allows the exchange of spatial information between different actors involved in 
risk and emergency management activities.  
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From Spatial Data to Synchronised Actions*  
 
 
Abstract 
A considerable amount of the required information in risk and emergency manage-
ment is geographical, but this information does not always reach the right actors at the 
right time, so how can geographical information be organised in such a way that it 
supports risk and emergency management more effectively? The answer requires a 
conceptualisation of risk and emergency management practices resulting in the net-
work-centric concept, which implies that those involved in risk and emergency 
management are connected and that they have the capability to share and access in-
formation. The concept was made operational through the development of an infor-
mation system and the exchange of geographical information within the system was 
facilitated by the use of peer-to-peer networking in combination with a client server 
network. On the application level, the information was presented in both map and text 
forms to support the exchange of information between actors. This way of organising 
geographical information and technology leads to improved information and 
communication, better situational awareness and faster decision making. 
 
Keywords: network-centric, spatial information infrastructures, emergency 
management, risk management 
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8.1  Introduction 
 
Recent emergencies and emergency response exercises have highlighted major infor-
mation deficiencies in risk management (activities related to the prevention and miti-
gation of risks) and emergency management (including activities related to emergency 
training, response and short-term recovery). Important information did not reach the 
right organisations and people at the right time, resulting in unnecessary loss of life 
and property (Kevany, 2003; National Research Council, 2007; Van de Ven & Van 
den Berg, 2007). 
The Dutch Bonfire exercise in 2004 illustrated the type of information deficiencies 
that can appear (COT et al., 2005). This particular exercise dealt with the potential 
threat of a terrorist attack in the Rotterdam harbour and an attack on the Amsterdam 
Arena stadium. During the exercises, important individuals such as the National 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the Director-General for Public Safety and 
Security as well as the ministerial and inter-ministerial policy teams, were not 
provided with integrated information on time and in a consistent way. Some informa-
tion was available to other organisations but was not actively requested by organisa-
tions in need of this information. The national coordination centre was unable to inte-
grate information from different sources, and thereby unable to get a more complete 
overview of the current situation. Moreover, the emergency rooms of the police 
department, fire department and the medical services had only a limited overview of 
the situation at the scene of the attacks, which also hampered effective decision 
making. Clearly then, information management is crucial in risk and emergency 
management, but important information does not always reach the right services and 
individuals at the right time, thus constraining effective mitigation, preparation, 
response and recovery.  
In addition to the recognition of information in general as crucial element, 
geospatial information in particular is regarded as indispensable. A considerable part 
of the information required before and during emergencies contains a specific spatial 
reference, such as the location of toxic clouds or flooded areas or the location of 
emergency services. For this reason, much effort is put into the development of geo-
information and communications technology (Geo-ICT) or geotechnology for risk and 
emergency management (Cova, 2005; Greene, 2002; Kevany, 2003; Köhler & 
Wächter, 2006; MacFarlane, 2005; National Research Council, 2007; Parker et al., 
2007). Consequently, the organisation of geographical information and consequently 
geotechnology requires special attention in addition to the organisation of information 
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in general. This paper focuses on the question of whether geo-information and geo-
technology can be organised in such a way that it supports decision-making processes 
within risk and emergency management more effectively.  
The research is based on the idea that the search for an appropriate role for geo-
information and geotechnology in risk and emergency management should not start 
with a particular technology, but with a conception of risk and emergency 
management activities. This statement follows Klosterman (2001) who argued that the 
search for an appropriate role for computer-based information and methods must 
begin with the conception of the activity that should be supported. A technology 
driven approach can limit our view resulting in a focus on those aspects of risk 
management and emergency management for which a particular technology or tool is 
appropriate, but neglecting other vital elements of risk and emergency management 
activities. As a result, the technologies may not meet the particular needs of the risk 
and emergency managers. For this reason, the central research objective is to develop 
a conception of risk and emergency management which can be used as a basis for the 
organisation of geographical information for decision support in general. 
 
 
8.2 Research strategy and method 
 
A conception of risk and emergency management can be developed in different ways. 
On the one hand, this conception can be obtained deductively, implying that knowl-
edge of individual phenomena is derived from universal laws. Consequently, general 
ideas about emergency response can be applied to individual practices and these gen-
eral ideas can be used as starting point for the organisation of geo-information and 
geotechnology in these practices. On the other hand, the conception can be obtained 
inductively. A conception of risk management can be based on studying particular risk 
management practices through which more general concepts and mechanisms are 
highlighted. Abduction can be regarded as a way to mediate between inductive and 
deductive reasoning. Similar to induction, the starting point of abduction is in the spe-
cific rather than the general. The researcher looks at particular situation-specific phe-
nomena; he/she does not only describe these phenomena, but also makes new inter-
preting links (Danermark et al., 2002). The examined risk and emergency manage-
ment practices can be interpreted through existing ideas e.g. from the literature or 
other examined practices. Through this interaction between the individual observa-
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tions with more general ideas derived from the literature or experiences with previous 
practices, a specific conceptualisation of the risk and emergency management prac-
tices at hand is developed. This strategy reflects the strategy of our conceptualisation 
of risk and emergency management.  
Our conceptualisation of risk and emergency management is based on two different 
projects: the GeoRisk project (www.georisk.nl) and the Geo-Data Infrastructure for 
Disaster Management (GDI4DM) project (www.gdi4dm.nl) in the Netherlands in 
which the authors participated. The GeoRisk project focussed on activities related to 
risk management in spatial planning. These activities were studied through examining 
planning practices with respect to the consideration of flood risks and industrial risks 
in spatial planning. Moreover, information requirements for dealing with risks in 
planning were considered (Projectconsortium Georisk, 2008). The project consortium 
included three universities, three research institutes, two consultancy companies, one 
municipality, one province, the directorate-general for Public Works and Water 
Management (Rijkswaterstaat - DWW) and one safety region. Safety regions are re-
sponsible for emergency response. In the Netherlands, emergency management ser-
vices are organised regionally. The country is divided into 25 safety regions and each 
safety region, which includes several municipalities, consists of a police department, 
fire department, and medical and paramedical services.  
Within the GDI4DM project, emergency response processes were studied through 
examining information and system requirements of the actors involved in emergency 
response (Neuvel & Zlatanova, 2006; Snoeren, 2006). Ideas on risk and emergency 
management found in external literature were used as an interpreting framework to 
make links between the different initial conceptualisations of risk and emergency 
management resulting from the examination of risk and emergency management 
practices.  
Whereas the GeoRisk project mainly focussed on the way spatial planners deal 
with safety risks and on the requirements for geotechnology in spatial planning, the 
GDI4DM project also aimed at developing Geo-ICT. Within this project, the concep-
tion of emergency management was made operational in principles for spatial infor-
mation infrastructures (SIIs) for emergency management at the regional level. Based 
on these principles, an information system was developed to support command and 
control, referred to as Eagle, which was tested and evaluated in the regional 
emergency exercise known as Eagle One (Brooijmans, 2008; Geodan, 2008; Riedijk et 
al., 2008; Van Capelleveen, 2008; Van de Ven, 2008). The project consortium in-
cluded three universities, one 'safety region', two consultancy companies, one munici-
pality, one province, the cadastre and the directorate-general for Public Works and 
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Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat - RWS). The GDI4DM project can be regarded as 
one of the leading projects on this topic in the Netherlands, since the Eagle One 
exercise was awarded the Public Safety Award in 2008. The jury of this award con-
sisted of 11 key figures on public safety from the Government and knowledge insti-
tutes including professors, mayors and directors of emergency services and research 
institutes. The Eagle application, which uses Microsoft technology, was also high-
lighted by networkworld as an innovative Microsoft research project 
(www.networkworld.com).  
This paper describes and reflects on the findings of these two projects. In the 
following section, a conception of risk and emergency management is discussed, re-
sulting in the concept of network-centric risk and emergency management which was 
used as point of departure for the development of Eagle to support emergency 
management. Subsequently, the added value of geo-information and geotechnology 
for network-centric risk and emergency management is described. We then discuss the 
architecture and applications of Eagle and the experiences with Eagle in the Eagle One 
emergency management exercise. In the concluding section, we reflect on the use of 
the network-centric approach as concept for the organisation of geo-information and 
geotechnology in risk and emergency management.  
 
 
8.3 Risk and emergency management  
 
The conceptualisation of risk and emergency management was a process that took 
place from the writing of the project proposal at the beginning, until the evaluation of 
the use of geo-information in the emergency training at the end. The resulting concep-
tion of risk and emergency management can be summarised in three key principles, 
which in the end resulted into the conceptualisation of risk and emergency manage-
ment as network-centric operations: 
• risk management and emergency response is a collaborative process, which implies 
the connection of all the actors involved; 
• collaboration requires a shared situational awareness; and 
• collaboration and a shared situation awareness require the sharing of information.  
First of all, risk and emergency management was recognised as a collaborative 
process. Collaboration between safety experts and spatial planners was regarded as 
crucial for the consideration of safety risks in spatial planning (Projectconsortium 
Georisk, 2008). Through this collaboration, both safety issues and potential ways to 
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deal with the safety issues could be addressed in the planning process and a commit-
ment for the consideration of safety risks could be created. Moreover, during an 
emergency response, cooperation between actors is required for effective action. 
During an evacuation, for example, the police department will be responsible for traf-
fic management but the municipalities are responsible for communication with citi-
zens (Diehl & Van der Heide, 2005). Consequently, emergency response has to be 
carried out by multiple agencies in which both vertical and horizontal coordination is 
required, requiring the collaboration of all the actors involved. Establishing connec-
tions can be regarded as an important challenge, since actors involved in emergency 
response are often spread out between different organisations which may have 
different physical locations. Moreover, actors within one organisation may also be 
spread out in the field or between offices.  
 In addition, collaboration requires a shared situational awareness. When there is a 
weak section of dike but actor A assumes that it is on the left side of the river bank 
and actor B believes that it is on the right side, collaboration to deal with the specific 
weak spot will be confused. Collaboration in spatial planning also requires shared 
situational awareness. For example, when spatial planners and safety experts have dif-
ferent knowledge about the nature and amount of hazardous materials in a particular 
installation, they will apply different safety distances for urban developments in the 
vicinity of the site. Shared situational awareness is located in the mind, rather than 
being available in an information system or in other media such as a handbook. Shared 
situational awareness therefore differs from the term Common Operational Picture 
(COP); for example, when the information system shows that the weak dike section is 
on the left side, but actor B interprets it as the right side, there is a common 
operational picture of the situation, but not a shared situational awareness. 
Collaboration and shared situation awareness, however, require the sharing of 
information. Information and communication are recognised as central elements in 
both risk and emergency management. Information is a prerequisite for situational 
awareness, which allows collaboration and coordination of these actions. The ex-
change of information is regarded as time critical, especially in emergency response. 
A common operational picture, as well as a shared situational awareness, requires the 
exchange of valid and up-to-date information between all the involved actors at the 
same time. The information that has to be distributed can consist of information that 
already exists prior to an event such as information about topography or contingency 
plans but also of information that becomes available during an event, referred to as in 
situ information, such as intelligence about a collapsed dike or on the geographical 
position of the emergency services.  
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Ideas about network-centric operations were useful for structuring the principles of 
risk and emergency management because similar to the presented ideas on risk and 
emergency management, the concept of network-centric operations has collaboration 
as point of departure. Moreover, the concept explicitly specifies the role of informa-
tion in these collaborative processes from which informational and system 
requirements can be derived, which also fitted in the principles of risk and emergency 
management that were developed already within the project. For these reasons, 
‘network-centric risk and emergency management’ was used as the interpreting 
framework through which the different conceptualisations of risk and emergency 
management can be structured and integrated. The term network-centric is derived 
from a military context where ‘network-centric warfare’ is the term used for the US 
military response to the information age. It implies that military operations are enabled 
by the networking of the armed forces and this networking takes place in the physical, 
information and cognitive domains (Alberts et al., 2001). The physical domain is the 
domain that the military seeks to influence, and includes the activities or events in a 
particular area that need to be controlled. The information domain is the domain where 
information is created, manipulated and shared. The cognitive domain is regarded as 
the domain of the mind of the actors involved in warfare which includes tactics, 
strategies and techniques. Principles of network-centric warfare can also be applied to 
other fields so we can speak of network-centric operations that have been applied to 
emergency management as well (Von Lubitz et al., 2008a; Von Lubitz et al., 2008b). 
If applied to risk and emergency management activities, we can speak of ‘network-
centric risk and emergency management’ (NCREM) (Table 8-1). 
 
Table 8-1. Characteristics of network-centric emergency response  
Domain Characteristics 
Information The actors involved in risk and emergency management have the capability 
to share, access, produce and gather information in a network-centric way 
instead of hierarchically. Of course, this information should be valid, 
complete, accurate and up to date. 
Cognitive The actors involved in risk and emergency management have developed an 
awareness and shared understanding about what’s going on, what can be 
done and what should be done.  
Physical The actors involved in risk and emergency management work together to 
influence the physical domain such as the area that is or can be flooded to 
reduce both the damage and the number of victims.  
 
150   Geographical Dimensions of Risk Management 
 
 
The physical domain then involves the area that the risk and emergency managers 
seek to influence. The information domain includes the information created and 
needed for effective risk management and response and here a distinction can be made 
between data and information. Data can be regarded as the basic descriptive charac-
teristics of things and placed in a comparatively raw format such as observations, 
counts, measurements, locations or attributes, whereas information is regarded as 
more processed, organised, summarised, selective and user friendly, with the intention 
of assisting correct interpretation (Parker et al., 2007). The common operational pic-
ture, for example, can be regarded as information. The cognitive domain is located in 
the mind and involves, amongst other things, situational awareness that can be con-
structed from the information in the information systems but can also result from other 
information e.g. resulting from face-to-face contact or telephone contact. Moreover, 
existing cognitions or elements in the cognitive domain shape observations and the 
interpretation of information. Previous experiences, feelings, intuitions and values can 
greatly influence the perception of information (see, for example, Te Velde et al., 
2002). In this respect, wisdom, referred to as the capacity to make value judgements 
based on knowledge (Walter, 2005), can be regarded as a factor which influences situ-
ational awareness 
These different domains are highly connected (Von Lubitz et al., 2008b). Improved 
information sharing through networks, for example, should result in a common 
operational picture and subsequently in shared understanding in the cognitive domain 
and into synchronised actions in the physical domain, which should result in better 
collaboration and subsequently in better decisions and the reduction of disaster impact, 
as illustrated in Figure 8-1.  
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Figure 8-1. The relationship between the information, cognitive and physical domains Source: 
Brooijmans (2008) 
 
 
8.4 The added value of geotechnology in NCREM 
 
Within previous evaluations of the use of information in risk and emergency 
management, it was mentioned that crucial information was either not available or not 
shared (ACIR, 2005; National Research Council, 2007). Geotechnology can contribute 
to the organisation of the information domain through its tools for gathering, 
processing, sharing and presenting information (MacFarlane, 2005). This can be 
regarded as a prerequisite for creating situational awareness, synchronising actions 
and, finally, limiting disaster impact effectively. First of all, geotechnology can sup-
port the collection and subsequent integration of relevant spatial data, such as popula-
tion or topographic data, which can be brought together in comprehensive databases. 
Subsequently, these data can be used for further analytical operations like the selection 
of areas higher than one metre above sea level or the calculation of the number of 
people living in a specific area. Through these static operations, a descriptive model of 
an area can be developed, which can result in an initial operational picture of the area 
or the event (see, for example, Köhler & Wächter, 2006; MacFarlane, 2005; Van de 
Ven et al., 2008; Zerger, 2002). Furthermore, modelling functions can be included 
within geo-tools which can be used for scenario development, e.g. to explore flood 
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patterns resulting from breaches of dikes in different locations. These tools are espe-
cially useful when the risk, e.g. the particular location of a dike breach, is not fully 
known. Assessment tools can be used to identify the consequences of flooding in the 
light of different objectives, e.g. damage reduction or the reduction of casualties, to 
explore different alternatives. In addition, geotechnology can support the visualisation 
of information through maps, charts, graphs, tables, animations or 3D graphics and 
such images can support actors involved in risk and emergency management 
(MacFarlane, 2005). Moreover, geotechnology can contribute to the exchange of geo-
graphical information through which collaboration can be supported as discussed pre-
viously. Spatial information infrastructures (SIIs), also referred to as geo-data infra-
structures (GDIs) or spatial data infrastructures (SDIs), can be regarded as the central 
concept for creating interoperable systems and enabling the exchange of geographical 
data and information. This exchange requires technical standards such as ISO stan-
dards, access networks such as the internet, policies such as those on conditions for 
data sharing and guidelines on responsibilities towards information production and 
maintenance of required spatial data sets, and, last but not least, individuals who use 
the spatial information, together with information suppliers and any value-adding 
agents in between (Mansourian et al., 2006; Williamson & Rajabifard, 2003). In this 
respect, an appropriate SII that enables the exchange of information is increasingly 
considered a critical aspect to support risk and emergency management activities 
(Cutter, 1996; Greene, 2002; Grothe et al., 2008; Köhler & Wächter, 2006; 
Mansourian et al., 2006; Parker et al., 2007; Scholten et al., 1998).  
It has been argued that major events and crises, even though they seem structured 
problems in the beginning, will inevitably pass into the unstructured domain in due 
course (French & Niculae, 2005). This unstructured character can hamper the use of 
geotechnology since, when it is unclear which problems should be tackled and which 
objectives should be met, it is also hard to use geo-tools for analysis. Nevertheless, 
this point was nuanced within the GDI4DM project. Even within these chaotic cir-
cumstances, structured working processes can be recognised, such as alerting or 
source and effect control (Diehl & Van der Heide, 2005; Dilo & Zlatanova, 2008; 
Fruijtier et al., 2009; Snoeren, 2006). The problems that need to be tackled within 
these working processes as well as the objectives that should be met can be well de-
fined in advance, i.e. through contingency planning. In addition, a considerable part of 
the informational requirements could be defined beforehand. Clearly then a chaotic, 
unstructured event contains both structured, semi-structured and unstructured sub-
problems, which can be supported through geotechnology. Moreover, geotechnology 
can stimulate communication and collaboration between actors, which is regarded as 
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crucial under chaotic circumstances (French & Niculae, 2005). Comparable arguments 
can be made in the context of risk management. Even though a planning problem, e.g. 
on the desired land use in the future, can be unstructured, the risk management 
problem within the planning process can be structured or semi-structured. Moreover, 
the information derived from the geo-tools can be used in discussions, e.g. as idea or 
argument to structure problems and objectives (Shulock, 1999; Weiss, 1991).  
 
 
8.5 Towards an architecture for geo-enabled NCREM 
 
The principles for NCREM have only been made operational through a system for 
supporting emergency management. Nevertheless, the experiences with these emer-
gency management systems are also relevant for risk management as discussed in the 
concluding section. Even though massive investments have been made in the 
development of geo-tools and SIIs, the special needs of emergency management have 
rarely been addressed (National Research Council, 2007). To meet the requirements 
for network-centric risk management and emergency response, new geographical 
systems and especially architectures have had to be developed. One major challenge 
associated with the architecture for a geo-enabled network-centric software solution 
lays in the connection of all the people, organisations, services and networks through 
which existing and in situ data were made available and easily accessible when 
needed. A mobile first responder in a crisis situation, for example, has to be able to get 
up-to-date geo-information from the disaster management service. Nevertheless, 
during a disaster, a constant availability and capacity of the network cannot be 
guaranteed, especially not for field workers. Therefore, peer-to-peer (P2P) networks 
were used to connect the actors in the field with each other and with the actors in the 
coordination centres. 
While quite common in military command and control systems, the P2P 
technology is still insufficiently explored in civil applications and especially in emer-
gency response situations (Bortenschlager et al., 2007). A P2P network differs from a 
more traditional client-server architecture in which a relatively low number of servers 
provide information to different clients or applications (Figure 8-2). Strictly speaking, 
a P2P network does not make a distinction between ‘clients’ and ‘servers’, but consists 
of equal entities, i.e. peers or nodes, which can serve both as clients and servers to 
other nodes. These nodes can be linked with each other via ad hoc connections and 
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allow for sharing of a large number of data, including real-time data. The P2P tech-
nology enables systems to be functional when a constant network connectivity with a 
server could not be guaranteed, since a P2P network allows the exchange of informa-
tion via other nodes available, either through a wireless local area network (WLAN) or 
mobile network or using ad hoc P2P networks (Bortenschlager et al., 2007). 
 
 
 
Figure 8-2. A client-server (left) versus peer-to-peer network (right) 
 
Within Eagle, the client-server approach and the P2P technology were 
integrated into one system architecture as shown in Figure 8-3. The system 
architecture consisted of clients (P2P, Open GIS Consortium (OGC) and vendor-
specific), a central database management system (DBMS), local data copies, a data 
harvester and external servers and services. The external servers were data repositories 
of various organisations which could possess valuable geo-information such as citizen 
and building registers, meteorological and statistical data. The organisations and 
institutions maintaining these data repositories were supposed to provide 24-7 access 
to their servers and applications. The Netherlands, for example, has identified 
approximately 30 of such data sets and the responsible organisations will be obliged to 
provide OGC services for access. The generated information is retrieved from the P2P 
network and stored in databases (Dilo & Zlatanova, 2008). Of course, calling the 
services directly has the main advantage of providing the most recent information. 
However, if these services are not available or overloaded, the information that was 
retrieved previously by another P2P client can be used instead. Consequently, data can 
be distributed either using the P2P network or directly from the system itself. 
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Figure 8-3. The Eagle system architecture 
 
With respect to the information that should be exchanged through the networks, the 
definition of well-defined standardised services for discovery and exchange of geo-
information is required. Geo-information services refer to the processing of geo-data 
which result in processed information, e.g. the potential water depth at a particular 
point or the fastest route from A to B (Annoni et al., 2005; Drummond & French, 
2008; Scholten et al., 2008). These services can be acquired from a great variety of 
available user-specific systems and can be presented in different applications, to meet 
specific user requirements and user interfaces and to enable the implementation of 
services from one application into another.  
Such services are closely related to the development of SIIs. Initiatives for SIIs are 
in progress at many levels all over the world, e.g. INSPIRE in Europe (www.ec-
gis.org/inspire). These have to be further enriched to be able to serve the emergency 
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sector. Large international projects, e.g. ORCHESTRA (www.eu-orchestra.org), 
OASIS (www.oasis-fp6.org) and WIN (ww.win-eu.org) have been reporting results of 
their research in this area. Proposals for standards and services developed within these 
projects are in process of discussion within the Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC, 
www. opengeospatial.org). However, all these services designed for client-server 
architecture can be made available within the P2P network. Selecting the relevant data 
and services required extensive investigations of user requirements and formal speci-
fications of the emergency response processes and the data created and required within 
each sub-process of emergency response (Dilo & Zlatanova, 2008; Snoeren, 2006). 
For that reason, a two step approach was applied: (i) the design of a conceptual model 
of emergency management processes and data requirements, using Unified Modelling 
Language (UML), and (ii) deriving a data model.  
On the visualisation and communication level, special attention was given to the 
creation and exchange of the COP. Traditionally, this COP was presented and ex-
changed through situation reports. These reports have been very useful to inform ac-
tors involved in emergency response about the actual situation. Nevertheless, three 
main drawbacks were recognised (Van de Ven et al., 2008). First, it took time for 
situation reports to arrive at other teams, especially at teams at the higher level. 
Second, situation reports provided a static view of the dynamic situation. Conse-
quently they were often out-dated. Third, not everybody who needed the information 
had access to the information. In addition to these drawbacks, it should be mentioned 
that situation reports often consisted of pages of text, which required time for reading.  
To improve visualisation and communication of situation reports, two alternative 
interfaces were developed and used together: SitPlot and SitText. SitPlot is a geo-
graphic interface based on ESRI’s ArcGIS that allows its users to view, analyse and 
generate geographical information that is needed for decision making, such as infor-
mation on current or potential water depth at a specific location. Figure 8-4 represents 
a screenshot of the SitPlot application at the beginning of an emergency exercise. It 
presents the area in which one of the emergency response exercises took place. On the 
left-hand side, different data layers, including reference and thematic data, can be 
selected such as topographic maps or maps with information about the population in 
the area. On the right-hand side, information about the incident can be added such as 
the location of the incident or the location of emergency services. The shared picture 
as presented in SitPlot results from the inputs from the different sections within the 
regional operational team (ROT, see also Section 8.6) and is available on every pc on 
which Sitplot is installed and activated. Users can add maps to SitPlot, e.g. maps 
which represent the location of an incident or the accessibility of an area, and these 
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maps then become available as separate map layer in SitPlot. Plotters in the informa-
tion-section take care of the integration of the added maps. In addition, they can carry 
out analytical operations within SitPlot in order to meet specific information require-
ments of various ROT-sections during the exercise, such as an analysis of the number 
of people that will be affected by a toxic cloud. 
 
 
Figure 8-4. SitPlot  
 
SitText (Figure 8-5) is a collective workspace used for storing and exchanging texts. It 
allows its users to send and receive short text messages. SitText consisted of different 
tabs for different groups of users such as the fire department of the police department. 
Figure 8-5 represents an example of SitText, which represents the situational report 
during one of the exercises. It contains information about various aspects of the 
emergency such as the weather conditions i.e. temperature 20 degrees, wind, 
Northeast 5; the nature of the incident, i.e. a train accident; the nature and direction of 
the released hazardous materials; the possibilities for emergency response i.e. some 
roads are blocked; the number of people affected together with and indication of the 
seriousness of their injuries and the actions undertaken i.e. emergency services have 
entered the train, the water board is warned. On the left-hand side, it is indicated 
which users are online. On the top, the different tabs can be selected. Through SitPlot 
and SitText, a more dynamic view of the actual situation could be given, which could 
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be exchanged with the actors involved in emergency management in a fast and 
efficient way. 
 
 
Figure 8-5. SitText 
 
 
8.6 Experiences from the Eagle One exercise  
 
In the Netherlands, most emergency incidents of a minor nature are responded to at 
the local level by the emergency services including the fire brigade, paramedic teams 
and the police department. When there is a need for a structured coordination, a coor-
dination team of representatives of the emergency services is formed at the site of an 
incident. When the magnitude of the emergency increases, other parties at other 
administrative levels can become involved and a regional coordination team is formed. 
This coordination team is often situated in the regional emergency operations centre of 
the safety region remote from the incident and consists of representatives of the 
emergency services and the municipality. The mayor of the municipality in which the 
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incident is taking place has the administrative lead within the regional coordination 
team. The nature of a disaster may require the need for the involvement of additional, 
specialised organisations such as the water board in case of a flooding. When the 
potential magnitude of an incident leads to a serious threat to a large section of the 
community in the incident vicinity, to the environment, or to anticipated severe 
damage to property, emergency officers at provincial or national level are involved 
(Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 2003; Scholtens, 2008).  
The Eagle One exercise focussed on the regional level and took place in the Safety 
region Gelderland Midden, in the Gelderland province, located in the east of the 
Netherlands (Figure 8-6). The central objective of Eagle One was to test and evaluate 
the use of information and geotechnology through testing the Eagle applicationsystem. 
Eagle was applied in the regional operational team (ROT) of the regional coordination 
centre. The regional emergency operations centre consists of a policy team, mainly 
focussed on decision making, and an operational team, which advises the policy team 
and executes the strategies developed by the team. The ROT communicates with both 
the policy team and with the actors in the field on the site of the incident. The ROT 
itself consists of eight sections: Information management; Fire department; Police 
department; Paramedics; Logistics; Municipality; Information services; and Third 
parties, consisting of organisations with specific expertise such as the water board 
during a flood or electricity companies during a power breakdown. The focus of the 
exercise was on the ROT. Proposed actions in the ROT were not executed and 
practiced in the field.  
 
 
Figure 8-6. Safety region Gelderland Midden 
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During the exercise, every section of the ROT was observed and particular attention 
was paid to the information domain in general and the communication process and the 
use of information and information systems in particular. The exercise was also 
evaluated in a plenary session with the participants. In addition, participants in the 
exercise were asked to fill in an online questionnaire. Within this questionnaire a 
distinction was made between users that used only SitPlot, referred to as SitPlot 
respondents and users that used both SitPlot and SitText, referred to as SitPlot and 
SitText respondents (Table 8-2). The observations and evaluations have resulted in 
two evaluation reports on network-centric sharing of information, the use of informa-
tion and the Eagle application during Eagle One (Brooijmans, 2008; Van de Ven, 
2008), one technical evaluation of the Eagle application (Geodan, 2008) and one 
evaluation of the emergency management in general during Eagle One (Van 
Capelleveen, 2008) resulting in an overall evaluation of the use of geo-information 
and Geo-ICT in the Eagle One exercise (Riedijk et al., 2008). In this section, only the 
main findings are summarised according to network-centric domain.  
 
Table 8-2. Respondents to the questionnaires 
 SitPlot SitText+SitPlot  
Organisation Respondents Respondents Total 
Fire brigade 7 8 15 
Police 2 3 5 
Paramedics 1 2 3 
Municipality 1 2 3 
Other  3 1 4 
Unknown 2 4 6 
Total  16 20 36 
Source: Brooijmans (2008). 
 
Information domain 
Through the information systems, the different units of the ROT were connected and 
were able to share information directly. Even though decision making still took place 
in a hierarchical way, the information could be shared more easily. In contrast with the 
established practices within the ROT, in which information was shared hierarchically 
from top to bottom or from bottom to top, information from one actor was now shared 
with other actors immediately. Moreover, more sources of information were available, 
since the regional actors were also connected to national and local geographical 
databases. In addition to having access to the information and the COP that was 
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derived from the information, participants could also contribute to the common picture 
from their own perspective.  
Through this way of organising information, the required information was mainly 
available in the information system as was also illustrated by the response to questions 
related to the information domain. For example, more than 50% of the SitPlot respon-
dents stated that all information needed was present in SitPlot and 83% stated that this 
information supported their tasks. Nevertheless, some redundant information was also 
available in the system, since 64% agreed that some data layers would never be used. 
There was some variation in the assessment of accuracy of the data in the SitPlot sys-
tem, however, with 21% agreeing that there was too much detail, 43% desired more 
detail. In addition, specific attention should be given to the accuracy of data, since 
46% of the SitPlot respondents found errors in the data compared with 14% who did 
not and 40% who did not know or gave a neutral answer. In addition, data should be 
more up-to-date as was agreed by 54% of the SitPlot respondents although 23% dis-
agreed. Related to this, only 36% of these respondents regarded the information in the 
system as valid and reliable compared with 14% who did not.  
 
Cognitive domain  
It can be concluded that the Eagle system contributed to both a common operational 
picture and a shared operational awareness. This was best observed during the mul-
tidisciplinary meetings. Little time was spent on explaining the situation, but the actors 
immediately started to plan actions. In addition, the responses to the questionnaires 
suggested that also the actors themselves perceived an increased situational awareness. 
Almost three quarters of the SitPlot and SitText respondents (72%) argued that other 
sections of the ROT had the same operational picture and 94% argued that actors in 
the same section had the same operational picture. Almost 90% of the SitPlot 
respondents argued that they had a better overview of what happened because infor-
mation was shared through maps. Moreover, 86% of the SitText and SitPlot respon-
dents agreed that they had a better operational picture through SitPlot and SitText.  
The available information helped greatly to shape the situational awareness of the 
participants. Even though this contributed to a shared situational awareness, it also 
caused some problems during the exercise, especially when information was taken for 
granted. For example, participants focused on vulnerable people from nursing and 
elderly homes that were available in the database, while neglecting other groups of 
vulnerable people. Therefore a critical attitude towards the information available and 
presented in the information system is required.  
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Physical domain 
In the end, improved information and communication should result in a shared situ-
ational awareness and to improved collaboration resulting in the reduction of the 
impact of an incident. It was difficult, however, to judge if the organisation of infor-
mation and the geotechnology system being tested actually resulted in better actions 
and effects. The setup of the training did not allow for making a distinction between 
different but parallel groups through which results of the exercise with the information 
system could have been compared with groups who worked in a traditional way 
without the system. Undertaking the exercise with a network-centric approach and the 
information system was a general objective and, therefore, groups were not excluded 
from using the system. Nevertheless, results on the collaboration and shared situ-
ational awareness already indicated that the information contributed to a reduction of 
potential effects of an incident through improving the communication, information 
and, related to that, the situational awareness. In addition, the questionnaire results 
suggested that the system had contributed positively to decision making in general, 
since over 70% of the SitPlot and the SitPlot and SitText respondents agreed that the 
information system improved the quality of their work in general.  
 
 
8.7 Discussion and conclusions 
 
Conceptualising risk and emergency management as a point of departure for 
developing information systems may look simple and straightforward in theory. 
However, it turned out to be difficult to do this in practice. Ideas on what risk 
management and emergency response is about or how it should be carried out are 
often implicit and hard to make explicit. It turned out to be useful to switch from 
particular conceptions derived from project meetings with developers and users within 
the project to a more general conception in the literature to develop an interpreting 
framework through which risk and emergency management as a process could be 
conceptualised. The conceptualisation of risk and emergency management as network-
centric operations turned out to be useful to understand risk and emergency 
management and to develop points of departure for the development of an information 
infrastructure through which geo-information and geotechnology could be organised. 
But did it also add anything new to existing ideas on risk and emergency management 
or geotechnology and SIIs? 
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At first glance the network-centric concept was useful as an overall concept to 
structure existing ideas on collaboration, shared situational awareness, information 
sharing, geotechnology and SIIs. Nevertheless, little was added to existing ideas on 
risk and emergency management or geotechnology and SII development. Its contribu-
tion to geotechnologies, for example, seemed limited, especially with respect to 
existing ideas on networks and services as developed in the field of SIIs (see, for 
example, Mansourian et al., 2006). Of course, the network-centric concept was useful 
in practice to convince the actors involved in emergency response of the need of 
information sharing and interoperability and consequently to create a shared 
situational awareness on how geo-information and geotechnology should be 
organised. In the end, however, we believe that the added value of the network-centric 
approach goes beyond its value for marketing or structuring ideas.  
A critical innovative aspect of the network-centric approach is its philosophy on 
information sharing. Whereas information was initially shared in an hierarchical way, 
the implementation of the network-centric approach resulted in a network-centric dis-
semination of information through which new information on the actual situation of 
actions of other actors became available immediately to actors involved in emergency 
response through which actions could be adapted to both the new situation and the 
actions of other actors. This network-centric way of information sharing instead of a 
hierarchical way also triggered technological innovations, such as the implementation 
of a P2P network to guarantee a constant information exchange during emergencies. 
In addition, network-centric risk and emergency management can be regarded as 
another way of coordinating activities and of stimulating collaboration in risk and 
emergency management. Actual emergency management processes in the Netherlands 
are being criticised for its hierarchical top-down command structure. These commands 
are regarded as ineffective ways of coordination during emergencies (Scholtens, 
2008). Nevertheless, coordination is not necessarily achieved through central 
commands, but can also be stimulated through information sharing and the 
development of a common operational picture as assumed in the network-centric 
approach, which can support self-managing ways of collaboration as an alternative for 
collaboration through central commands and control (see also Scholtens, 2008).  
 These principles and lessons as derived from the development of Eagle and the 
emergency training can also be relevant for risk management processes. Of course, it 
can be argued that relevant risk information for risk management is already becoming 
available and shared, e.g. through improved and increased risk assessment or through 
the worldwide development of spatial data clearinghouses as a main element of SIIs 
(Crompvoets et al., 2004). These existing information infrastructures, however, do 
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often not meet the specific requirements needed for emergency response such as net-
work stability or the speed of information availability and exchange (National 
Research Council, 2007). Therefore, the organisation and development of 
geotechnology and geo-information for risk management should also be considered in 
the light of the requirements for emergency management so that the information and 
networks can also be used during an emergency. Moreover, principles of a network-
centric dissemination of information in risk management should be considered. In risk 
management practices, it is not uncommon that information is distributed hierarchi-
cally. Changes in the nature and amount of hazardous materials at a particular instal-
lation, for example, are often distributed hierarchically, e.g. from the plant operator to 
a National Health and Safety Executive, who should forward this information to a 
local planning department (Basta et al., 2007). Even though risk management prac-
tices are less time-critical, a network-centric organisation of information dissemination 
and information systems can still contribute to a more realistic picture of the safety 
risks of a particular area and consequently to an improved situational awareness which 
can result in improved collaboration and coordination and subsequently to more 
effective risk management. Outdated information, for example, can result into 
inappropriate safety distances or contingency plans.  
Even though network-centric warfare has been highly technology driven (Von 
Lubitz et al., 2008b), we believe that the added value of the network-centric approach 
for the organisation of geotechnology in risk and emergency response lies in the 
network-centric organisation of information dissemination, which subsequently re-
quires technology such as the development of services and networks. An exclusive 
focus on technology is therefore undesirable, since it can derive attention away from 
crucial organisational aspects. Moreover, the implementation of an information system 
that can support NCREM does not imply that network-centric emergency response 
automatically results from it. People should be willing to share information in a 
network-centric way. In addition, it can be argued that, according to network-centric 
emergency response principles, people with a better information position should be 
able to take better decisions. The central command can still give orders to lower level 
units about the objectives that should be achieved but these operational units do have 
the freedom to decide on how these objectives should be achieved as is worked out in 
the Netherlands defence doctrine (Ministry of Defence, 2005). As stated by Von 
Lubitz et al. (2008b: 576), 
 
“the net effect of network-centricity is much greater operational and tactical freedom for 
the individual units that support the most effective execution of ‘commander’s intent’ as 
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well as operational coordination of all activities within the entire spectrum of the assigned 
missions”.  
 
Clearly then, the elaboration of network-centric risk and emergency management is 
about both the organisation of information and about the organisation of risk and 
emergency management itself. Consequently, the development of geotechnology for 
risk and emergency management is not only about the information system or 
technology itself, but also about the way risks or emergencies can or should be 
addressed and dealt with, which requires a conception of risk and emergency 
management activities. 
Risk and emergency management activities have been portrayed as network-centric 
operations in which collaboration and information exchange are required. Based on 
this conceptualisation of risk and emergency management practices, it has been argued 
that information should no longer be shared in an hierarchical way. Information 
should be shared and available at all levels at the same moment through information 
networks. The development and implementation of a spatial information infrastructure 
is desirable to organise geographical information for emergency management and to 
facilitate information sharing and integration during emergency preparation and 
response. Organising geographic information and geotechnology in a network-centric 
way can lead to improved information; improved communication; better situational 
awareness; better and faster decision making and more effective risk management and 
emergency response.  
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Discussion 
 
Spatial planning and Geo-ICT are regarded as important instruments for risk 
management. Nevertheless, the use of spatial planning for risk reduction and the 
related use of Geo-ICT for the consideration of safety risks in planning is far from 
widespread. In the Introduction, various factors that could explain the limited use of 
Geo-ICT were identified. Similar to studies on spatial literacy, one specific factor was 
emphasised: the forms of reasoning of actors involved in planning. It was assumed 
that the forms of reasoning of spatial planners with respect to risk management could 
– at least to some extent – explain both the use of spatial planning to reduce safety 
risks and the use of Geo-ICT to support the consideration of safety risks. In line with 
Klosterman (2001), it was assumed that forms of reasoning about how safety risks can 
or should be managed could also be used as a point of departure for developing direc-
tions for the further application and development of Geo-ICT. With this background, 
the central research question was discussed:  
 
How are safety issues addressed in spatial planning practices and what contribution 
can be made by geo-information and Geo-ICT to support the consideration of safety 
risks in spatial planning? 
 
The resulting research revealed many interesting insights on the conceptual and meth-
odological levels. On the conceptual level, spatial planning activities could be linked 
more explicitly with the capacity of an area to resist, adapt to, cope with and recover 
from emergencies. Moreover, factors and conditions were identified which could be 
used to understand the consideration of safety risks in planning practices. With respect 
to risk management and Geo-ICT, it was demonstrated how the network-centric 
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approach can contribute to the organisation of geo-information and Geo-ICT in risk 
and emergency management. On the methodological level, it was illustrated how 
existing concepts of risk management and spatial planning can enrich inductive inter-
pretative research strategies and results. This chapter brings these results together. In 
addition, recommendations are given for enhancing spatial planning and Geo-ICT as 
risk management instruments.  
 
 
9.1  Spatial planning for risk reduction 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, safety risks within an area can be divided into compo-
nents: the hazards, exposure and the capacities of an area to resist, adapt to, cope with 
and recover from emergencies. These safety risks were highly influenced by the spa-
tial disposition (ruimtelijke inrichting) and consequently by land use and land use 
changes. Therefore, spatial planning was regarded as an important instrument to 
reduce safety risks. Spatial planning, for example, was used as an instrument to 
implement safety distances around hazardous installations, which reduced exposure to 
industrial hazards.  
This distinction between risk aspects was helpful to identify risk reduction 
measures that can be complementary to the measures that are already considered in 
spatial planning practices. In spatial planning, land use near dikes can be regulated to 
facilitate dike improvements, which can increase the resistance capacity of a dike ring 
area. The regulation of land use in dike-ring areas, however, can also complement 
dikes, e.g. when exposure is reduced through these land-use regulations. However, the 
land use in dike-ring areas is rarely regulated for flood risk reduction purposes.  
In this respect, it was interesting to observe changes in the way safety risks are 
considered in Dutch spatial planning and risk management practices, where the ca-
pacity of an area to deal with hazards and exposure is taken into account more 
explicitly. This approach is most prominent in external safety policies, but comparable 
trends can also be identified in the reconsideration of flood management policies, 
especially at the national and regional levels (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 
2008a; Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2008c). Within these flood management 
policies, special attention is paid to reducing the potential consequences of a flood. 
Even though preventing flooding remains the main pillar of these flood risk manage-
ment policies, the influence of the spatial disposition on flood risks is now being 
explicitly considered as well. Consequently, flood risks should be considered in spatial 
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planning practices and in decisions on urban development (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, 2008c).  
This policy is in line with recent European policies on flood management. In 
November 2007, the European Directive on the assessment and management of flood 
risks (07/60/EC) came into force. This framework for the assessment and management 
of flood risks obliges Member States to carry out a flood risk assessment for their 
territory and to identify areas where, according to these States, potential significant 
flood risks exist or are likely to occur. Based on this flood risk information, 
appropriate objectives for the management of flood risks for the identified high-risk 
areas should be established by the Member States. In addition, Member States should 
establish flood risk management plans which describe the measures they will take to 
achieve the flood management objectives. As discussed previously, spatial planning 
can be an important instrument for implementing measures. 
However, if additional risk reduction measures are considered, the contribution of 
spatial planning to risk reduction should not be narrowed down to the land allocation 
plans to regulate land use, such as the implementation of safety distances in land 
allocation plans. Spatial planning has more to offer to the reduction of hazards and 
vulnerability than land allocation plans alone. Even though many risk reduction 
measures, such as risk communication or the presence of evacuation routes, could not 
be implemented through these plans (see Chapter 4), they can be addressed in 
planning processes. In the planning process, the safety risks as a whole could be 
addressed and arrangements could be made to implement safety measures and 
measures both within the land allocation plan itself and outside its scope. Conse-
quently, spatial planning processes can be perceived as actual risk reduction instru-
ments that can be used to make arrangements to implement safety measures. This can 
result in the implementation of safety measures either in land allocation plans or in 
other instruments such as private-law arrangements with developers or risk communi-
cation plans. 
Nevertheless, developing visions on how spatial planning and spatial plans can 
contribute to risk reduction is one thing, but implementing them is another. Many 
local governments have avoided using spatial planning to implement mitigation 
measures, especially with respect to flood risks. Despite the acknowledgement that 
planning can contribute to risk reduction, the commitment of government bodies in 
general and spatial planners in particular to mitigate specific hazards through spatial 
plans or spatial planning was limited. In the studies on planning practices, the inter-
viewed planners gave various reasons for using or not using spatial planning or plans 
for reducing safety risks. Some reasons were beyond the control of governmental 
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bodies, such as previous disaster experiences. Nevertheless, commitment could also be 
explained by factors and conditions that are controllable by government, including the 
availability of clear guidelines for the consideration of safety risks, public 
commitment and the capacity and skills of actors involved in planning to deal with 
safety risks. Clearly then, the required commitment for hazard mitigation of actors 
involved in spatial planning can at least partly be encouraged by governmental bodies, 
which also offers these bodies opportunities for promoting the consideration of safety 
risks in spatial planning.  
 
Recommendations 
Based on the examination of specific local planning practices and the consideration of 
both flood risks and industrial risks in these practices, several recommendations can 
be made for promoting the commitment of spatial planners to risk management on the 
local level in general and consequently for the implementation of the national flood 
risk management policies in particular. These recommendations can be relevant to 
professionals involved in flood risk management and spatial planning, but also to pro-
fessionals involved in the consideration of other risks in planning, such as the 
consideration of climate change risks and adaptation measures.  
First of all, higher-tier governmental bodies can provide guidelines and require-
ments for the consideration of safety risks. For example, national or regional govern-
mental bodies can identify areas in which explicit attention for flood risks is required. 
This attention can be made operational through the involvement of safety experts in 
spatial planning processes in these areas. These safety experts should address these 
safety risks and provide recommendations on how to deal with them. Of course, these 
requirements should not only apply to lower-tier governmental bodies, but also to the 
higher-tier governmental bodies themselves, if they are considering spatial develop-
ments in flood-prone areas.  
Even though such coercive strategies can provide a point of departure for 
encouraging the consideration of safety risks, a strict focus on coercive mechanisms 
was regarded as undesirable, since it can result in a symbolic consideration of safety 
risks to meet the formal requirement, rather than an active consideration of safety risks 
and potential measures to deal with these risks. A combination of cooperative and 
coercive strategies should therefore be pursued, which was also regarded as an 
important strength of the safety recommendations on industrial risks. Therefore, the 
second recommendation for implementing the considered flood risk policies is to 
encourage cooperation between planners and flood risk experts through an extension 
of the Water Assessment (WA). Similar to the safety recommendations, the WA has 
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been a successful instrument for bringing spatial planners and water managers to-
gether. It has resulted in increased attention for water management issues in spatial 
planning. Like the safety recommendations, the WA is communicative in character 
(Van Dijk, 2008). It promotes deliberation between water managers and spatial plan-
ners. However, flood risks resulting from the failure of primary dikes are not yet con-
sidered in the WA. In this light, the inclusion of these risks in the WA is worth con-
sidering if flood risks are to be addressed more explicitly in spatial planning. The ad-
vantage of extending existing planning instruments with a hazard component is that 
relatively minor adjustments have to be made to normal practices in order to be effec-
tive (Olshansky & Kartez, 1998). The guidelines on the national or regional levels can 
provide the coercive safety net if these communicative processes do not result in the 
consideration or implementation of risk reduction measures.  
If flood risks are considered in the WA, then water managers will have an 
important task in addressing flood risks and giving recommendations for reducing 
flood risks. Their safety recommendations, however, should not necessarily be limited 
to those measures that can be implemented in land allocation plans, since the process 
of plan development also offers opportunities to address safety issues in general and to 
promote the adoption and implementation of safety measures through other plans and 
processes, such as risk communication plans, contingency plans, building regulations 
or private law arrangements with developers.  
 To promote commitment, of course, other conditions should also be met. The 
actors involved in the consideration of these risks should have the capacity to deal 
with them. If risks should be explicitly considered, staff should be capable of taking 
these risks into account. This implies, for example, that both appropriate risk infor-
mation and risk management expertise are available. In addition, planners should be 
made aware of risks e.g. through risk communication. Moreover, trade-offs between 
other interests should be considered, since risk prevention is sometimes controversial 
in the light of other interests such as economic development. The management of 
safety risks should therefore be considered in the light of these various interests. 
Finally, special attention should be paid to public commitment. Even though this 
factor hardly played a role in the studies on the safety recommendations and on flood 
risk management, it turned out to be crucial during the implementation of safety 
measures, as illustrated by the ‘making space for water’ projects. For that reason, a 
more interactive approach should be considered as an alternative for the authoritarian 
styles of implementing safety measures. This provides alternative ways to manage 
potential conflicts and to potentially transform these conflicts into more constructive 
discussions (Fischer, 2003a; Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; King, 2008; Klinke & Renn, 
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2002). Nevertheless, approaches that are more interactive and those that link risk 
management with spatial planning both require another substantive starting point. The 
development of risk reduction measures from a safety perspective can be problematic, 
as was the case in some ‘making space for water’ projects. The measures that were 
developed for the reduction of flood risks conflicted with the interests, values, norms, 
convictions and knowledge of other stakeholders in the specific areas. The resulting 
conflicts were not only about the flood risks or the measures themselves, but could 
also be regarded as conflicts about the actual and desired landscape as a whole. For 
that reason, an area-oriented perspective is recommended. This perspective concen-
trates on an area as a whole and on the different spatial sector claims on that area. 
Because implementing risk reduction measures through spatial planning inherently 
requires balancing different spatial claims with varying interests, values, norms and 
convictions with respect to the current and future landscape and its inhabitants and 
users, this area-oriented perspective is also recommended for risk management in 
spatial planning. 
 
 
9.2  The contribution, use and further development of Geo-
ICT 
 
Ideas on the contribution of geo-information and Geo-ICT to the consideration of 
safety risks in planning were based on conceptions of spatial planning and the consid-
eration of safety risks in planning. Based on an understanding of how spatial planners 
deal with safety risks and informational requirements within spatial planning, ideas 
were developed on how geo-information on risks can contribute to the planning 
process and how this information should be organised. These ideas were enriched by 
ideas on emergency management and the role of information and Geo-ICT in emer-
gency management, which resulted in the concept of network-centric risk and emer-
gency management. This concept provided a point of departure for discussions on the 
contribution of geo-information and Geo-ICT to spatial planning and for the further 
development of geo-information and Geo-ICT.  
Network-centric risk and emergency management implies that actors involved in 
risk and emergency management have the capability to gather, produce, share and ac-
cess information in a network-centric way. Information is distributed directly to those 
individuals and organisations for which the information is relevant, instead of 
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distributing the information step-by-step in a hierarchical way. This network-centric 
distribution of information should result in a common picture of both the available 
information about the present situation and the actions that are planned and taken. The 
immediate availability of this common operational picture should be a basis for a 
shared situational awareness of the safety risks, and subsequently, a basis for the col-
laboration and synchronisation of actions through which the impacts (real or potential) 
of risks and emergencies are reduced.  
These ideas on network-centric risk and emergency management in general and on 
the role and contribution of information in particular are related to ideas on the de-
velopment of Geo-ICT and spatial information infrastructures (SIIs), respectively. SIIs 
can play a crucial role in facilitating the dissemination of information. Through 
networks, the actors involved in risk and emergency management can be connected. 
Moreover, the required information can be gathered, developed and integrated into a 
single, common picture of the area. In addition, Geo-ICT can provide tools to analyse 
this picture, e.g. to develop scenarios of different emergencies and to visualise the in-
tegrated information. For these reasons, SIIs and Geo-ICT can contribute to the inte-
gration of spatial data and information from different sources in order to develop a 
common picture of the present safety risks in a specific area. 
These ideas can be made operational through the establishment of SIIs; this 
includes technological developments, such as the development of networks and ser-
vices, which enable the exchange of data and information. In addition, organisational 
arrangements should be made, such as arrangements on data use and exchange and 
arrangements on data standards that enable the exchange of data and information 
between different systems. As a result, the many actors involved in both risk and 
emergency management can be connected to each other, and the required information, 
which was often spread between many different parties, can be exchanged. Moreover, 
arrangements on standards for data and services are required to facilitate the exchange 
of information between the different information systems that are used for risk and 
emergency management. 
As illustrated in Chapter 7, the actors involved in risk and emergency management 
have overlapping information requirements. Nevertheless, some information 
requirements and system requirements differ. For that reason, the architecture of a 
spatial information infrastructure should allow room for differentiation in information 
supply and system requirements. The widely applied Service Oriented Architecture 
approach offers an interesting concept for such an information infrastructure. More-
over, this information infrastructure point of view promotes thinking beyond a single 
application developed for a specific type of activity or user. This is because informa-
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tion and services developed for a single risk management activity - such as spatial 
planning or emergency response - or one group of actors, can be relevant for other 
actors or activities as well.  
Nevertheless, the added value of the network-centric concept – compared to 
existing ideas on SIIs as presented in Chapter 7 – is its philosophy on information 
sharing in general. Whereas SIIs can also support hierarchical information dissemina-
tion, the implementation of the network-centric approach requires that information 
about the actual situation or about the actions of other actors becomes available 
immediately to the actors for whom this information is relevant. Based on this infor-
mation, actions can be adapted to the new situation as well as to the actions of other 
actors. Consequently, ideas on network-centric risk and emergency management have 
enriched accepted ideas on SIIs. 
These ideas are not only relevant for emergency response, in which a common 
operational picture of the present situation is regarded as crucial, but also for spatial 
planning. Similar to emergency management, it is important that the actors involved in 
spatial planning have access to up-to-date information. Information about changes in 
environmental licences for operators of hazardous installations, for example, should 
also become available to spatial planning, since these changes may increase or 
decrease the possibilities for spatial development. In addition, changes in the allowed 
number of buildings or people in an area can affect the approval of applications for 
environmental licences. Therefore, the principles of network-centric risk and emer-
gency management also deserve attention in spatial planning, especially with respect 
to the development of information systems to support spatial planning. In addition, 
organising the geo-information and Geo-ICT used for spatial planning in a network-
centric way is not only beneficial for spatial planning, but also for emergency 
management. A considerable part of the information used in spatial planning is also 
required by emergency managers. Therefore, a network-centric organisation of geo-
information and Geo-ICT for risk management also contributes to the organisation of 
geo-information for emergency response, since emergency managers require this 
information as well.  
Even though the focus of this research was mainly on geo-information, the focus 
during the development of geo-information and Geo-ICT for supporting network-
centric risk and emergency management should go beyond the information that can be 
presented on a map. Policy makers or decision makers, for example, also require 
knowledge and expertise which is not explicitly geographical, such as information on 
how risks can or should be managed. For that reason, other applications that can be of 
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added value to geographical applications should be considered as well, such as text 
applications, as was illustrated in Chapter 8.  
Moreover, sharing information is not only about the organisation of information in 
information systems. It is also about the organisation of the information that can be 
derived from these systems and about the organisation of information and expertise 
that are not or cannot be included in these systems, such as tacit knowledge and skills. 
For these reasons, network-centric risk and emergency management requires not only 
an appropriate organisation of geo-information and Geo-ICT, but also a network-
centric organisation of information in general. Therefore, attention should be paid to 
the organisation of risk and emergency management in general. With respect to risk 
management in spatial planning, an appropriate organisation of planning processes 
and of the consideration of safety risks in these processes is needed. The safety 
recommendations in Dutch planning practices can be regarded as an example of how 
expertise and information can be brought together in the planning process. Clearly 
then, ideas on the contribution and further development and application of geo-infor-
mation and Geo-ICT should be developed hand-in-hand with ideas on how the con-
sideration of safety risks in planning should be organised. 
 
Recommendations 
Within the Netherlands, many efforts are being undertaken on the further development 
and application of Geo-ICT to support risk and emergency management. Relevant risk 
information is increasingly becoming available, which can enhance the situational 
awareness of actors involved in risk and emergency management. This information is 
mainly made available to spatial planning through risk maps. Risk maps are available 
via the Internet for professionals and, to a lesser extent, the public (as discussed in 
Chapter 3). In addition to information on hazardous installations, these risks maps are 
extended with information about other hazards, including potential water depths in 
case of flooding, and with information about vulnerable objects (www.risicokaart.nl). 
Moreover, the information is also becoming available for response and recovery 
activities, because databases of the risks maps are also included in the national SII that 
was developed to support emergency management (Ministerie van Binnenlandse 
Zaken et al., 2007). As a result, information can also be shared between the domains 
of risk and emergency management, resulting in a common picture of the safety risks 
in an area, which can enhance a shared situational awareness. Consequently, many 
problems with respect to the availability and accessibility of geo-information are being 
tackled. 
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Despite these efforts on the national level, the implementation of these national 
models and SII initiatives to local and regional practices should be worked out further. 
Local practices in which geo-information about flood risks was actively used are 
scarce (see, for example, Steekelenburg et al., 2008; Stone et al., 2008), consistent 
with the small number of planning practices in which flood risks resulting from 
primary water defences are actively considered. In addition, a study of the advisory 
body on hazardous materials (Adviesraad gevaarlijke stoffen) revealed that a further 
development of more local risk models is desirable to support the consideration of 
external safety risks. The fire departments, for example, do not have quantitative 
models to calculate the number of wounded people or models to develop insight into 
the effects of safety measures on self-help or the possibilities for emergency response 
(Adviesraad gevaarlijke stoffen, 2008). Consequently, the present and future possibili-
ties for emergency response and self-help cannot be assessed effectively. Also, with 
respect to networks, special attention should be paid to the regional level (as was 
illustrated in Chapter 8), where peer-to-peer principles were applied to make the 
national information accessible at both the regional level and in the field. Clearly then, 
national initiatives are promising in the light of the ideas presented in this study, but 
the implementation of these ideas at the regional and local levels deserves further 
attention.  
Moreover, issues for the future dissemination of information can be identified. It 
should be considered which information can be distributed in a network-centric way, 
and when this information can be distributed in such a way. Direct network-centric 
dissemination of information can be desirable in relation to the time pressure that is 
evident in many crisis situations. Users of this information can add their information 
to the common operational picture, or they can suggest changes if they regard the 
information as incorrect. Nevertheless, some extent of hierarchical distribution – in 
order to check and approve the information before disseminating it – can be recom-
mended as well. In addition, it should be defined which type of information can be 
relevant for which type of actor, since an overly enthusiastic distribution of informa-
tion easily results in information overloads. Furthermore, some information can be 
confidential, which makes a broad distribution of this information undesirable. There-
fore, the information requirement and the requirements for the distribution of infor-
mation within both risk and emergency management should be elaborated in greater 
detail. In addition, more training programmes based on the principles of network-
centric risk and emergency management are desirable in order to enhance the skills of 
risk and emergency managers and the concept of network-centric risk and emergency 
management itself.  
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9.3  Suggestions for further research  
 
Similar to other studies, this research not only provided answers to questions, but it 
also raised new ones. Therefore, some suggestions for further research are given. The 
suggestions presented here are not all-encompassing, but some directions can be 
identified. First of all, examining the consideration of safety issues over a longer term 
is desirable to study the effects of policy changes on both the consideration of safety 
risks and the implementation of actual safety measures. This study provided useful 
insights, but the policy context in which spatial planning in the Netherlands is carried 
out has changed, and the implications of these changes on the consideration of safety 
risks are unclear. A new national spatial planning act has been in force since July 
2008. In addition, flood risk management policies are being reconsidered, which may 
result in different responsibilities and tasks for spatial planners with respect to risk 
management. Continuing research on the consideration of safety risks and on the 
implementation of safety measures can provide insight into the effects and effective-
ness of specific policies and policy changes. In addition, more insight can be acquired 
into the responsibilities of actors involved and how these responsibilities are per-
ceived.  
Second, ideas on the integration of spatial planning and emergency management 
require further elaboration. Spatial planning and emergency management are often 
regarded as different fields. Nevertheless, they have much to offer to each other. 
Spatial planning, for example, can be used to address, discuss and implement 
measures for increasing the possibilities for emergency response, whereas emergency 
responders can provide valuable knowledge and expertise about increasing the 
capacity of an area to respond to events. It was previously argued that a combination 
of coercive and cooperative strategies can encourage the consideration of emergency 
management concerns in spatial planning. However, few studies have been conducted 
on the consideration of emergency management concerns in spatial planning, or on the 
effectiveness of the developed strategies to encourage the consideration of emergency 
management concerns. Therefore, further research on the effectiveness of such 
strategies is desirable.  
Third, the added value of risk information and Geo-ICT should be studied in more 
detail. The network-centric approach assumed that better information leads to shared 
understanding of the actual situation and subsequently to better decisions and 
synchronised actions, which should ultimately result in the reduction of disaster 
impact. However, information sharing does not automatically result in risk reduction 
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or reduced losses. Other factors, such as commitment to the consideration of safety 
risks in general, also play a role. For that reason, the use of geographical risk infor-
mation and its effects on decision making processes should be studied further. Even 
though studies on knowledge use are available (see, for example, Boogerd et al., 1997; 
Hills, 2005; Hisschemöller et al., 1998; In 't Veld, 2000; Macauley, 2006; Shulock, 
1999; Stephenson, 2000; Weiss, 1991), it remains important to conduct additional 
studies that provide insight into the use of information, and specifically in this case, 
the use of geographical risk information and systems. This will ensure the de-
velopment and application of these systems and the evaluation of the contribution of 
network-centric operations.  
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Appendix: List of Actors Interviewed  
 
 
Study on risk maps (Chapter 3) 
Mrs. Balmforth, HSE 
Mr. Bouwman, Provincie Overijssel 
Mr. Manuel, RIVM 
Mr. Van der Zande, RIVM 
 
Study on the implementation of safety recommendations (Chapter 4) 
Mrs. Gerritsen, Gemeente Arnhem 
Mr. Koedam, Gemeente Arnhem 
Mr. Meijers, Gemeente Arnhem 
Mr. De Wijer, Gemeente Duiven 
Mr. Flijling, Gemeente Ede 
Mr. Van Beukering, Gemeente Ede  
Mrs. Refwutu, Gemeente Lansingerland 
Mr. Bakker, Gemeente Rotterdam 
Mr. De Rooij, Gemeente Rotterdam 
Mr. E.B. Weeder, Gemeente Schiedam 
Mr. In ’t Veld, Gemeente Spijkenisse 
Mrs. Koenen, Gemeente Zevenaar 
Mr. Geurts, Gemeente Zevenaar 
Mr. De Boer, Hulpverlening Gelderand Midden 
Mrs. Duindam Hulpverlening Gelderand Midden 
Mrs. Van Schaijk, Hulpverlening Gelderland Midden 
Mr. Anink, Veiligheidsregio Rotterdam Rijnmond 
Mr. Buitendijk, Veiligheidsregio Rotterdam Rijnmond 
 
Study on the consideration of flood risks (Chapter 5) 
Mrs. Cobio, Gemeente Alblasserdam 
Mrs. Bax, Gemeente Dordrecht 
Mrs. Van Walwijk Gemeente Dordrecht 
Mrs. Shouten, Gemeente Giesenlanden 
Mr. Pouw, Gemeente Gorinchem 
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Mr. Van den Berg, Gemeente Graafstroom 
Mr. Ligny, Gemeente Hardinxveld-Giessendam 
Mr. Van Gilst, Leerdam 
Mrs. Kievit, Gemeente Liesveld 
Mrs. Van der Spek, Gemeente Nieuw-Lekkerland 
Mr. Van Bracht, Gemeente Papendrecht 
Mr. Labee, Gemeente Sliedrecht 
Mr. Foppen, Gemeente Vianen 
Mr. Hanning, Gemeente Zederik 
Mrs. Aalbers, Hoogheemraadschap van Delfland 
Mr. Van Bruggen, Hoogheemraadschap Schieland en de Krimpenerwaard 
Mrs. Frinking, Provincie Zuid-Holland 
Mrs. Somsen, Provincie Zuid-Holland 
Mr. Zaalberg, Provincie Zuid-Holland  
Mr. Hielen, Waterschap Rivierenland 
 
Study on informational requirements with respect to flood risk management 
Mr. Klijn, Deltares 
Mr. Beugelink, PBL 
Mr. Lightvoet, PBL 
Mr. Pieterse, PBL 
Mr. Tennekes, PBL 
Mr. De Wit, TNO 
Mrs. Roos, TNO 
Mrs. Frinking, Provincie Zuid-Holland 
Mrs. Somsen, Provincie Zuid-Holland 
Mr. Zaalberg, Provincie Zuid-Holland  
Mr. Piek, Provincie Zuid-Holland 
Mr. De Mooij, Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat
 
 
 
Summary 
 
Both spatial planning and Geo-ICT are regarded as important instruments for risk 
management. Nevertheless, their use is seen as problematic. Spatial planning, despite 
its potential as an instrument for risk management, is not widely used to mitigate 
safety risks. The use of Geo-ICT is also far from effective due to the limited 
availability of geo-information, unsuitable geo-tools or limited possibilities for 
information exchange. This thesis describes how safety issues are addressed in spatial 
planning practices and what contributions can be made by geo-information and Geo-
ICT to support the consideration of safety risks in these practices.  
The first aim of this study was to understand how safety issues are addressed in 
spatial planning practices and to explore the reasons for the use or non-use of spatial 
planning for reducing safety risks in advance. Based on the resulting insights, 
recommendations have been given for stimulating the consideration of safety risks in 
planning. The resulting insights were also used as a starting point for meeting the 
second aim, which was to discuss the contribution of Geo-ICT and to give 
recommendations on the further development and application of geo-information and 
Geo-ICT for the consideration of safety issues in spatial planning. 
 
Risk management, spatial planning and Geo-ICT 
Spatial planning, with its objective of influencing land use, can play an important role 
in increasing the safety of citizens in both industrial and flood-prone areas. It can con-
tribute to the management of various risk components including hazards, exposure and 
the capacity of an area to resist, cope with, adapt to and recover from disasters. For 
example, existing hazardous installations can be reallocated to reduce hazards in a 
particular area, and development in hazard-prone areas can be regulated to reduce 
exposure. In addition, spatial planning can facilitate obtaining the space required for 
the improvement of dikes, through which the resistance capacity of dike-ring areas can 
be increased. Spatial planners can also stimulate the capacity for disaster response by 
requiring the presence of evacuation or access routes within an area as a prerequisite 
for further urban development in hazard-prone areas.  
 In addition to the examples above, the adaptation of buildings (by flood 
proofing, for example) can improve the way an area is adapted to potential flooding. 
Furthermore, critical elements of infrastructure, such as power stations and drinking 
water facilities, can be located outside hazard-prone areas, thereby increasing the 
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capacity for recovery after a disaster. To consider both hazards and impacts in spatial 
planning and to make informed choices between alternative ways of development, 
spatial planners require information about these safety risks. A considerable part of 
this information can be regarded as geo-information. Therefore, both geo-information 
and Geo-ICT are essential for risk management in spatial planning.  
 
Research approach 
Many studies on the use of geo-information in spatial planning have geo-tools, 
technologies or information itself as the object of study. In this light, the limited use of 
geo-information and Geo-ICT is explored and explained from a system and 
information characteristics point of view. Within the present study, however, spatial 
planning practices themselves have been taken as the starting point.  
It was assumed that the way spatial planners give meaning to safety risks in spatial 
planning practices significantly shapes actions and, consequently, the use of risk 
information in planning. For that reason, the way safety issues are addressed in spatial 
planning practices and the contributions that could be made by geo-information and 
Geo-ICT to support the consideration of safety risks in these practices were explored.  
The epistemological position taken in this thesis is based on the assumption that 
realities cannot be discovered objectively, but that they are produced by human 
thoughts in culture. This approach is referred to as constructivism. This implies that 
knowledge about reality should be regarded as the result of the interplay between 
reality and the actors who perceive reality. The consideration of safety risks in 
planning practices was consistently analysed from an interpretative perspective. The 
research focussed on how spatial planners attributed meaning to risk in spatial 
planning practices, which provided a way of understanding how risks are dealt with in 
these practices. Moreover, it was assumed that the attributed meanings also shape the 
use of geo-information. For example, if spatial planners do not regard themselves as 
being responsible for reducing specific risks, it is unlikely that risk-reducing measures 
will be taken as a result of the information presented on risk maps, even though the 
risks can be considerable in terms of probabilities or potential consequences. 
Consistent with interpretative policy analysis methodology, human meaning and social 
realities were put at the core of the analysis.  
Case studies were the main method for studying the way spatial planners attributed 
meaning to safety risks in spatial planning practices. They provided an in-depth and 
context-dependent understanding of the reasoning of spatial planners, and were 
focussed on the consideration of two different types of safety risks in the Netherlands: 
1) external safety risks resulting from the production, use, storage and transport of 
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hazardous materials and 2) flood risks from the sea and major rivers. These two risks 
represent prominent industrial and natural hazards in the Netherlands. 
The contribution of geo-information and Geo-ICT to risk management and spatial 
planning was examined through case studies as well. These studies focussed both on 
informational requirements and on the use of Geo-ICT in spatial planning. The study 
on the development of Geo-ICT was based on actual practice. To increase 
understanding of the context and framework for risk management in the Netherlands, 
the development of risk maps in the Netherlands was compared with the development 
of risk maps in the UK. The examination of informational requirements was based on 
expected changes in flood risk management policies, in which attention for spatial 
planning and the capacity of an area to deal with floods is increasing. These studies 
focussed mainly on cases in the Netherlands.  
In addition, informational requirements and Geo-ICT developments within 
emergency management practices were examined, because the cases on spatial 
planning showed that spatial planners were increasingly interested in emergency 
management concerns and that informational requirements of spatial planners 
overlapped with informational requirements of actors involved in emergency 
management. Moreover, ideas about emergency response and the related organisation 
of Geo-ICT to support emergency response were also relevant for spatial planning.  
The data required for these case studies was collected through desktop studies and 
interviews. The desktop studies focussed on the policy documents of the selected 
spatial planning and risk and emergency management practices. The interviews with 
representatives of the authorities involved in the selected cases provided additional 
insight into informational requirements and into the reasoning involved in deciding to 
use or not use spatial planning for risk mitigation. 
 
The consideration of safety risks in spatial planning 
The exploration of the management of industrial risks showed that industrial hazards 
were addressed in planning practices and that the safety recommendations from the 
regional fire department played an important role in the consideration of these 
industrial hazards in planning. The safety recommendations stimulated dialogue 
between safety experts from the regional fire department and the municipality, which 
strengthened the cooperation between these two governmental bodies and the 
awareness of spatial planners for risk reduction measures. The communicative 
character of the safety recommendation process turned out to be an important strength, 
since it corresponded with the communicative character of spatial planning processes.  
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In addition, national safety regulations, such as the legally binding risk tolerance 
thresholds for individual risk (plaatsgebonden risico) and the procedures and non-
binding thresholds for societal risks (groepsrisico) provided a coercive safety net if 
these communicative processes did not result in the consideration of industrial hazards 
or in the implementation of risk reduction measures.  
Nevertheless, the safety recommendations tended to result in a relatively modest 
‘fine tuning’ of spatial plans rather than more substantive changes. Moreover, the 
implementation of safety measures seldom led to an elimination of industrial risks, 
because the adopted measure focussed mainly on increasing the capacity of an area to 
deal with these risks. In addition, many risk reduction measures, such as risk 
communication or the presence of evacuation routes, could not be directly 
implemented through land allocation plans. These plans were regarded as regulatory 
instruments to prohibit specific land-use changes and not as instruments to implement 
additional safety measures. In the spatial planning process, however, risk reduction 
measures could be addressed and arrangements could be made for the implementation 
of these measures both within the land allocation plan itself and outside its scope. For 
that reason, the contribution of spatial planning to risk reduction should not be 
narrowed down to the land allocation plans for regulating land use in hazard-prone 
areas. The power of planning processes should be recognised in addition to the power 
of plans. Special attention, however, should be given to the actual implementation of 
measures that could not be implemented in the land allocation plan, since coordination 
of the implementation through other instruments is required. 
With respect to the consideration of flood risks in spatial planning, the established 
practices can be characterised as planners focussing on the reduction of the probability 
of flooding rather than potential flood consequences. Land-use strategies to reduce 
damage potential were only minimally addressed. Within the dike-ring areas, some 
land-use development (such as residential development) was regulated to protect the 
existing dikes and to reserve space for facilitating dike reinforcements or river 
broadening in the future. For areas in the river forelands, which are not protected by 
dikes, changes in land use were also regulated by the local land allocation plans.  
Most arguments for not using spatial planning to reduce flood consequences, as 
given by the respondents, directly or indirectly referred to other governmental 
policies. Floods were regarded as being reduced to an acceptable level through dikes 
and the legal criteria for dike strength, and therefore additional land-use measures 
were not needed. In addition, local spatial planners did not regard themselves as being 
responsible for considering additional flood risk measures. They argued that water 
managers, such as water boards, should indicate how to deal with flood risks at 
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proposed building sites. However, the water boards did not address the need for 
additional measures, since they mainly focussed on the maintenance of dikes and the 
reinforcement of sections of weak dike. 
In some of the cases studied, however, additional measures to reduce flood con-
sequences were considered. To reduce damage potential, proposed residential areas 
were to be elevated or the number of houses decreased. Many respondents referred to 
previous experiences with flooding or threats of flooding as the argument for 
considering additional measures. Nevertheless, previous disaster experiences were not 
the only factor that explained the use or non-use of spatial planning to reduce the 
consequences of potential flooding.  
On the whole, the use or non-use of spatial planning for the reduction of both 
industrial risks and flood risks could be understood to be a result of the commitment 
of the actors involved in spatial planning to the consideration and management of 
safety risks. In addition to previous disaster experiences, this commitment was 
influenced by government strategies, such as the availability of guidelines. Strict 
guidelines for the implementation of safety distances, for example, were an important 
reason for the consideration of safety risks in spatial planning, whereas the absence of 
guidelines for the consideration of safety risks in planning could result in limited 
attention for safety risks in local planning practices. The perceived responsibility of 
planners, however, was not always consistent with the formal responsibility. In some 
areas, additional measures for reducing flood risk were taken, even though these 
measures were not formally required.  
Furthermore, the perceived trade-offs between other interests (such as economic 
growth), played an important role. Some planners did not take additional risk 
reduction measures or allowed urban development in hazard-prone areas because of 
economic benefits. In addition, capacities of local authorities played an important role. 
These capacities concerned not only the expertise of staff, which is required for 
dealing with safety risks, but also the availability of risk information or hazard-free 
land. 
Another important factor, as derived from the planning and risk management 
literature, was public commitment to risk reduction measures. Even though this issue 
was hardly mentioned as a reason for using or not using spatial planning to reduce 
safety risks, our examination of ‘making space for water’ projects showed that public 
commitment was crucial for a successful implementation of measures. Based on these 
experiences, it was argued that spatial planning should not only be regarded as an in-
strument through which safety risks can be addressed. Spatial planning can also pro-
vide a valuable substantive perspective for the development of risk reduction 
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measures. Conflicts that appeared during the implementation of measures were not 
only about the proposed measures for risk reduction, but also about other interests and 
ambitions, such as ambitions for agriculture or housing. Because a spatial planning 
perspective implies a substantive focus on the landscape as a whole and on the 
coherence of and between different land uses, it can offer an interesting approach for 
implementing safety measures and for integrating and balancing spatial claims for risk 
reduction with other conflicting spatial claims on an area.  
However, it is important to recognise that the way that industrial and flood risks are 
being dealt with in spatial planning practices in the Netherlands is changing. More 
attention is being given to emergency response aspects such as the presence of 
evacuation routes. This could be recognised most explicitly in external safety policies, 
but was also apparent in flood risk management, especially at the national and regional 
levels. For that reason, a further integration of both emergency response and spatial 
planning is worth consideration.  
 
The contribution of geo-information and Geo-ICT 
In the Netherlands, risk maps have been developed to inform professionals involved in 
risk management about external safety risks. Authorities responsible for granting 
environmental license to operators of a given hazardous installation are obliged to 
forward all relevant information about the hazardous materials to a central database: 
the Installations Handling Dangerous Substances database (IHDS). Additional risk 
information is stored in the ISOR (Informatie Systeem Overige Ramptypen) database, 
such as information about vulnerable objects or information about other hazards such 
as flood hazards. This database is the result of the cooperation between the twelve 
Dutch provinces. Based on the information from both the IHDS database and the 
ISOR database, provincial risk maps have been realised on a GIS platform.  
A comparison of the development of risk maps in the Netherlands and the UK 
showed that in both countries the GIS databases, which store the enormous amount of 
data regarding industrial risks, only recently came into being. A notable difference 
between the two countries concerns the possibility of public access to the risk maps. In 
the Netherlands, a notable amount of risk information is available to the public via the 
Internet. In the UK, this risk information is also public, but can only be accessed by 
the public after a specific request. The comparison confirmed the fact that different 
developments and applications of risks maps are grounded in the political, cultural and 
historical context in which they are created and that they can only be understood in 
their context.  
Summary   207 
 
Geo-information about safety risks, such as risk maps, has the potential to support 
spatial planning. Nevertheless, the information is only of added value if the actors 
involved in planning consider safety risks in general. As a result of the increased 
attention for safety risks in spatial planning, the need for safety risk information is 
increasing. The required information could be divided into hazards, exposure, and the 
resistance, adaptive, coping and recovery capacity of an area.  
A comparison of information requirements of emergency responders at the fire 
department showed that informational requirements of spatial planners and emergency 
responders considerably overlapped, especially with respect to static and simulated 
risk information. Real-time information was mainly required for flood emergency 
management. Nevertheless, the real-time information obtained during flood 
emergency activities could also be used to improve simulated information in other 
flood management activities, such as flooding scenarios for spatial planning. 
Therefore, the future development of Geo-ICT should not only focus on the further 
development and application of specific systems for supporting only a limited number 
of activities with respect to risk management, but also on infrastructure and networks 
through which information from different applications can be exchanged, since 
informational requirements overlap. For this reason, it is important to think beyond 
one application for one type of activity or one group of users, since information for 
one disaster management activity or user can be useful for other activities and users as 
well.  
Because differences in informational and system requirements still exist, the 
architecture should also allow room for differentiation in information supply and 
system requirements. The widely applied Service Oriented Architecture approach 
offers an interesting concept for such an information infrastructure. Within this 
concept, the required information for each actor is acquired through the composition 
of a relevant package of information services. These datasets and services can be 
acquired from a great variety of available user-specific systems. Through a selection 
of services, the user is not connected to all available databases for risk management, 
but only to a relevant selection. Furthermore, these services can be presented in 
different applications to meet specific user requirements and user interfaces and to 
enable the exchange of services from one application to another. 
In addition to the Service Oriented Architecture approach, the organisation of geo-
information and Geo-ICT within these networks should be based on principles of Net-
work-Centric Risk and Emergency Management (NCREM). This concept offers a 
model to describe and understand risk and emergency management processes, as well 
as a vision for the future role and development of Geo-ICT to support these processes. 
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NCREM implies that actors involved in risk and emergency management have the 
capability to gather, produce and share information in a network-centric way. 
Information is distributed directly to those individuals and organisations for whom the 
information is relevant, instead of distributing the information step-by-step in a 
hierarchical way. This network-centric distribution of information should result in a 
common picture of both the available information about the present situation and the 
actions that are planned and taken. The immediate availability of this common 
operational picture should be a basis for a shared situational awareness of the safety 
risks, and subsequently, a basis for the collaboration and synchronisation of actions 
through which the impact (real or potential) of risks and emergencies are reduced. In 
this respect, the main contribution of Geo-ICT is to enable network-centric risk and 
emergency management.  
 
Recommendations and suggestions for further research 
Several factors were identified through which the commitment of spatial planners to 
the use of spatial planning for risk reduction could be understood. In addition, 
suggestions for promoting the commitment of spatial planners in the Netherlands to 
risk management could be derived from these factors. Guidelines from higher-tier 
governmental bodies in combination with cooperative strategies, such as the safety 
recommendations, turned out to be crucial for the use of spatial planning for risk 
reduction. Therefore, it is suggested that the consideration of flood risk in the 
Netherlands can be encouraged by guidelines from higher-tier governmental bodies in 
which they indicate areas in which explicit attention for flood risk is required. In 
addition, cooperation between planners and flood risk experts should be encouraged 
through an extension of the Water Assessment (WA). The WA has already been a 
successful instrument for bringing spatial planners and water managers together, but 
flood risks resulting from the failure of primary dikes are hardly considered in the 
WA. The inclusion of these risks in the WA is worth considering if flood risks are to 
be addressed more explicitly in spatial planning. As illustrated by the study on 
external safety (externe veiligheid), recommendations in the WA should not 
necessarily be limited to those measures that can be implemented in land allocation 
plans. In addition, other measures such as risk communication and the development of 
evacuation routes can be addressed. Monitoring the actual consideration and 
implementation of the suggested measures remains desirable, since the use of spatial 
planning for increasing the possibilities for emergency response in general, as well as 
the use of planning to reduce potential flood consequences in particular is, at least in 
Summary   209 
 
the Netherlands, still in its infancy and the policies on both spatial planning and risk 
management are still changing. 
Geo-information and Geo-ICT have the potential to support the consideration of 
safety risks, especially now that such risks are increasingly considered in spatial 
planning practices. Despite major efforts in the development of Spatial Information 
Infrastructures at the national level and in the development of risk maps on industrial 
risks, special attention is required for the implementation of such national initiatives to 
local and regional flood management practices, since local planning practices in which 
flood risk information is explicitly used are scarce. Moreover, the concept of network-
centric risk and emergency response requires further attention. This could take place, 
for example, through additional studies that provide insight into the informational 
requirement within network-centric emergency management and response, or through 
more training or pilot programmes in which the principles of the NCREM can be 
worked out, evaluated and taught, since this concept is still at an intentional stage. 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
Zowel ruimtelijke ordening als Geo-ICT worden gezien als belangrijke instrumenten 
voor risicomanagement. Het gebruik van deze instrumenten wordt echter als proble-
matisch gezien. Ruimtelijke planning wordt, ondanks zijn potentieel als instrument 
voor risicobeheersing, beperkt toegepast voor het verminderen van veiligheidsrisico’s. 
Het gebruik van Geo-ICT is eveneens verre van effectief vanwege de beperkte 
beschikbaarheid van geo-informatie, ongeschikte geo-tools of beperkte mogelijkheden 
voor informatie-uitwisseling. Dit proefschrift beschrijft hoe veiligheidsvraagstukken 
in ruimtelijke planningspraktijken in acht worden genomen en welke bijdrage geo-in-
formatie en Geo-ICT kunnen leveren bij het ondersteunen van de inachtneming van 
veiligheidsrisico’s in deze praktijken.  
Het eerste doel van deze studie was om te begrijpen hoe veiligheidsrisico’s worden 
meegenomen in ruimtelijke planningspraktijken en om te verkennen waarom ruimte-
lijke planning nu wel of niet wordt ingezet om veiligheidsrisico’s vroegtijdig aan te 
pakken. Op basis van deze inzichten zijn aanbevelingen gegeven om de inachtneming 
van veiligheidsrisico’s in de ruimtelijke planning te stimuleren. De verkregen inzich-
ten zijn eveneens gebruikt als vertrekpunt voor het tweede doel van deze studie: het 
bespreken van de mogelijke bijdrage van Geo-ICT en het geven van suggesties en 
aanbevelingen voor de verdere ontwikkelingen en toepassing van geo-informatie en 
Geo-ICT ter ondersteuning van risicomanagement in de ruimtelijke planning. 
 
Risico management, ruimtelijke planning en Geo-ICT 
Ruimtelijke planning, met als doel het beïnvloeden van landgebruik, kan een belang-
rijke rol spelen bij het vergroten van de veiligheid van burgers in zowel industriële als 
overstromingsgevoelige gebieden. Er kan een bijdrage worden geleverd aan de be-
heersing van verscheidene risicocomponenten, waaronder de dreiging, blootstelling en 
de capaciteiten van een gebied om rampen te weerstaan of te bestrijden, zich aan te 
passen aan potentiële rampen of om te herstellen van een ramp. Bestaande gevaarlijke 
installaties kunnen bijvoorbeeld worden verplaatst om de dreiging in een specifiek 
gebied weg te nemen. Daarnaast kan bebouwing in gevaarlijke gebieden gereguleerd 
worden om de blootstelling te verkleinen. Bovendien kan ruimtelijke planning dijk-
verbetering faciliteren door de benodigde ruimte te reserveren, waardoor de weerstand 
van een dijkring kan worden vergroot. Ruimtelijke planners kunnen ook de capaciteit 
voor rampenbestrijding van een gebied vergroten door de aanwezigheid van toegangs- 
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of evacuatieroutes te vereisen als voorwaarde voor verdere verstedelijking in 
gevaarlijke gebieden. 
Naast de voorbeelden hierboven, kan ook de aanpassing van gebouwen (bijvoor-
beeld door het overstromingsbestendig maken van gebouwen) de mate van aanpassing 
van een gebied vergroten. Verder kan vitale infrastructuur, zoals elektriciteit- en 
drinkwatervoorzieningen buiten de gevaarlijke gebieden worden gesitueerd, waardoor 
de herstelcapaciteit na een ramp kan worden vergroot.  
Om dergelijke gevaren en gevolgen mee te nemen in de ruimtelijke planning en om 
hierbij geïnformeerde keuzes te maken tussen alternatieve ontwikkelingsrichtingen 
hebben ruimtelijke planners informatie nodig over deze veiligheidsrisico’s. Een aan-
zienlijk deel van deze informatie kan worden omschreven als geo-informatie. Daarom 
zijn zowel geo-informatie als Geo-ICT essentieel voor risicomanagement in de ruim-
telijke planning. 
 
Onderzoeksbenadering 
Veel studies naar het gebruik van geo-informatie in de ruimtelijke planning hebben de 
geo-tools, technologieën of informatie zelf als object van onderzoek. In dit licht wordt 
het beperkte gebruik van geo-informatie en Geo-ICT verkend en verklaard vanuit de 
karakteristieken van de informatie of het informatiesysteem. In deze studie worden 
ruimtelijke planningspraktijken zelf echter als uitgangspunt genomen. 
Hierbij wordt verondersteld dat de manier waarop ruimtelijke planners in 
ruimtelijke planningspraktijken betekenis geven aan veiligheidsrisico’s voor een 
belangrijk deel hun acties beïnvloedt. De manier waarop zij betekenis geven aan 
veiligheidsrisico’s beïnvloedt daarmee ook het gebruik van risico-informatie in de 
ruimtelijke planning. Om deze reden is verkend op welke manier veiligheidrisico’s in 
acht worden genomen in ruimtelijke planningspraktijken en op welke manier geo-
informatie en Geo-ICT een bijdrage kan leveren aan de inachtneming van 
veiligheidsrisico’s in deze praktijken. 
Het onderzoek is uitgevoerd vanuit de epistemologische veronderstelling dat de 
werkelijkheid niet objectief kan worden ontdekt, maar dat zij het cultuurgebonden 
product is van menselijk denken. Deze benadering staat bekend als constructivisme. 
Dit houdt in dat kennis over de werkelijkheid moet worden gezien als het resultaat van 
een interactie tussen de werkelijkheid en de actoren die deze werkelijkheid waarne-
men. De inachtneming van veiligheidsrisico’s is geanalyseerd vanuit dit perspectief. 
Het onderzoek richtte zich op de vraag hoe ruimtelijke planners betekenis toekennen 
aan risico’s in ruimtelijke planningpraktijken. Hiermee kon de manier waarop met 
deze risico’s wordt omgegaan worden begrepen. Bovendien is verondersteld dat de 
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gegeven betekenis ook het gebruik van geo-informatie beïnvloedt. Wanneer ruimte-
lijke planners zich bijvoorbeeld niet verantwoordelijk achten voor het reduceren van 
bepaalde risico’s is het onwaarschijnlijk dat risicoreducerende maatregelen worden 
genomen als gevolg van de informatie gepresenteerd op risicokaarten, zelfs wanneer 
de risico’s aanzienlijk zijn in termen van waarschijnlijkheid of potentiële gevolgen. In 
lijn met de interpretatieve beleidsanalyse vormden menselijke betekenissen en sociale 
werkelijkheid dan ook de kern van de analyse.  
De manier waarop ruimtelijke planners in de ruimtelijke planning betekenis geven 
aan veiligheidsrisico’s is vooral bestudeerd door middel van casestudies. Deze studies 
verschaften een diepgaand en contextafhankelijk begrip van de redeneringen van 
ruimtelijke planners. De casestudies hebben zich gericht op de inachtneming van twee 
verschillende veiligheidsrisico’s in Nederland 1) externe veiligheidsrisico’s als gevolg 
van productie, gebruik, opslag en vervoer van gevaarlijke stoffen en 2) overstromings-
risico’s vanuit de zee en grote rivieren. Deze twee risico’s representeren namelijk 
prominente technologische en natuurlijke dreigingen in Nederland. 
De bijdrage van geo-informatie en Geo-ICT aan risicomanagement en ruimtelijke 
planning is eveneens door middel van casestudies onderzocht. Deze studies richtten 
zich op zowel de informatiebehoeften en op het gebruik van Geo-ICT in ruimtelijke 
planning. Het onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van Geo-ICT is gebaseerd op huidige 
praktijken. De ontwikkeling van risicokaarten in Nederland is hierin vergeleken met 
de ontwikkeling van risicokaarten in het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Achterliggend doel 
hierbij was om het Nederlandse kader en de Nederlandse context voor risi-
comanagement beter te begrijpen. Het onderzoek naar informatiebehoeften was geba-
seerd op de te verwachten veranderingen in het beleid voor de beheersing van over-
stromingsrisico’s. In dit beleid neemt de aandacht voor ruimtelijke planning en de 
capaciteit van een gebied om met overstromingsrisico’s om te gaan toe . Deze studie 
heeft zich vooral gericht op cases in Nederland.  
Daarnaast zijn ook de behoeften aan informatie en Geo-ICT in de rampenbestrij-
ding onderzocht, omdat uit de cases over ruimtelijke planning naar voren kwam dat 
ruimtelijke planners in toenemende mate geïnteresseerd zijn in aspecten van rampen-
bestrijding. Hieruit kwam naar voren dat informatiebehoeften van ruimtelijke planners 
overlapten met informatiebehoeften van actoren betrokken bij de rampenbestrijding. 
Bovendien bleken ideeën over rampenbestrijding en de daaraan gerelateerde 
organisatie van Geo-ICT om de rampenbestrijding te ondersteunen relevant voor de 
ruimtelijke planning.  
Het materiaal dat benodigd was voor de casestudies is verzameld door literatuur-
studies en interviews. De literatuurstudies richtten zich op beleidsdocumenten van de 
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geselecteerde praktijken van ruimtelijke planning, risicomanagement en rampenbe-
strijding. De interviews met vertegenwoordigers van de autoriteiten die betrokken 
waren bij de geselecteerde cases gaven aanvullende inzichten in de informatiebehoef-
ten en in de argumenten met betrekking tot het wel of niet gebruikten van ruimtelijke 
planning voor het verminderen van veiligheidsrisico’s. 
 
De inachtneming van veiligheidsrisico’s in ruimtelijke planning 
Het onderzoek naar de beheersing van industriële risico’s liet zien dat industriële drei-
gingen in de ruimtelijke planning in acht werden genomen en dat de veiligheidsadvie-
zen van de regionale brandweer een belangrijke rol speelden bij de inachtneming van 
deze industriële dreigingen. De veiligheidsadviezen stimuleerden dialoog tussen vei-
ligheidsexperts van de regionale brandweer en de gemeente, waardoor de samenwer-
king tussen deze twee overheidsorganen werd versterkt en het bewustzijn van ruimte-
lijke planners voor risicoreducerende maatregelen werd vergroot. Het communicatieve 
karakter van de veiligheidsadvisering bleek een sterk punt te zijn, omdat dit corres-
pondeerde met het communicatieve karakter van ruimtelijke planningsprocessen. 
Daarnaast boden ook nationale veiligheidseisen, zoals wettelijke normen voor het 
plaatsgebonden risico en de oriënterende waarden en procedures voor het groepsri-
sico’s een dwingende stok achter de deur voor het geval dergelijke communicatieve 
processen niet resulteerden in de inachtneming van industriële risico’s of de uitvoering 
van risicoreducerende maatregelen. 
Desondanks resulteerden de veiligheidsadviezen vooral in kleine aanpassingen in 
ruimtelijke plannen in plaats van in meer substantiële veranderingen. Bovendien 
leidde de uitvoering van veiligheidsmaatregelen zelden tot het wegnemen van de indu-
striële risico’s. De genomen maatregelen waren vooral gericht op het vergroten van de 
capaciteiten om binnen een gebied met een ramp om te gaan. Daarbij konden ook veel 
risicoreducerende maatregelen, zoals risicocommunicatie of de aanwezigheid van 
vluchtroutes, niet direct via het bestemmingsplan geborgd worden. Bestemmingsplan-
nen werden namelijk vooral gezien als regulerende instrumenten om specifieke vor-
men van landgebruik toe te laten en niet als instrumenten om aanvullende veilig-
heidsmaatregelen mee uit te voeren. Het ruimtelijke planningsproces biedt echter wel 
de mogelijkheid om risicoreducerende maatregelen ter discussie te stellen en biedt 
mogelijkheden om afspraken te maken over de uitvoering van deze maatregelen zowel 
binnen het bestemmingsplan als daarbuiten. Om deze reden dient de bijdrage van 
ruimtelijke planning aan de beheersing van veiligheidsrisico’s dan ook niet te worden 
beperkt tot het bestemmingsplan voor de regulering van landgebruik in gevaarlijke 
gebieden. De kracht van het planningsproces dient eveneens te worden onderkend. 
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Bijzondere aandacht voor de daadwerkelijke uitvoering van maatregelen die niet 
kunnen worden verankerd in het bestemmingsplan is hierbij echter gewenst, omdat 
hierbij coördinatie tussen verschillende instrumenten vereist is. 
De gevestigde praktijken met betrekking tot de inachtneming van overstromingsri-
sico’s in de ruimtelijke planning zijn vooral gericht op het reduceren van de kans op 
overstroming in plaats van op het reduceren van de potentiële gevolgen. Landgebruik-
strategieën om de potentiële schade te beperken werden slechts beperkt meegenomen. 
Binnen de dijkringgebieden werden sommige vormen van landgebruik, zoals woning-
bouw, gereguleerd om bestaande dijken te beschermen of om ruimte te reserveren 
voor toekomstige dijkversterkingen of rivierverbredingen. Voor de uiterwaarden, die 
niet zijn beschermd door dijken, werd het landgebruik eveneens gereguleerd door 
bestemmingsplannen.  
De meeste argumenten van respondenten voor het niet gebruiken van ruimtelijke 
planning om de gevolgen van een overstroming te beheersen hadden betrekking op het 
beleid van andere overheden. De kans op overstromingen werd acceptabel gevonden, 
omdat het land al wordt beschermd door dijken, waarvan de sterkte aan wettelijke 
eisen moet voldoen. Om deze reden werden aanvullende maatregelen niet noodza-
kelijk geacht. Bovendien achtten lokale ruimtelijke planners zichzelf niet verantwoor-
delijk voor het meenemen van aanvullende maatregelen. Zij stelden dat waterbeheer-
ders, zoals het waterschap, dienen aan te geven hoe bij bouwprojecten met overstro-
mingsrisico´s moet worden omgegaan. Het waterschap stelde dergelijke maatregelen 
echter niet ter discussie. Zij richtte zich vooral op het dijkonderhoud en op het 
versterken van de zwakke schakels in de dijken.  
In sommige bestudeerde cases werden echter wel aanvullende maatregelen over-
wogen om de mogelijke gevolgen van een overstroming te reduceren. Voorgestelde 
bouwlocaties werden bijvoorbeeld opgehoogd of het aantal te bouwen huizen werd 
verkleind. Veel van de geïnterviewden refereerden hierbij naar eerdere ervaringen met 
(dreigende) overstromingen als argument voor het overwegen van deze aanvullende 
maatregelen. Dergelijke eerdere ervaringen waren echter niet de enige factor waarmee 
de inzet van ruimtelijke planning voor de beheersing van overstromingsschade kon 
worden verklaard. In het algemeen kan de inzet van ruimtelijke planning voor de re-
ductie van zowel industriële risico’s als overstromingsrisico’s worden gezien als het 
resultaat van het commitment van de betrokken actoren voor de inachtneming en 
beheersing van veiligheidsrisico’s. Dit commitment werd, naast eerdere ervaringen 
met rampen, beïnvloed door strategieën van overheden, zoals de beschikbaarheid van 
richtlijnen. Strikte richtlijnen voor de overweging van veiligheidsrisico’s in 
ruimtelijke planning waren bijvoorbeeld een belangrijke reden voor de inachtneming 
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van deze risico’s in de ruimtelijke planning, terwijl het ontbreken van deze regels kon 
resulteren in een beperkte aandacht voor veiligheidsrisico’s. De gevoelde 
verantwoordelijkheid van ruimtelijke planners was echter niet altijd in 
overeenstemming met de formele verantwoordelijkheid. In sommige gebieden werden 
bijvoorbeeld aanvullende maatregelen genomen, terwijl dit niet formeel noodzakelijk 
was. Verder speelden ook andere belangen, zoals economische groei, een belangrijke 
rol. Sommige planners namen geen aanvullende risicoreducerende maatregelen of lie-
ten stedelijke ontwikkelingen toe in gevaarlijke gebieden vanwege de economische 
baten. Daarnaast speelden ook de capaciteiten van lokale overheden een belangrijke 
rol. Deze capaciteiten hebben niet alleen betrekking op de noodzakelijke expertise van 
de medewerkers, maar ook op de beschikbaarheid van bijvoorbeeld risico-informatie 
of over minder gevaarlijke gronden.  
Een andere belangrijke factor die uit de plannings- en risicomanagementliteratuur 
naar voren is gekomen is het publieke draagvlak voor risicoreducerende maatregelen. 
Hoewel dit punt in het onderzoek naar de omgang met overstromingsrisico’s nauwe-
lijks als reden is genoemd voor het wel of niet gebruiken van ruimtelijke planning 
voor risicobeheersing heeft het onderzoek naar ‘ruimte voor water’ projecten laten 
zien dat publiek draagvlak cruciaal is voor een succesvolle uitvoering van maatrege-
len. Op basis van deze ervaringen is dan ook gesteld dan ruimtelijke planning niet al-
leen moet worden gezien als een instrument waarmee veiligheidsrisico’s ter discussie 
kunnen worden gesteld. Ruimtelijke planning kan ook dienen als een waardevolle in-
houdelijk perspectief voor de ontwikkeling van risicoreducerende maatregelen. 
Conflicten die zich voordeden tijdens de uitvoering van maatregelen gingen immers 
niet alleen over de voorgestelde maatregelen voor risicobeheersing, maar ook over 
andere belangen en ambities, zoals ambities voor landbouw of woningbouw. Omdat 
ruimtelijke planning zich inhoudelijk richt op het landschap in zijn geheel en op de 
samenhang tussen verschillende vormen van landgebruik kan het een interessante 
benadering zijn voor de uitvoering van veiligheidsmaatregelen en voor het integreren 
en afwegen van ruimteclaims voor veiligheidsmaatregelen met andere conflicterende 
ruimteclaims op een gebied.  
Het is echter van belang om te erkennen dat de manier waarop in de Nederlandse 
ruimtelijke planning met externe veiligheidsrisico’s en overstromingsrisico’s wordt 
omgegaan aan het veranderen is. Er wordt meer aandacht besteed aan de mogelijkhe-
den voor rampenbestrijding, zoals de aanwezigheid van evacuatieroutes. Deze aan-
dacht is het meest expliciet herkenbaar in het externe veiligheidsbeleid, maar was ook 
aanwezig in het beleid voor de beheersing van overstromingen en dan in het bijzonder 
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op nationaal en regionaal niveau. Om deze reden is een verdere integratie van ruimte-
lijke planning en rampenbestrijding het overwegen waard. 
 
De bijdrage van geo-informatie en Geo-ICT 
In Nederland zijn risicokaarten ontwikkeld om professionals die betrokken zijn bij 
risicomanagement te informeren over externe veiligheidsrisico’s. De autoriteiten die 
verantwoordelijk zijn voor het verlenen van de milieuvergunningen voor gevaarlijke 
installaties zijn verplicht om alle relevante informatie over de gevaarlijke stoffen door 
te geven aan een centrale database: het Register Risicosituaties Gevaarlijke Stoffen 
(RRGS). Aanvullende informatie wordt opgeslagen in het Informatie Systeem voor 
Overige Ramptypen (ISOR), zoals informatie over kwetsbare objecten of informatie 
over andere dreigingen zoals overstromingsdreiging. Deze database is het resultaat 
van de samenwerking tussen de twaalf Nederlandse provincies. Op basis van de 
informatie uit zowel het RRGS en het ISOR zijn via een GIS platform de provinciale 
risicokaarten tot stand gekomen.  
Een vergelijking van de ontwikkeling van risicokaarten in Nederland en het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk heeft laten zien dan in beide landen dergelijke geografische 
databases, met een enorme hoeveelheid gegevens over industriële risico’s, recent tot 
stand zijn gekomen. Een noemenswaardig verschil tussen de twee landen is de 
publieke toegang tot deze risicokaarten. In Nederland is een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid 
risico-informatie publiek toegankelijk via internet. In het Verenigd Koninkrijk is de 
risico-informatie eveneens publiek toegankelijk, maar alleen via speciaal verzoek. De 
vergelijking bevestigt hiermee dat verschillende ontwikkelingen en toepassingen van 
risicokaarten ingebed zijn in de politieke, culturele en historische contexten waarin zij 
zijn ontstaan en dat deze ontwikkelingen ook in deze context dienen te worden begre-
pen. 
Geo-informatie over veiligheidsrisico’s, zoals risicokaarten, kan ruimtelijke plan-
ning ondersteunen. Deze informatie is echter alleen van toegevoegde waarde wanneer 
de betrokkenen bij ruimtelijke planning veiligheidsrisico’s in acht nemen. Als gevolg 
van de toegenomen aandacht voor veiligheid in ruimtelijke planning neemt de 
behoefte aan risico-informatie toe. De benodigde informatie kan worden 
onderverdeeld in informatie over de dreiging, blootstelling en over de capaciteiten van 
een gebied om een ramp te weerstaan, te bestrijden of om zich aan te passen aan deze 
dreiging of te herstellen van een mogelijke ramp.  
Uit een vergelijking tussen de informatiebehoeften van ruimtelijke planners en 
rampenbestrijders bij de brandweer kwam naar voren dat informatiebehoeften van 
deze groepen aanzienlijk overlappen, vooral met bestrekking tot de statische en gesi-
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muleerde risico-informatie. Real-time informatie was vooral vereist voor de bestrij-
ding van overstromingen. De verkregen informatie tijdens een overstroming kan ech-
ter ook gebruikt worden om gesimuleerde informatie voor andere activiteiten te 
verbeteren, zoals overstromingsscenario’s voor ruimtelijke planning. De verdere 
ontwikkeling van Geo-ICT dient zich dan ook niet alleen te richten op de verdere 
ontwikkeling en toepassing van specifieke systemen voor de ondersteuning van een 
beperkt aantal activiteiten met betrekking tot risicomanagement, maar ook op de infra-
structuur en netwerken waarmee de informatie van de verschillende systemen kan 
worden uitgewisseld. Het is daarom belangrijk om verder te kijken dan specifieke toe-
passingen voor één type activiteit of een specifieke groep gebruikers, omdat informa-
tie voor één gebruiker of activiteit van risicobeheersing ook nuttig kan zijn voor 
andere gebruikers en activiteiten.  
Hoewel er een overlap is in informatiebehoeften, bestaan er tussen gebruikers ook 
nog steeds verschillen in informatiebehoeften en systeemeisen. De 
systeemarchitectuur dient daarom ook ruimte te bieden voor differentiatie van infor-
matie en systemen. De breed toegepaste service gerichte architectuur biedt hiervoor 
een interessant concept. Binnen dit concept wordt voor elke gebruiker een specifieke 
bundel van diensten samengesteld, waarmee de gebruiker van de benodigde informatie 
wordt voorzien. De benodigde gegevenssets en bewerkingen kunnen worden verkre-
gen uit verschillende, ook gebruikerspecifieke, systemen. Door middel van een selec-
tie van services wordt de gebruiker niet gekoppeld aan alle beschikbare gegevenssets 
voor risicomanagement, maar alleen aan een relevante selectie. Daarnaast kunnen deze 
services worden weergegeven in verschillende toepassingen om daarmee te voldoen 
aan specifieke systeemeisen voor gebruik en interface en om de uitwisseling van 
diensten tussen de verschillende toepassingen mogelijk te maken. 
Naast de service gerichte architectuurbenadering dient de organisatie van geo-in-
formatie en Geo-ICT binnen deze netwerken gebaseerd te worden op de principes van 
Netcentrische Risicobeheersing en Rampenbestrijding (NCRR). Dit concept biedt een 
model waarmee risicobeheersings- en rampenbestrijdingsprocessen beschreven en 
begrepen kunnen worden. Daarnaast biedt dit concept een visie voor de toekomstige 
rol en ontwikkeling van Geo-ICT voor de ondersteuning van deze processen. NCRR 
houdt in dat de actoren die betrokken zijn bij risicobeheersing en rampenbestrijding de 
mogelijkheid hebben om informatie op een netcentrische manier te verzamelen, te 
produceren en te delen. Informatie wordt direct verspreid naar die individuen en 
gebruikers voor wie deze relevant is, in plaats van een hiërarchische, stapsgewijze 
verspreiding van informatie. Deze netcentrische verspreiding van informatie moet 
resulteren in een gemeenschappelijk beeld van zowel de beschikbare informatie over 
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)   219 
 
de huidige situatie als van de acties die worden gepland en ondernomen. De directe 
beschikbaarheid van dit gemeenschappelijke operationele beeld dient als basis voor 
een gedeeld bewustzijn van de huidige situatie en veiligheidsrisico’s en kan vervol-
gens aan de basis staan van verdere samenwerking en synchronisatie van acties. Hier-
door kan de werkelijke of potentiële impact van een risico of ramp worden verkleind. 
In dit perspectief ligt de hoofdbijdrage van Geo-ICT in het mogelijk maken van net-
centrische risicobeheersing en rampenbestrijding. 
  
Aanbevelingen en suggesties voor verder onderzoek 
Uit dit onderzoek zijn verschillende factoren naar voren gekomen waarmee het com-
mitment van ruimtelijke planners voor het gebruik van ruimtelijke planning voor de 
beheersing van veiligheidsrisico’s kan worden begrepen. Uit deze factoren kunnen 
ook suggesties ter bevordering van het commitment van Nederlandse ruimtelijke plan-
ners worden afgeleid. Richtlijnen van hogere overheden in combinatie met meer op 
samenwerking gerichte strategieën, zoals veiligheidsadviezen, bleken cruciaal te zijn 
voor het gebruik van ruimtelijke planning voor de reductie van veiligheidsrisico’s. 
Daarom wordt gesteld dat de inachtneming van overstromingsrisico’s in de ruimtelijke 
planning kan worden bevorderd door het stellen van richtlijnen door hogere overhe-
den. In deze richtlijnen moet worden aangegeven in welke gebieden expliciet aandacht 
moet worden besteed aan overstromingrisico’s. In aanvulling daarop moet de 
samenwerking tussen ruimtelijke planners en overstromingrisico-experts worden 
aangemoedigd door een uitbreiding van de watertoets. De watertoets is al een 
succesvol instrument om ruimtelijke planners en waterbeheerders samen te brengen. 
Overstromingsrisico’s door het falen van primaire keringen worden echter nog 
nauwelijks meegenomen in de watertoets. Het meenemen van deze risico’s in de 
watertoets is het overwegen waard wanneer overstromingsrisico’s meer expliciet 
meegenomen dienen te worden in de ruimtelijke planning. Zoals ook is geïllustreerd 
door de studie naar externe veiligheid dienen de adviezen in de watertoets zich niet 
noodzakelijk te beperken tot maatregelen die direct in het bestemmingsplan kunnen 
worden opgenomen. Ook andere maatregelen, zoals risicocommunicatie en de 
ontwikkeling van evacuatieroutes kunnen met de watertoets ter discussie worden 
gesteld in het planproces. Het monitoren van de doorwerking en uitvoering van 
maatregelen blijft echter gewenst, omdat in Nederland het gebruik van ruimtelijke 
planning voor het vergoten van de mogelijkheden voor rampenbestrijding in het 
algemeen en voor het reduceren van de gevolgen van overstromingen in het bijzonder 
nog de kinderschoenen staat. Daarnaast is monitoren van belang omdat het ruimtelijke 
plannings- en risicobeheersingsbeleid verandert.  
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Geo-informatie en Geo-ICT hebben de potentie om de inachtneming van veilig-
heidsrisico’s te ondersteunen, vooral nu dergelijke risico’s in toenemende mate wor-
den meegenomen in de ruimtelijke planning. Ondanks aanzienlijke inspanningen voor 
de ontwikkeling van Ruimtelijke Informatie Infrastructuren op nationaal niveau en de 
ontwikkeling van risicokaarten voor industriële risico’s en overstromingsrisico’s, is 
bijzondere aandacht voor de doorwerking van dergelijke nationale initiatieven op 
lokaal en regionaal niveau gewenst. Lokale voorbeelden waarin expliciet gebruik 
wordt gemaakt van overstromingsrisico-informatie zijn immers schaars. Bovendien 
verdient het concept van netcentrische risicobeheersing en rampenbestrijding verdere 
aandacht. Dit kan bijvoorbeeld worden uitgewerkt door middel van aanvullende 
studies waarin inzicht wordt verkregen in de informatiebehoeften binnen NCRR of 
door middel van aanvullende trainingen of proefprojecten waarin de principes van 
NCRR kunnen worden uitgewerkt, geëvalueerd en onderwezen, omdat het concept 
zich nog in een beginstadium bevindt.  
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